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No. 162

MODEL STANDARDS

ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct
The Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, including the Preambleand the
Comments, were adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association in August 1983, and appear here as amended through February
1994. The Model Code Comparisons, which are included here to assist the
reader in comparing the Model Rules with the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, were never considered by the House of Delegatesand are not
official ABA policy. The Model Rules are copyrighted by the American Bar
Association.
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities
Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law.

[1] A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.
[21 As a representative of clients, a
lawyer performs various functions. As
advisor, a lawyer provides a client with
an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the
client's position under the rules of the
adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the
client but consistent with requirements
of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks
to reconcile their divergent interests as
an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a
spokesperson for each client. A lawyer
acts as evaluator by examining a client's
legal affairs and reporting about them to
the client or to others.
[3] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in
confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the

[4] A lawyer's conduct should conform
to the requirements of the law, both in
professional service to clients and in the
lawyer's business and personal affairs. A
lawyer should use the law's procedures
only for legitimate purposes and not to
harass or intimidate others. A lawyer
should demonstrate respect for the legal
system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public
officials. While it is a lawyer's duty,
when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's
duty to uphold legal process.
[5] As a public citizen, a lawyer should
seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of
service rendered by the legal profession.
As a member of a learned profession, a
lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the
law beyond its use for clients, employ
that knowledge in reform of the law and
work to strengthen legal education. A
lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies
in the administration of justice and of
the fact that the poor, and sometimes
persons who are not poor, cannot afford
adequate legal assistance, and should
therefore devote professional time and
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civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer government, the legal profession is
should aid the legal profession in pursu- unique in this respect because of the
ing these objectives and should help the close relationship between the profession
bar regulate itself in the public interest. and the processes of government and law
[6) Many of a lawyer's professional re- enforcement. This connection is manisponsibilities are prescribed in the Rules fested in the fact that ultimate authority
of Professional Conduct, as well as sub- over the legal profession is vested largely
stantive and procedural law. However, a in the courts.
[10] To the extent that lawyers meet
lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of profes- the obligations of their professional callsional peers. A lawyer should strive to ing, the occasion for government regulaattain the highest level of skill, to im- tion is obviated. Self-regulation also
prove the law and the legal profession helps maintain the legal profession's inand to exemplify the legal profession's dependence from government dominaideals of public service.
tion. An independent legal profession is
[7] A lawyer's responsibilities as a rep- an important force in preserving governresentative of clients, an officer of the ment under law, for abuse of legal aulegal system and a public citizen are usu- thority is more readily challenged by a
ally harmonious. Thus, when an oppos- profession whose members are not deing party is well represented, a lawyer pendent on government for the right to
can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a practice.
client and at the same time assume that
[11] The legal profession's relative aujustice is being done. So also, a lawyer tonomy carries with it special responsican be sure that preserving client confi- bilities of self-government. The profesdences ordinarily serves the public inter- sion has a responsibility to assure that
est because people are more likely to seek its regulations are conceived in the publegal advice, and thereby heed their legal lic interest and not in furtherance of paobligations, when they know their com- rochial or self-interested concerns of the
munications will be private.
bar. Every lawyer is responsible for ob[8] In the nature of law practice, how- servance of the Rules of Professional
ever, conflicting responsibilities are en- Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in secountered. Virtually all difficult ethical curing their observance by other lawproblems arise from conflict between a yers. Neglect of these responsibilities
lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the compromises the independence of the
legal system and to the lawyer's own in- profession and the public interest which
terest in remaining an upright person it serves.
while earning a satisfactory living. The
[12] Lawyers play a vital role in the
Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe preservation of society. The fulfillment of
terms for resolving such conflicts. With- this role requires an understanding by
in the framework of these Rules many
lawyers of their relationship to our legal
difficult issues of professional discretion system. The Rules of Professional Concan arise. Such issues must be resolved
luct, when properly applied, serve to dethrough the exercise of sensitive profesine that relationship.
sional and moral judgment guided by the 3cope
basic principles underlying the Rules.
[13] The Rules of Professional Conduct
[9] The legal profession is largely selfire rules of reason. They should be intergoverning. Although -other professions I reted with reference to the purposes of
also have been granted powers of self- Iegal representation and of the law
itself.
T-n-%
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Some of the Rules are imperatives. cast
in the terms "shall" or "shall not." These
define proper conduct for purposes of
professional discipline. Others, generally
cast in the term "may," are permissive
and define areas under the Rules in
which the lawyer has professional discretion. No disciplinary action should be
taken when the lawyer chooses not to act
or acts within the bounds of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships between the lawyer and
others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define
a lawyer's professional role. Many of the
Comments use the term "should." Comments do not add obligations to the
Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules.
(14) The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role.
That context includes court rules and
statutes relating to matters of licensure,
laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law
in general. Compliance with the Rules. as
with all law in an open society, depends
primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion
and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however, exhaust
the moral and ethical considerations
that should inform a lawyer, for no
worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules
simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.
[15] Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive
law external to these Rules determine
whether a dient-lawye relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the
client-lawyer relationship attach only
after the client has requested the lawyer
2-21-96
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to render.legal services and the lawyer

has agreed to do so. But there are some
duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that may attach when the
lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose can
depend on the circumstances and may be
a question of fact.
[161 Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and
common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority
concerning legal matters that ordinarily
reposes in the client in private clientlawyer relationships. For example, a
lawyer for a government agency may
have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or
whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects
is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts,
and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under
the supervision of these officers may be
authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where
a private lawyer could not represent
multiple private clients. They also may
have authority to represent the "public
interest" in circumstances where a private lawyer would not be authorized to
do so. These Rules do not abrogate any
such authority.
[17] Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibitionimposed by a Rule is
a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct
will be made on the basis of the facts and
circumstances as they existed at the time
of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has
to act upon uncertain or incomplete evi-
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dence of the situation. Moreover, the
Rules presuppose that whether or not
discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as
the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether
there have been previous violations.
[18] Violation of a Rule should not give
rise to a cause of action nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty
has been breached. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers
and to provide a structure for regulating
'conduct through disciplinary agencies.
They are not designed to be a basis for
civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose
of the Rules can be subverted when they
are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a
just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment,
or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority,
does not imply that an antagonist in a
collateral proceeding or transaction has
standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.
Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should
be deemed to augment any substantive
legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such
duty.
[19] Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of either the attorney-client or
work product privilege. Those privileges
were developed to promote compliance
with law and fairness in litigation. In
reliance on the attorney-client privilege,
clients are entitled to expect that communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected against compelled
disclosure. The attorney-client privilege
is that of the *client and not of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situa-tions the lawyer under the Rules has a
limited discretion to disclose a client
confidence does not vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter, the client
2-.1-96
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has a reasonable expectation that information relating to the client will not be
voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure
of such information may be judicially
compelled only in accordance with recognized exceptions to the attorney-client
and work product privileges.
[20] The lawyer's exercise of discretion
not to disclose information under Rule
1.6 should not be subject to reexamination. Permitting such reexamination
would be incompatible with the general
policy of promoting compliance with law
through assurances that communications will be protected against disclosure.
[21] The Comment accompanying each
Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide general orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but
the text of each Rule is authoritative- Research notes were prepared to compare
counterparts in the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (adopted
1969, as amended) and to provide selected
references to other authorities. The notes
have not been adopted, do not constitute
part of the Model Rules, and are not intended to affect the application or interpretation of the Rules and Comments.
Terminology
"Belief" or "Believes" denotes that the
person involved actually supposed the
fact in question to be true. A person's
belief may be inferred from circumI
stances.
"Consult" or "Consultation" denotes
communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in
question.
"Firm" or "Law firm" denotes a lawyerer lawyers in a private firm, lawyers
employed in the legal department of a
corporation or other organization and
lawyers employed in a legal services organization. See Comment, Rule 1.10.
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"Fraud" or "'Fraudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and not
merely negligent misrepresentation or
failure to apprise another of relevant information.
"Knowingly." "Known," or "Knows"
denotes actual knowledge of the fact in
question. A person's knowledge may be
inferred from circumstances.
"Partner" denotes a member of a partnership and a shareholder in a law firm
organized as a professional corporation.
"Reasonable" or "Reasonably" when
used in relation to conduct by a lawyer
denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.

01:105

"Reasonable belief" or "Reasonabi V
believes" when used in reference to
lawyer denotes that the lawyer believe
the matter in question and that the cir S
cumstances are such that the belief is
reasonable.
"Reasonably should know" when used
in reference to a lawyer denotes that a
lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in
question.
"Substantial" when used in reference
to degree or extent denotes a material
matter of clear and weighty importance.

Model Rules Of Professional Conduct
CLIENT-LAW" ER RELATIONSHIP
RULE 1.1 Compe
ce
A lawyer shall pr vide competent
representation to a cli L Competent
representation requir
the legal
knowledge, skill. thorou ness and
preparation reasonably nee sary for
the representation.

COMMENT
Legal Knowledge and Skill
whthera lwyere
In dterinin

which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly
admitted lawyer can be as competent as
a practitioner with long experience.
Some important legal skills, such as the
analysis of precedent, the evaluation of
evidence and legal drafting, are required
in all legal problems. Perhaps the most
fundamental legal skill consists of deter-

mining what kind of legal problems a
situation may involve, a skill that necestranscends any particular special-sarily

the preparation and study the lawyer is
able to give the matter and whether it is
feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.
In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner.
Expertise in a particular field of law may
be required in some circumstances,
A lawyer need not necessarily have

adprovide
A lawyer
zed knowledge.
equate
representation
in can
a wholly
novel
thrrd
ea
Id through necessary study. Competent
re esentation can also be provided
thro h the association of a lawyer of
sa!,
establi
ed competence in the field in
questionIn an em
ency a lawyer may give advice or assi
nee in a matter in which
the lawyer d
not have the skill ordinarily required
ere referral to or consultation or asso iation with another
lawyer would be imp ctical. Even in an
emergency, however,
sistance should
be limited to that reaso ably necessary
in the circumstances, for *11considered

special training or prior experience to

action under emergency co ditions can

handle legal problems of a type with

jeopardize the client's interes

skill in
knowledge
ploys the requisite
• _.__-_,,_
_ ___ and
t .....
a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialthe lawyers
ized nature of the matter.,
general
experience,
the
lawyer's
training
and experininthe field in question,

2-21-J6
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Paragraph (a) rmits a lawyer to
disclose informatio where impliedly
authorized to do so order to carry out
the representation. nder DR 4-101(B)
and (C), a lawyer w not permitted to
reveal "confidences' unless the client
first consented after

isclosure.
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(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation %%ill not
be adversely affected, and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter
is undertaken, the consultation
shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advantages and
risks involved.
COMMENT

Paragraph (b) r efines the exceptions to the requirem nt of confidentiality. Regarding par aph (bgl), DR 4101(CX3) provided th t a lawyer "may
reveal ...(tihe intent n of his client to
commit a crime an( the information
necessary to prevent the crime." This Loyalty to a Client
option existed regardl ss of the seriousLoyalty is an essential element in the
lawyer's relationship to a client. An
ness of the proposed c ime.
raph (bX2), DR 4- impermissible conflict of interest may
With regard to pa
101(CX4) provided th t a lawyer may exist before representation is undertakreveal "(cjonfidences or secrets neces- en, in which event the representation
sary to establish or a llect his fee or to should be declined. The lawyer should
defend himself or his mployers or asso- adopt reasonable procedures, appropriciates against an acu tion of wrongful ate for the size and type of firm and
conduct." Paragraph ( X2) enlarges the practice, to determine in both litigation
exception to include d lscosure of infor- and non-litigation matters the parties
mation relating to clai
by the lawyer and issues involved and to determine
other than for the I twyer's fee; for whether there are actual or potential
example, recovery of property from the conflicts of interest.
If such a conflict arises after represendient.
tation has been undertaken, the lawyer
RULE 1.7 Conflict of Interest:-Gener- should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than
al Rule
one client is involved and the lawyer
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a
withdraws because a conflict arises after
client if the representation of that representation, whether the lawyer may
client will be directly adverse to
continue to represent any of the clients
another client, unless:
is determined by Rule 1.9. See also Rule
(I) the lawyer reasonably be- 2.2(c). As to whether a client-lawyer
lieves the representation will not relationship exists or, having once been
established, is continuing, see Comment
adversely affect the relationship
to Rule 1.3 and Scope.
with the other client; and
As a general propositiojn. loyalty to a
(2) each client consents after conclient prohibits undertaking representasultation.
tion directly adverse to that client with(b) A lawyer shall not represent a out that client's consent. Paragraph (a)
client if the representation of that expresses that general rule. Thus. a
client may be materially limited by
lawyer ordinarily may. not act as advothe lawyer's responsibilities to an- cate against a person the lawyer repreother client or to a third person, or sents in some other matter, even if it is
by the lawyer's own interests, unless: wholly unrelated. On the other hand.
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simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are
only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require consent of the respective clients.
Paragraph (a) applies only when the
representation of one client would be
directly adverse to the other.
Loyalty to a client is also impaired
when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course
of action for the client because of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses
alternatives that would otherwise be
available to the client. Paragraph (b)
addresses such situations. A possible
conflict does not itself preclude the
representation. The critical questions
are the likelihood that a conflict will
eventuate and, if it does, whether it will
materially interfere with the lawyer's
independent professional judgment in
considering alternatives or foreclose
courses of action that reasonably should
be pursued on behalf of the client.
Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the
other interest involved.
Consultation and Consent
A client may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (aXI)
with respect to representation directly
adverse to a client, and paragraph (bX1)
with respect to material limitations on
representation of a client, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the
client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for
such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent.

When more than one client is involved.
the question of conflict must be resolved
as to each client. Moreover, there may
be circumstances where it is impossible
to make the disclosure necessary to
obtain consent. For example, when the
lawyer represents different clients in
related matters and one of the clients
refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to
make an informed decision, the lawyer
cannot properly ask the latter to consent.
Lawyer's Interests
The lawyer's own interests should not
be permitted to have adverse effect on
representation of a client. For example,
a lawyer's need for income should not
lead the lawyer to undertake matters
that cannot be handled competently and
at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and
1.5. If the probity of a lawyer's own
conduct in a transaction is in serious
question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client
detached advice. A lawyer may not
allow related business interests to affect
representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which
the lawyer has an undisclosed interest.
Conflicts in Litigation
Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of opposing parties in litigation.
Simultaneous representation of parties
whose interests in litigation zhay conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants , is governed by paragraph (b). An
impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the
parties* testimony, incompatibility in
positions in relation to an opposing
party or the fact that there are substan-
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tially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in
question. Such conflicts can arise in
criminal cases as well as civil. The
potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a
lawyer should decline to represent more
than one codefendant. On the other
hand, common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if
the risk of adverse effect is minimal and
the requirements of paragraph (b) are
met. Compare Rule 2.2 involving intermediation between clients.
Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as
advocate against a client the lawyer
represents in some other matter, even if
the other matter is wholly unrelated.
However, there are circumstances in
which a lawyer may act as advocate
against a client. For example, a lawyer
representing an enterprise with diverse
operations may accept employment as
an advocate against the enterprise in an
unrelated matter if doing so will not
adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of
the suit and if both clients consent upon
consultation. By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances
may represent government employees
in proceedings in which a government
agency is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can
depend on the nature of the litigation.
For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in
a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation.
A lawyer may represent parties haying antagonistic positions on a legal
question that has arisen in different
cases, unless representation of either
client would be adversely affected- Thus.
it is ordinarily not improper to assert

such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper

tbtished
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to do so in cases pending at the same
time in an appellate court.
Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service
A lawyer may be paid from a source
other than the client, if the client is
informed of that fact and consents and
the arrangement does not compromise
the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client.
See Rule 1.8(0. For example, when an
insurer and its insured have conflicting
interests in a matter arising from a
liability insurance agreement, and the
insurer is required to provide special
counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's
professional independence. So also,
when a corporation and its directors or
employees are involved in a controversy
in which they have conflicting interests,
the corporation may provide funds for
separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the clients consent after consultation and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional
independence.
Other Conflict Situations
Conflicts of interest in contexts other
than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for
adverse effect include the duration and
intimacy of the lawyer's relationship
with the client or clients involved, the
functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict
will arise and the likely prejudice to the
client from the conflict if it does arise.
The question is often one of proximity
and degree.
For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation
whose interests are fuhdamentally antagonistic to each other, but common
representation is permissible where the
clients are generally aligned in interest
even though there is some difference of
interest among them.
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Conflict questions may also arise in
estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to
prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and,
depending upon the circumstances, a
conflict of interest may arise. In estate
administration the identity of the client
may be unclear under the law of a
particular jurisdiction. Under one view,
the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust,
including its beneficiaries. The lawyer
should make clear the relationship to
the parties involved.
A lawyer for a corporation or other
organization who is also a member of its
board of directors should determine
whether the responsibilities of the two
roles may conflict. The lawyer may be
called on to advise the corporation in
matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to
the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity
of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's
resignation from the board and the
possibility of the corporation's obtaining
legal advice from another lawyer in
such situations. If there is material risk
that the dual role will compromise the
lawyer's independence of professional
judgment, the lawyer should not serve
as a director.
Conflict Charged by an Opposing
Party

Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of
the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the
question when there is reason to infer
that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry
by the court is generally required when
a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as
clearly to call in question the fair or
efficient administration of justice, op-

posing counsel may properly raise the
question. Such an objection should be
viewed with caution, however, for it can
be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope.
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
DR 5-101(A) provided that "iexcept
with the consent of his client after full
disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept
employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of the client
will be or reasonably may be affected by
his own financial, business, property, or
personal interests." DR 5-105(A) provided that a lawyer "shall decline proffered
employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf
of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by the acceptance of
the proffered employment, or if it would
be likely to involve him in representing
differing interests, except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105(C)." DR 5105(C) provided that "a lawyer may
represent multiple clients if it is obvious
that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to
the representation after full disclosure
of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent
professional judgment on behalf of
each." DR 5-107(B) provided that a lawyer "shall not permit a person who
recommends, employs, or pays him to
render legal services for another to
direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering such services.Rule 1.7 clarifies DR 5-105(A) by re-,
quiring that, when the lawyer's other
interests are involved, not only must the
client consent after consultation but
also that, independent of such consent,
the representation reasonably appears
not to be adversely affected by the
lawyer's other interests. This requirement appears to be the intended meaning of the provision in DR 5-105(C) that
"it is obvious that he can adequately

ABA/BNA .a-yers" Manual on Professional Conduct(
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based in su bsta ,tial part on information relatin g to e representation.
(e) A lamvyer hall not provide financial ass'istan e to a client in connection witth pe lding or contemplated litigationn. ex pt that:
(1) a ia wye may advance court
costs an I ex enses of litigation.

represent" the client, and was implicit
in EC 5-2. which stated that a lawyer
"'should not accept proffered employment if his personal interests or desires
will, or there is a reasonable probability
that they will, affect adversely the advice to be given or services to be rendered the prospective client.**
RULE 1.8 Conflict o lnterest- ProhibTransactions
bited Tmatter.
(a) A lawyer shall ot enter into a
business transaction ith a client or
n ownership.
knowingly acquire
possessory, security c r other pecunito a client
ary interest advers
unless:
(1) the transactioL and terms on
which the lawyer mcquires the interest are fair and reasonable to
the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing to the
client in a manner which can be
under tood by the
reasonably
client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to ;eek the advice
of independent c lunsel in the
transaction; and
nts in writing
(3) the client co
thereto.
(b) A lawyer shall n t use information relating to repri sentation of a
client to the dLsadv ntage of the
client unless the clien consents after
consultation, except I s permitted or
required by Rule 1.6 o Rule 3.3.
(c) A lawyer shall i ot prepare an
instrument giving th, lawyer or a
person related to the wyer as parent, child, sibling, cr spouse any
substantial gift from I client including a testamentary gif , except where
the client is related to he donee.
(d) Prior to the conc usion of representation of a client, B lawyer shall
an agreement
not make or negotia
giving the lawyer lit rary or media
rights to a portray l or account

03-18,87

Pubjisbed b7

mas.

B,

01:121

the repa,yme t of which may be
contingerit o the outcome of the
annd
(2) a la vyer representing an indiay pay court costs
gent cie nt
of litigation on beand expers
half of th .cli nt.
(f) A lawsyer hall not accept cornpensation for epresenting a client
from one ot er than the client
unless:
(1) thei clie t consents after consultation;
e
no interference with
(2) then
the lawyecr's independence of professional ju gment or with the
client-lawye relationship; and
(3) inforim tion relating to representation of client is protected as
required i )y ule 1.6.
(g) A lawye who represents two or
more client a hall not participate in
gregate settlement of
making an
the claims4
or in a ci o or against the clients,
I case an aggregated
t
oren
to guilty or nolo conagreement
sents after * unless each client connsultation. including
disclosure
the existence and naof all
tie
he claims or pleas involved and f the participation of
each person n the settlement.
(I) A la- ,er shall not make an
agreement T -ospectively limiting the
lawyer's lial ility to a client for malpractice unih ss permitted by law and
the client
independently represented in In king the agreement, or
settle a clai for such liability with
an unrepre ented client or former
client witho t first advising that person in writi g that independent rep-
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represent" the cli t. and was implicit
in EC 5-2. which tated that a lawyer
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based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.
'should not acce t proffered employ(e) A lawyer shall not provide fiment if his person I interests or desires nancial assistance to a client in conwill, or there is a r asonable probability nection with pending or contemplatthat they will. aff ct adversely the ad- ed litigation, except that:
vice to be given o services to be ren(1) a lawyer may advance court
dered the prospecti e client."
costs and expenses of litigation,
the repayment of which may be
RULE 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohicontingent
on the outcome of the
bited Transactions
matter;, and
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a
(2) a lawyer representing an indibusiness transaction with a client or
gent client may pay court costs
knowingly acquire an ownership,
and expenses of litigation on bepossessory, security or other pecunihalf of the client.
ary interest adverse to a client
(f) A lawyer shall not accept comunless:
pensation for representing a client
(1) the transaction and terms on from one other than the client
which the lawyer acquires the in- unless:
terest are fair and reasonable to
(1) the client consents after conthe client and are fully disclosed
sultation;
and transmitted in writing to the
(2) there is no interference with
client in a manner which can be
the lawyer's independence of proreasonably understood by the
fessional judgment or with the
client.
client-lawyer relationship; and
(2) the client is given a reason(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as
able opportunity to seek the advice
required by Rule 1.6.
of independent counsel in the
transaction; and
(g) A lawyer who represents two or
(3) the client consents in writing more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of
thereto.
(b) A lawyer shall not use informa- the claims of or against the clients,
tion relating to representation of a or in a criminal case an aggregated
client to the disadvantage of the agreement as to guilty or nolo conclient unless the client consents after tendere pleas, unless each client conconsultation, except as permitted or sents after consultation, including
disclosure of the existence and narequired by Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3.
ture of all the claims or pleas in(c A lawyer shall not prepare an volved and of th6 participation
of
instrument giving the lawyer or a each person in the settlement.
person related to the lawyer as par(h) A lawyer shall not make an
ent. child, sibling, or spouse any agreement prospectively
limiting the
substantial gift from a client, includ- lawyer's liability to
a
client
for maling a testamentary gift, except where practice unless permitted
by law and
the client is related to the donee.
the client is independently repre(d) Prior to the conclusion of repre- sented in making the agreement, or
sentation of a client. a lawyer shall -settle -a claim for such liability with
not make or negotiate an agreement an unrepresented client or former
giving the lawyer literary or media client without first advising that perrights to a portrayal or account son in writing that independent rep-
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resentation is appropriate in connec- client, and the restrictions in paragraph
(a) are unnecessary and impracticable.
tion therewith.
A lawyer may accept a gift from a
(i) A lawyer related to another
client, if the transaction meets general
lawyer as parent, child, sibling or
spouse shall not represent a client in
standards of fairness. For example, a
a representation directly adverse to
simple gift such as a present given at a
holiday or as a token of appreciation is
a person who the lawyer knows is
represented by the other lawyer expermitted. If effectuation of a substancept upon consent by the client after
tial gift requires preparing a legal inconsultation regarding the relation- strument such as a will or conveyance,
ship.
however, the client should have the
detached advice that another lawyer
(J A lawyer shall not acquire a
can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an
proprietary interest in the cause of
exception where the client is a relative
action or subject matter of litigation
the lawyer is conducting for a client, of the donee or the gift is not substantial.
except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law
Literary Rights
to secure the lawyer's fee or exAn agreement by which a lawyer
penses; and
acquires
literary or media rights con(2) contract with a client for a
cerning the conduct of the representareasonable contingent fee in a civil
tion creates a conflict between the intercase.

ests of the client and the personal inter-

COMMENT:
Transactions
Lawyer

ests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in
Between

Client and

As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should
be fair and reasonable to the client- In
such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is
often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer

may not exploit information relating to
the representation to the client's disad-

the representation of the client may
detract from the publication value of an
account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer

representing a client in a transaction
concerning

literary

property

from

agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall
consist of a share in ownership in the
property, if the arrangement conforms

to Rule 1.5 and paragraph

().

vantage. For example, a lawyer who has

Person Paying for Lawyeres Services

learned that the client is investing in

Rule 1.8(f) requires disclosure of the
fact that the lawyer's services are being
paid for by a third party. Such an
arrangement must also conform to the
requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning
confidentiality and Rule 1.7 concerning
conflict of interest. Where the client is a
class, consent may be obtained on behalf
of the class by court-supervised procedure.

specific real estate may not, without the
client's consent seek to acquire nearby
property where doing so would adverse-

ly affect the client's plan for investment.
Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply

to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for
products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example,
banking or brokerage services, medical

services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and- utilities services. In such transactions, the lawyer
has no advantage in dealing with the

Y

Family Relationships Between Lawyer-s
Rule 1.8(i applies to related lawyers
who are in different firms. Related law-
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yers in the same firm are governed by
Rules 1.7. 1.9. and 1.10. The disqualification stated in Rule 1.8(i) is personal and
is not imputed to members of firms with
whom the lawyers are associated.
Acquisition of Interest in Litigation
Paragraph (j) states the traditional
general rule that lawyers are prohibited
from acquiring a proprietary interest in
litigation. This general rule, which has
its basis in common law champerty and
maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and
continued in these Rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set
forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for
certain advances of the costs of litigation
set forth in paragraph (e).
This Rule is not intended to apply to
customary qualification and limitations
in legal opinions and memoranda.
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 5104(A) provided that a lawyer "shall not
enter into a business transaction with a
client if they have differing interests
therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment
therein for the protection of the client
unless the client has consented after full
disclosure." EC 5-3 stated that a lawyer
"should not seek to persuade his client to
permit him to invest in an undertaking
of his client nor make improper use of
his professional relationship to influence
his client to invest in an enterprise in
which the lawyer is interested."

With regard to paragraph (b), DR 4101(BK3) provided that a lawyer should

not use -a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself, or of a
third person, unless the client consents
after full disclosure."

There was no counterpart to paragraph (c) in the Disciplinary Rules of the
Model Code. EC 5-5 stated that a lawyer
"should not suggest to his client that a
gift be made to himself or for his benefit.
If a lawyer accepts a gift from his client.

3-15-89
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he is peculiarly susceptible to the charge
that he unduly influenced or overreached
the client. If a client voluntarily offers to
make a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer
may accept the gift, but before doing so.
he should urge that the client secure disinterested advice from an independent.
competent person who is cognizant of all
the circumstances. Other than in exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument in which his client desires to name him beneficially be
prepared by another lawyer selected by
the client."
Paragraph (d) is substantially similar
to DR 5-104(B), but refers to "literary or
media" rights, a more generally inclusive
term than "publication" rights.
Paragraph (e)(1) is similar to DR 5103(B), but eliminates the requirement
that "the client remains ultimately liable
for such expenses."
Paragraph (e)(2) has no counterpart in
the Model Code.
Paragraph (f) is substantially identical to DR 5-107(A)(1).
Paragraph (g) is substantially identical to DR 5-106.

The first clause of paragraph (h) is
similar to DR 6-102(A). There was no
counterpart in the Model Code to the sec-

ond clause of paragraph (h).
Paragraph (i) has no counterpart in
the Model Code.

Paragraph (j) is substantially identical to DR 5-103(A).
RULE 1.9 Conflict of nteresL Former Client
formerly rep(a) A lawyer tWho
resented a client in a atter shall not
thereafter represent another person
in the same or a sub antially related
person's intermatter in which th
verse to the inests are materially
terests of the former client unless the
former client consen after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly
represent a person i the same or a
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firm are governed by
yers in the sa
Rules 1.7. 1.9. a d 1.10. The disqualification stated in R le 1.8(i) is personal and
is not imputed t' members of firms with
whom the lawye s are associated.
terest in Litigation
Acquisition of
the traditional
states
(j
Paragraph
general rule tha lawyers are prohibited
from acquiring proprietary interest in
litigation. This eneral rule, which has
its basis in com non law champerty and
maintenance, is ;ubject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and
continued in the e Rules. such as the exception for reaso iable contingent fees set
forth in Rule 1. and the exception for
certain advances of the costs of litigation
set forth in para raph (e).
This Rule is n t intended to apply to
customary quali cation and limitations
in legal opinions and memoranda.
MODEL CODE (OMPARISON
With regard tparagraph (a). DR
104(A) provided i hat a lawyer "shall not
enter into a busi ess transaction with a
client if they hve differing interests
therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise hi professional judgment
therein for the 1 rotection of the client.
unless the client tas consented after full
disclosure." EC -3 stated that a lawyer
"should not seek z persuade his client to
permit him to ir vest in an undertaking
of his client nor make improper use of
his professional i elationship to influence
in an enterprise in
his client to inv
which the lawye is interested."
With regard 0 paragraph (b). DR 4101(B3() providi I that a lawyer should
not use 'a confida nce or secret of his client for the advan tage of himself, or of a
third person, un ess the client consents
after full discios re."
There was no counterpart to paragraph (c) in the isciplinary Rules of the
Model Code. EC 5 stated that a lawyer
.should not sugg t to his client that a
gift be made to hi self or for his benefit.
If a lawyer accep a gift from his client,
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he is peculiarly suscepti le to the charge
that he unduly influenceJ or overreached
the client. If a client vol ntarily offers to
make a gift to his Ia yer. the lawyer
may accept the gift. but before doing so.
he should urge that the lient secure disinterested advice from in independent.
competent person who is cognizant of all
the circumstances. Othe than in exceptional circumstances, a t wyer should inwhich his clisist that an instrument
ent desires to name hin beneficially be
prepared by another lav er selected by
the client."
Paragraph (d) is subs ntially similar
to DR 5-104(B), but refe to "literary or
media" rights, a more ge erally inclusive
term than "publication" rights.
Paragraph (e)(1) is si ilar to DR 5103(B), but eliminates he requirement
that "the client remains Itimately liable
for such expenses."
Paragraph (e)(2) has m3 counterpart in
the Model Code.
Paragraph (f) is subs ntially identical to DR 5-107(AXI).
ntially identiParagraph (g) is sub
cal to DR 5-106.
ragraph (h) is
The first clause of
similar to DR 6-102(A There was no
counterpart in the Mode Code to the second clause of paragraph (h).
Paragraph (i) has no counterpart in
the Model Code.
Paragraph (j) is subs antially identical to DR 5-103(A).
RULE 1.9 Conflict of I terese Former Client
(a) A lawyer'who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person
in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly
represent a person in the same or a
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substantially related matter in which
a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially
adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had
acquired information protected by
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material
to the matter;.
unless the former client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose
present or former firm has formerly
represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter:.
(1)use information relating to the
representation to the disadvantage
of the former client except as Rule
1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or
when the information has become
generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to
the representation except as Rule
1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.
COMMENT:
After termination of a client-lawyer
relationship, a lawyer may not represent
another client except in conformity with
this Rule. The principles in Rule 1.7 determine whether the interests of the present and former client are adverse. Thus,
a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract
drafted on behalf of the former client. So
also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning
the same transaction.
The scope of a "matter" for purposes
of this Rule may depend on the facts of a
particular situation Gr transaction. The
lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specif-
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ic transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially
adverse interests clearly is prohibited.
On the other hand. a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a
former client is not precluded from later
representing another client in a wholly
distinct problem of that type even
though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to
the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions
within the same military jurisdiction.
The underlying question is whether the
lawyer was so involved in the matter
that the subsequent representation can
be justly regarded as a changing of sides
in the matter in question.
Lawyers Moving Between Firms
When lawyers have been associated
within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer
should undertake representation is more
complicated- There are several competing
considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must
be reasonably assured that the principle
of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so
broadly cast as to preclude other persons
from having reasonable choice of legal
counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new
clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be
recognized that today many lawyers
practice in firms, that many lawyers to
some degree limit their practice to one
field or another, and that many move
from one association to another several
times in their careers. If the concept of
imputation were applied with unqualified
rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to
move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to
change counsel.
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Reconciliation of these competing
principles in the past has been attempted
under two rubrics. One approach has
been to seek per se rules of disqualification. For example, it has been held that a
partner in a law firm is conclusively presumed to have access to all confidences
concerning all clients of the firm. Under
this analysis, if a lawyer has been a partner in one law firm and then becomes a
partner in another law firm, there may
be a presumption that all confidences
known by the partner in the first firm are
known to all partners in the second firm.
This presumption might properly be applied in some circumstances, especially
where the client has been extensively
represented, but may be unrealistic
where the client was represented only for
limited purposes. Furthermore, such a
rigid rule exaggerates the difference between a partner and an associate in modern law firms.
The other rubric formerly used for
dealing with disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in
Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has
a two fold problem. First, the appearance
of impropriety can be taken to include
any new client-lawyer relationship that
might make a former client feel anxious.
If that meaning were adopted, disqualification would become little more than a
question of subjective judgment by the
former client. Second, since "impropriety" is undefined, the term "appearance of
impropriety" is question-begging. It
therefore has to be recognized that the
problem of disqualification cannot be
properly resolved either by simple analogy to a lawyer practicing alone or by the
very general concept of appearance of
impropriety.
Confidentiality
Preserving confidentiality is a question
of access to information. Access to information, in turn, is essentially a question.
of fact in particular circumstances, aided
by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made
12-25S-G
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about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm
and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy
to all information about all the firm's
clients. In contrast, another lawyer may
have access to the files of only a limited
number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients;
in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a
lawyer in fact is privy to information
about the clients actually served but not
those of other clients.
Application of paragraph (b) depends
on a situation's particular facts. In such
an inquiry, the burden of proof should
rest upon the firm whose disqualification
is sought.
Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify
the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and l-9(b).
Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm
acquired no knowledge or information
relating to a particular client of the firm,
and that lawyer later joined another
firm, neither the lawyer individually nor
the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a
related matter even though the interests
of the two clients conflict. See Rule
1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once
a lawyer has terminated association with
the firm.
Independent of thl question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing
professional association has a continuing
duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1-9.
Adverse Positions
The-second aspect of loyalty to a client
is the lawyer's obligation to decline subsequent representations involving positions adverse to a former client arising
in substantially related matters. This obligation requires abstention from adverse representation by the individual
EadThe Bu.,.
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lawyer involved, but does not properly
entail abstention of other lawyers
through imputed disqualification. Hence.
this aspect of the problem is governed by
Rule 1.9(a). Thus, if a lawyer left one
firm for another, the new affiliation
would not preclude the firms involved
from continuingto represent clients with
adverse interests in the same or related
mafters, so long as the conditions of
paragraphs (b) and (c) concerning confidentiality have been met.
Information acquired by the lawyer in
the course of representing a client may
not subsequently be used or revealed by
the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has
once served a client does not preclude the
lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later
representing another client.
Disqualification from subsequent representation is for the protection of former clients and can be waived by them.
A waiver is effective only if there is disclosure of the circumstances, including
the lawyer's intended role in behalf of
the new client.
With regard to an opposing party's
raising a question of conflict of interest,
see Comment to Rule 1-7. With regard to
disqualification of a firm with which a
lawyer is or was formerly associated, see
Rule 1.10.
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
There was no counterpart to this Rule
in the Disciplinary Rules of the Model
Code. Representation adverse to a former
client was sometimes dealt with under
the rubric of Canon 9 of the Model Code,
which provided: "A lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of impropriety." Also applicable were EC 4-6 which stated
that the "obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his
client continues after the termination of
his employment" and Canon 5 which
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stated that '"a] lawyer should exercise
independent professional judgment on
behalf of a client."
The provision for waiver by the former
client in paragraphs (a) and (b) is similar to DR 5-105(C).
The exception in the last clause of
paragraph (cXI) permits a lawyer to use
information relating to a former client
that is in the "public domain," a use that
was also not prohibited by the Model
Code, which protected only "confidences
and secrets." Since the scope of
paragraphs (a) and (b) is much broader
than "confidences and secrets," it is necessary to define when a lawyer may make
use of information about a client after
the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.
RULE [.10 Im ted Disqualification:
General Rule
(a) While lav yers are associated in
a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a cli nt when any one of
them practici
alone would be prohibited from d ing so by Rules 1.7,
1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.
(b) When a L twyer has terminated
an association v ith a firm, the firm is
not prohibited I ram thereafter representing a perso with interests materially adverse L those of a client represented by th, formerly associated,
lawyer and not :urrently represented
by the firm, uni
(1) the mat r is the same or substantially re ed to that in which
the formerly sociated lawyer represented the c lent; and
(2) any la
r remaining in the
firm has info
tion protected by
Rules 1.6 and L 9(c) that is material
to the matter.
(c) A disqualifi ation prescribed by
this rule may be '[aived by the affected client under t1e conditions stated
in Rule 1.7.

it
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lawyer involved, but does not properly
entail abstenti, n of other -lawyers
through imputed isqualification. Hence,
this aspect of the roblem is governed by
Rule 1.9(a). Thus if a lawyer left one
firm for anothe!, the new affiliation
would not preclu 3e the firms involved

from continuing' represent clients with
adverse interests n the same or related
matters, so long as the conditions of
lparagraphs (b) an I (c) concerning confidentiality have be n met.
Information acc aired by the lawyer in
the course of repr enting a client may
not subsequently 4e used or revealed by
the lawyer to the d sadvantage of the client. However, the act that a lawyer has
once served a client does not'preclude the
lawyer from using generally known information about t at client when later
representing anoth r client.
Disqualification om subsequent representation is for e protection of former clients and ca be waived by them.
A waiver is effectiv only if there is disclosure of the circ instances, including
the lawyer's intend role in behalf of
the new clientWith regard to Ln opposing party's
raising a question o r conflict of interest,
see Comment to Rul 1.7. With regard to
disqualification of firm with which a
lawyer is or was for aerly associated, see
Rule 1.10.
MODEL CODE CO PARISON
to this Rule
terpart
-c
There was no
Rules of the Model
in the Disciplina
Code. Representati adverse to a former
client was sometisen dealt with under
the rubric of Cano 9 of the Model Code,
lawyer should avoid
which provided:
even the appearan e of impropriety- Also applicable we EC 4-6 which stated
that the "obligati n of a lawyer to preand secrets of his
serve the confide
client continues a ter the termination of
his employment' and Canon 5 which
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stated that Ila] wyer should exercise
independent profi sional judgment on
behalf of a client-'
The provision fo waiver by the former
client in paragrap is (a) and (b) is simi-

lar to DR 5-105(C)
The exception i the last clause of
paragraph (cX1)p rmits a lawyer to use
to a former client
information relati
that is in the "pub ic domain," a use that
was also not pro ibited by the Model
Code, which prote :ted only "confidences
and secrets." ! ince the scope of
paragraphs (a) an (b) is much broader
than "confidences nd secrets," it is necessary to define wh n alawyer may make
use of information about a client after
ationship has termithe client-lalvyer
natedRULE 1.10 Imputed Disqualification:
General Rule
(a) While lawyers are associated in
a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of
them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7,
1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
(b) When a lawyer has terminated
an association with a firm, the firm is
not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated
lawyer and not currently represented
by the firm, unless:
(I) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which
the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the
firm has information protected by
Rules G and S.(c) that is material
to the matter.
(c) A disqualification prescribed by
this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated
in Rule t.7.
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COMMENT.
Definition of "Firm"
For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term "firm" includes
lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in
the legal department of a corporation or
other organization, or in a legal services
organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For
example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be
regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the
public in a way suggesting that they are
a firm or conduct themselves as a firm,
they should be regarded as a firm for the
purposes of the Rules. The terms of any
formal agreement between associated
lawyers are relevant in determining
whether they are a firm, as is the fact
that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve.
Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful
cases to consider the underlying purpose
of the Rule that is involved. A group of
lawyers could be regarded as a firm for
purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so
regarded for purposes of the rule that
information acquired by one lawyer is
attributed to the other.
With respect to the law department of
an organization, there is ordinarily no
question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
However. there can be uncertainty as to
the identity of the client For example, it
may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as
well as the corporation by which the
members of the department are directly
employed. A similar question-can arise
concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates.
3-1549
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Similar questions can also arise with
respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers
employed in the same unit of a legal ser-

vice organization constitute a firm, but
not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent
practitioners, whether the lawyers
should be treated as associated with each
other can depend on the particular rule
that is involved, and on the specific facts
of the situation.
Where a lawyer has joined a private
firm after having represented the government, the situation is governed by
Rule 1.11(a) and (b); where a lawyer represents the government after having

served private clients, the situation is
governed by Rule 1.11(c)(1). The individual lawyer involved is bound by the
Rules generally, including Rules 1.6, 1.7
and 1.9.
Different provisions are thus made for
movement of a lawyer from one private
firm to another and for movement of a
lawyer between a private firm and the
government- The government is entitled
to protection of its client confidences
and, therefore, to the protections provided in Rules 1.6, 1.9 and 1.11. However, if
the more extensive disqualification in
Rule 1.10 were applied to former government lawyers, the potential effect on the
government would be unduly burdensome- The government deals with all private citizens and organizations and,
thus, has a much wider circle of adverse
legal interests than does any private law
firm. In these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers-would be
seriously impaired if Rule 1.10 were applied to the government. On balance.
therefore, the government is better
served in the long run by the protections
stated in Rule 1.11.
Principles of Imputed Disqualification

The-rule of- imputed disqualification
stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the
principle of loyalty to the client as it apead The B..-,,
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plies to lawyers who practice in a law
firm. Such situations can be considered
from the premise that a firm of lawyers
is essentially one lawyer for purposes of
the rules governing loyalty to the client.
or from the premise that each lawyer is
vicariously bound by the obligation of
loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom
the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a)
operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the
situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b) and

1.10(b).
Rule 1.10(b) operates to permit a law
firm, under certain circumstances, to
represent a person with interests directly
adverse to those of a client represented
by a lawyer who formerly was associated
with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the
law firm may not represent a person with
interests adverse to those of a present
client of the firm, which would violate
Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the
same or substantially related to that in
which the formerly associated lawyer
represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material
information protected by Rules 1.6 and
1.9(c).
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
DR 5-I05(D) provided that "(ijf a lawyer is required to decline or to withdraw
from employment under a Disciplinary
Rule, no partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm, may accept or continue such employment."
RULE 1.11 Succesive Government
and Private Emt loyment
(a) Except as 1a4 may otherwise expressly permit, a Iwyer shall not represent a private client in connection

\
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with a matter in which the lawyer
participated perso aally and substantially as a public c flicer or employee,
unless the approl riate government
agency consents i fter consultation.
No lawyer in a fir
with which that
lawyer is associat
may knowingly
undertake or cont nue representation
in such a matter 6less:
(1) the disq4 alified lawyer is
screened from iy participation in
the matter and is apportioned no
part of the fee tl erefrom; and
(2) written notj ce is promptly given to the approl riate government
agency to enab]e it to ascertain
compliance with the provisions of
this Rule.
(b) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a la vyer having information that the law er knows is confidential government information about
a person acquired when the lawyer
was a public officer or employee, may
not represent a pr vate client whose
interests are advers e to that person in
a matter in whict the information
could be used to tl Le material disadvantage of that pe on. A firm with
which that lawyer is associated may
undertake or contit ue representation
in the matter only if the disqualified
lawyer is screened from any participation in the mati r and is kpportioned no part of th fee therefrom.
(c) Except as law
y otherwise expressly permit, a I
er serving as a
public officer or en loyee shall not(1) participat,
in a matter in
which the awye participated personally and subs Lntially while in
private practice ir nongovernmentat employment, u aless under applicable law no one i ,or by lawful delegation may be, a' thorized to act in
the lawyer's steac in the matter; or
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obligation to under
the representation competently (see Rule 1.1); the obligation to avoid dis alifying conflicts.
and to secure
client
forthse
cot esent after consulbe
tation for tho c
which can be
agreed to (see Rule .7); and the obligation to protect inf mation relating to
the representation ( ee Rules 1.6 and 1.9).
If approval of th substitution of the
purchasing attorne - for the selling attorney is required y the rules of any
tribunal in which matter is pending,
such approval mu be obtained before
the matter can be included in the sale
(see Rule 1.16).
Applicability of t e Rule
This Rule applie to the sale of a law
practice by represei tatives of a deceased,
disabled or disapp eared lawyer. Thus,
the seller may be r presented by a nonlawyer represents ;ive not subject to
these Rules. Since, however, no lawyer
may participate in a sale of a law practice which does no conform to the requirements of this ule, the representatives of the selleri- well as the purchasing lawyer can be pected to see to it
that they are met.
Admission to or etirement from a law
partnership or pr essional association,
retirement plans nd similar arrangements, and a sale f tangible assets of a
law practice, do n constitute a sale or
purchase governed y this Rule.
This Rule does t apply to the transfers of legal rep
tation between lawyers when such t
fers are unrelated
to the sale of a pr tice.
MODEL CODE
MPARISON
There was no unterpart to this Rule
in the Model Cod.
COUNSELOR
RULE L. Advisor
In representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional Judgment and render candid
advice. In rendering advice,. alawyermay refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, econom-

No. 89

ic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation.
COMMENT:
Scope of Advice
A client is entitled to straightforward
advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In
presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to
sustain the client's morale and may put
advice in as acceptable a form as honesty
permits. However, a lawyer should not be
deterred from giving candid advice by
the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.
Advice couched in narrowly legal
terms may be of little value to a client,
especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be
inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to
refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice- Although a
lawyer is not a moral advisor as such,
moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may
decisively influence how the law will be
applied.
A client may expressly or impliedly
ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a
client experienced in legal matters, the
lawyer may accept it at face value. When
such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the
lawyer's responsibility ai advisor may
include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations.
Matters that go beyond strictly legal
questions may also be in the domain of
another profession. Family matters can
involve problems within the professional
competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters
can involve problems within the competence of the-accounting profession or of
financial specialists. Where consultation
with a professional in another field is it-
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self something a competent lawyer would
recommend, the lawyer should make
such a recommendation. At the same
time, a lawyer's advice at its best often
consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts.
Offering Advice
In general, a lawyer is not expected to
give advice until asked by the client.
However, when a lawyer knows that a
client proposes a course of action that is
likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, duty to
the client under Rule 1.4 may require
that the lawyer act if the client's course
of action is related to the representation.
A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or
to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to
this Rule in the Disciplinary Rules of the
Model Code. DR 5-107(B) provided that a
lawyer "shall not permit a person who
recommends, employs, or pays him to
render legal services for another to direct
or regulate his professional judgment in
rendering such legal services." EC 7-8
stated that '"a]dvice of a lawyer to his
client need not be confined to purely legal
considerations.... In assisting his client
to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those
factors which may lead to a decision that
is morally just as well as legally permissible- In the final analysis, however,..
the decision whether to forego legally
available objectives or methods because
of non-legal factors is ultimately for the
client.-."
RULE 2.2 Inter ediary
(a) A lawyer : ay act as intermediary between cli, ts if:
(L) the law r consults with each
client concer4 ing the implications

of the comm
2-28-90
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cluding thA advantages and risks involved, an the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains
each client consent to the common
representa on;
(2) the la yer reasonably believes
that the in tter can be resolved on
terms com atible with the clients'
best interes,
that each client will
be able to make adequately informed dec sions in the matter and
that there s little risk of material
prejudice t the interests of any of
the clients i 'the contemplated resolution is u uccessful; and
(3) the Is yer reasonably believes
that the co mon representation can
be under ken impartially and
without i proper effect on other
responsibi ities the lawyer has to
any of the lients.
(b) While acting as intermediary,
the lawyer s all consult with each client concern ng the decisions to be
made and th. considerations relevant
in making t iem, so that each client
can make a equately informed decisions.
(c) A la
r shall withdraw as intermediary i any of the clients so requests, or if ny of the conditions stated in paragr ph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon
ithdrawal, the lawyer
shall not con inue to represent any of

the clients it the matter that was the
subject of th intermediation.
COMMENT.
A lawyer cts as intermediary under
this Rule whea the lawyer represents two
or more parties with potentially conflicting interests. A,key factor in defining the
.relationship i;whether the parties share
responsibili
for the lawyer's fee, but
the common
presentation may be inferred from ther circumstances. Because confusi n can arise as to the lawyer's role wh e each party is not sepa-rately represe ted. it is important that
the lawyer ma e clear the relationship.
The Rule d
not apply to a lawyer
acting as arbit ator or mediator between
aad The Uureau of Ntetoaal Affairs. Icc.
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self something a corn tent lawyer would
recommend, the la yer should make
such a recommenda ion. At the same
at its best often
time, a lawyer's adv
consists of recomme ding a course of action in the face of c flicting recommendations of experts.
Offering Advice
In general, a Is.
give advice until

er is not expected to
sked by the client.

However, when a wyer knows that a
rse of action that is
client proposes a
likely to result in s bstantial adverse lethe client, duty to
gal consequences
the client under ule 1.4 may require
that the lawyer ac if the client's course
of action is related
the representation.
A lawyer ordinari has no duty to initiate investigation f a client's affairs or
to give advice that he client has indicated is unwanted, b t a lawyer may initiate advice to a el nt when doing so appears to be in the lient's interest.
MODEL CODE C( MPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to
this Rule in the Di ciplinary Rules of the
Model Code. DR 5-07(B) provided that a
lawyer "shall not permit a person who
recommends, emp oys, or pays him to
render legal servia s for another to direct
or regulate his prc fessional judgment in
rendering such le al services." EC 7-8
stated that "la~dvie of a lawyer to his
client need not be nfined to purely legal
considerations.. I assisting his client
to reach proper ecision, it is often der to point out those
sirable for a la
factors which ma lead to a decision that
is morally just as ,ell as legally permissible. In the fin analysis, however_
the decision wh her to forego legally
available objecti+s or methods because
of non-legal facto is ultimately for the
client-.."
RULE 2.2 Intermediary
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each
client concerning the implications
of the common representation. in-
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cluding the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains
each client's consent to the common
representation:
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes
that the matter can be resolved on
terms compatible with the clients'
best interests, that each client will
be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and
that there is little risk of material
prejudice to the interests of any of
the clients if the contemplated reso-

lution is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes
that the common representation can
be undertaken impartially and
without improper effect on other
responsibilities the lawyer has to
any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary,
the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the decisions to be
made and the considerations relevant
in making them, so that each client
can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any of the conditions stat-

ed in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer
shall not continue to represent any of
the clients in the matter that was the
subject of the intermediation.

COMMENT:
A lawyer acts as intermediary under
this Rule when the lawyer represents two

or more parties with potentially conflicting interests. A key factor in defining the
relationship is whether the parties share
responsibility for the lawyer's fee, but
the common representation may be inferred from other circumstances. Because confusion can arise as to the lawyer's role where each party is not separately represented, it is important that
the lawyer make clear the relationship.
The Rule does not apply to a lawyer
acting as arbitrator or mediator between
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or among parties who are not clients of
the lawyer, even where the lawyer has
been appointed with the concurrence of
the parties. In performing such a role the
lawyer may be subject to applicable
codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint Committee of
the American Bar Association and the
American Arbitration Association.
A lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship
between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example,
in helping to organize a business in
which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or
more clients have an interest, arranging
a property distribution in settlement of
an estate or mediating a dispute between
clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be that each party may
have to obtain separate representation,
with the possibility in some situations of
incurring additional cost, complication
or even litigation. Given these and other
relevant factors, all the clients may prefer that the lawyer act as intermediary.
In considering whether to act as intermediary between clients, a lawyer should
be mindful that if the intermediation
fails the result can be additional cost.
embarrassment and recrimination. In
some situations the risk of failure is so
great that intermediation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot
undertake common representation of clients between whom contentious litigation is imminent or who contemplate
contentious negotiations. More generally.
if the relationship between the parties
has already assumed definite antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adjusted by intermediation ordinarily is not very good.
The appropriateness of intermediation
can depend on its form. Forms of intermediation range from informal arbitration, where each client's case is presented

$42-00
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by the respective client'and the lawyer
decides the outcome, to mediation, to
common representation where the clients' interests are substantially though
not entirely compatible. One form may
be appropriate in circumstances where
another would. not. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation
involves creating a relationship between
the parties or terminating one.
Confidentiality and Privilege
A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of intermediation is the effect on client-lawyer
confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege. In a common representation,
the lawyer is still required both to keep
each client adequately informed and to
maintain confidentiality of information
relating to the representation. See Rules
1.4 and 1.6. Complying with both requirements while acting as intermediary requires a delicate balance. If the balance
cannot be maintained, the common representation is improper. With regard to
the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that as between commonly
represented clients the privilege does not
attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if
litigation eventuates between the clients,
the privilege will not protect any such
communications, and the clients should
be so advised.
Since the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented
clients, intermediation is improper when
that impartiality cannot be maintained.
For example, a lawyer who has represented one of the clients for a long period
and in a variety of matters might have
difficulty being impartial between that
client and one to whom the lawyer has
only recently been introduced.
Consultation
In acting as intermediary between clients, the lawyer is required to consult
with the clients on the implications of
doing so, and proceed only upon consent
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based on such a consultation. The consultation should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances.
Paragraph (b) is an application of the
principle expressed in Rule 1.4. Where
the lawyer is intermediary, the clients
ordinarily must assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is independently represented.
Withdrawal
Common representation does not diminish the rights of each client in the
client-lawyer relationship. Each has the
right to loyal and diligent representation, the right to discharge the lawyer as
stated in Rule 1.16, and the protection of
Rule 1.9 concerning obligations to a former client.
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to
this Rule in the Disciplinary Rules of the
Model Code. EC 6-20 stated that a "lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial arbitrator or mediator in matters
which involve present or former clients.
He may serve in either capacity if he first
discloses such present or former relationships." DR 6-105(B) provided that a
lawyer "shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent judgment in behalf of a client will
be or is likely to be adversely affected by
his representation of another client, or if
it would be likely to involve him in representation of differing interests, except to
the extent permitted 'under DR 5105(C)." DR 6-105(C) provided that "a
lawyer may represent multiple clients if
it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interests of each and if each
consents to the representation after full
disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each."
RULE 23 EvaluajIon for Use by
Third Persons
(a) A lawyer may undertake an
evaluation of a to tter affecting a cliS-26-90
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ant for the e of someone other than
the client If
(1) the I wyer reasonably believer
that makig the evaluation is compatible w th other aspects of the
lawyer's telationship with the client; and
(2) the 4 lient consents after consultation.
(b) Except as disclosure is required
in connectioz with a report of an evaluation. info fration relating to the
.
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Rule 1.6.
COMMENT.
Definition
An evaluati n may be performed at
the client's dir ction but for the primary
purpose of est blishing information for
the benefit of ird parties; for example,
an opinion conerning the title of property rendered at he behest of a vendor for
the informati n of a prospective purchaser, or at t e behest of a borrower for
the informati n of a prospective lender.
In some situa ons, the evaluation may
be required b a government agency; for
example, an 4pinion concerning the legality of the s curities registered for sale
under the sec ,rities laws. In other instances, the e aluation may be required
by a third per on. such as a purchaser of
a business.
Lawyers fo the government may be
called upon to give a formal opinion on
the legality of contemplated government
agency action. In making such an evaluation, the govea nment lawyer acts at the
behest of the government as the client
but for the p rpoe of establishing the
limits of the I ency's authorized activity. Such an op ion is to be distinguished
from confide tial legal advice given
agency official. The critical question is
whether the o .nion is to be made public.
A legal eva uation should be distinguished from n investigation of a person with who the lawyer does not have
a client-lawyei relationship. For example. a lawyer tained by a purchaser to
analyze a vend r's title to property does
bA Ser"' et
bA.tt
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even though the plan is based in
tractors, act for the I yer in rendition
whole or in part on a pr -ofit-sharing
of the lawyer's profe sional services. A
arrangement.
ch assistants aplawyer should give
(b) A lawyer shall not f orm a partpropriate instructio and supervision
concerning the ethi I aspects of their nership with a nonlawyer if any of the
employment, partic arly regarding the activities of the partnersh ip consist of
obligation not to dis lose information re- the practice of law.
lating to representa on of the client, and
(c) A lawyer shall not p ermit a pershould be responstble for their work son who recommends, e mploys, or
product. The meas res employed in su- pays the lawyer to rende r legal serpervising nonlawy4 rs should take ac- vices for another to direct or regulate
count of the fact t at they do not have the lawyer's professional j adgment in
legal training and a e not subject to pro- rendering such legal servi ces.
fessional discipline(d) A lawyer shall not pi -actice with
in the form of a professi onal corpoor
MODEL CODE CO PARISON
ration or association aulthorized to
f:_
There was no di t counterpart to practice law for a profit, iL
this Rule in the M
I Code. DR 4-101(D)
(1) a nonlawyer owns aany interest
provided that a Ia er "shall exercise
therein, except that a fid uciary repreasonable care to p vent his employees,
resentative of the estate of a lawyer
associates, and othe whose services are
may hold the stock or int erest of the
utilized by him fro disclosing or using
lawyer for a reasonable t ime during
confidences or seer
of a clienL..." DR
administration;
7-107(J) provided t at ' a] lawyer shall
(2) a nonlawyer is a co rporate diexercise reasonable care to prevent his
rector or officer thereof; or
employees and assciates from making
(3) a nonlawyer has tihe right to
an extrajudicial staement that he would
direct or control the p rofessional
be prohibited from making under DR 7judgment of a lawyer.
107."
COMMENT:

RULE 5.4 Professional Independence
of a Lawyer
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not
share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with
the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment
of money, over a reasonable period
of time after the lawyer's death, to
the lawyer's estate or to one or more
specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the
practice of a deceased, disabled, or
disappeared lawyer may. pursuant
to the provisions of Rule 1.17. pay to
the estate or other representative of
that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan,

a-23-91
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The provisions of this Rule express
traditional limitations on sharing fees.
These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or
recommends employment of the lawyer,
that arrangement does not modify the
lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements
should not interfere with the lawyer's
professional judgment.
MODEL CODE COMP4RISON
Paragraph (a) is substantially
cal to DR 3-102(A).
Paragraph (b) is substantially
cal to DR 3-103(A).
Paragraph (c) is substantially
cal to DR 5-107(B).
Paragraph (d)- is substantially
cal to DR 5-107(C).
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RULE 5-5 Unaut orized Practice of
Law
A lawyer shall ot:
in a jurisdiction
(a) practice Ia
where doing so via ates the regulation
of the legal prof sion in that jurisdiction; or
(b) assist a pe son who is not a
member of the bar in the performance
of activity that co titutes the unauthorized practice f law.

COMMENT.
The definition of t e practice of law is
established by law nd varies from one
jurisdiction to ano er. Whatever the
definition, limiting e practice of law to
members of the bar rotects the public
services by unagainst rendition of
ph (b) does not
qualified persons. Pa
prohibit a lawyer f im employing the
services of paraprof ionals and delegating functions to t em, so long as the
lawyer supervises t e delegated work
and retains responsib lity for their workSee Rule 5.3. Like * it does not prohibit lawyers from pro, ding professional
advice and instructi n to nonlawyers
uires knowledge
whose employment
of law;, for example, aims adjusters,
employees of financial r commercial, institutions, social work rs, ac countants
in government
and persons employ
agencies. In addition, a awyer may counsel nonlawyers who wi h to proceed pro
se.
MODEL CODE COMP RISON
raph (a), DR 3With regard to pa
e provided that
101(B) of the Model
ctice law in a
'Ta] lawyer shall not
jurisdiction where to d so would be in
violation of regulations f the profession
in that jurisdiction-"
aph (b), DR 3With regard top
101(A) of the Model Cod provided that
"al lawyer shall not aid non-lawyer in
the unauthorized practi of law."
RULE 5.6 Restrictions n Right to
Practice

.A lawyer shall not psi ticipate in offering or making:
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(a) a partnership aI employment
agreement that restric the right of a
lawyer to practice aft r termination
of the relationship, eicept an agreement concerning benifits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement i which a restriction on the lawyer' right to practice
is part of the setthlment of a controe te parties.
versy between priv
COMMENT.

[

An agreement retricting the right of
partners or associ: tes to practice after
leaving a firm not ,nly limits their professional autonom but also limits the
freedom of client to choose a lawyer.
Paragraph (a) pro. 'ibits such agreements
except for restrit ns incident to provisions concerning .tirement benefits for
service with the fir
Paragraph (b) p ohibits a lawyer from
agreeing not to re )resent other persons
in connection wit] settling a claim on
behalf of a client.
This Rule does aotapply to prohibit
restrictions that n y be included in the
terms of the sale o£ a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17.
MODEL CODE

MXbPARISON

This Rule is sul stantially similar to
DR 2-108.
RULE 5.7 Responsibilities Regarding
Law-Related Services
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the
Rules of Professional Conduct with
respect to the provision of law-related
services, as defined in paragraph (b),
if the law-related services are providede
"(I) by the lawyer in circumsitances that are not distinct from
the lawyer's provision of legal'services to clients; or
(2) by a separate entity controlled
by the lawyer individually or with
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others if the lawyer fails to take
reasonable measures to assure that
a person obtaining the law-related
services knows that the services of
the separate entity are not legal
services and that the protections of
the client-lawyer relationship do
not exist-

(b) The term "law-related services"
denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction
with and in substance are related to
the provision of legal services, and
that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided
by a nonlawyer.
COMMENT
When a lawyer performs law-related
services or controls an organization that
does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is
the possibility that the person for whom
the law-related services are performed
fails to understand that the services may
not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the
law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests,
and obligations of a lawyer to maintain
professional independence apply to the
provision of law-related services when
that may not be the case.
Rule 5.7 applies to the provision of
law-related services by a lawyer even
when the lawyer does not provide any
legal services to the person for whom the
law-related services are performed. The
Rule identifies the circumstances in
which all of the Rules of Professional
Conduct apply to the provision of lawrelated services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the
conduct of a lawyer involved -in-the provision of law-related services is subject
to those Rules that apply generally to
lawyer conduct, regardless of whether
the conduct involves the provision of legal services. See, eg. Rule 8A.
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When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that
are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services
must adhere to the requirements of the
Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in Rule 5.7(a)(1).
Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct
from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with others has control of such
an entity's operations, the Rule requires
the lawyer to take reasonable measures
to assure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal
services and that the Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the clientlawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer's control of an entity extends to the
ability to direct its operation. Whether a
lawyer has such control will depend upon
the circumstances of the particular case.
When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a
lawyer to a separate law-related service
entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must
comply with Rule L8(a).
In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure
that a person using law-related services
understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related serices, in a

manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the
fact, that the relationship of the person

to the business entity will not be a clientlawyer relationship. The communication
should be made before entering into an
agreement for provision of or providing
law-related services, and preferably
should be in writing.
The burden is upon the lawyer to show
that the lawyer has taken reasonable
measures under the circumstances to
communicate the desired understanding.
For instance, a sophisticated user of law-
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related services, such as a publicly held
corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to
making distinctions between legal services and law-related services, such as an
individual seeking tax advice from a lawyer-accountant or investigative services
in connection with a lawsuit.
Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services,
a lawyer should take special care to keep
'separate the provision of law-related and
legal services in order to minimize the
risk that the recipient will assume that
the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders
both types of services with respect to the
same matter. Under some circumstances
the legal and law-related services may be
so closely entwined that they cannot be
distinguished from each other, and the
requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (aX2) of the
Rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for assuring that
both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by Rule 5.3, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity
which the lawyer controls complies in all
respects with the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
A broad range of economic and other
interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related
services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting,
trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis social work, psychological counseling, tax
return preparation, and patent, medical
or environmental consulting.
When a lawyer is obliged -to accord the
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(f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the
requirements of Rule 1.6 relating to disclosure, of confidential information. The
promotion of the law-related services
must also in all respects comply with
Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard.
lawyers should take special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed
as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional
law.
When the full protections of all of the
Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the
Rules, for example, the law of principal
and agent, govern the legal duties owed
to those receiving the services. Those
other legal principles may establish a
different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of
information, conflicts of interest and
permissible business relationships with
clients. See also Rule 8.4 (Misconduct).
MODEL CODE COMPARISON
There was no counterpart to this Rule
in the Model Code
PUBLIC SE VICE

RULE 6.1 Voluntary ro Bone Publico Service
A lawyer should pire to render at
least (50) hours of ro bono publico
legal services per y r. In fulfilling
this responsibility, e lawyer shotd&
(a) provide a subs atial majority of
the (50) hours of I
I services without fee or expectatio of fee to:
(1) persons of Ii ited means or
(2) charitable, eligious, civic,
community, gover
ental and educational organizat ons in matters
-which are desigued imarily to address the needs of rmns of limited
recipients of -such services the protecmeans; and
tions of those Rules that apply to -the

client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer

must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11,
especially Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a), (b) and

U-=4G

(b) provide any ad itional services

through:
(1) delivery of leg Iservices at no
fee or substantially reduced fee to

individuals, groups r organizations
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A A MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

create "unjusti ed expectations" would
ordinarily pr clude advertisements
about results a tained on behalf of a client, such as t e amount of a damage
award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favora le verdicts, and advertisements contai ng client endorsements.
Such informat on may create the unjustifled expecta [on that similar results
can be obtaine for others without reference to the s cific factual and legal circumstances.
MODEL COD

COMPARISON

rovided that '"a lawyer
DR 2-101
shall not - tse - any form of public
communicat n containing a false.
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim."
DR 2-101(B) provided that a lawyer
"may publish )r broadcast - the following informati
.-. in the geographic area
or areas in wl ich the lawyer resides or
maintains offi .es or in which a significant part of .he lawyer's clientele resides, provide that the information -_
complies with DR 2-101(A). and is prmsented in a d gnified manner-" DR 2101(B) then s cified twenty-five categories of inform tion that may be dissemainated. DR 2-1 1(C) provided that 'Ja]ny
person desiri
to expand the information authori
for disclosure in DR 2101(B), or to rovide for its dissemination through
her forums may apply to
(the agency aving jurisdiction under
state law._
he relief granted in response to an such application shall be
promulgated
an amendment to DR 2101(B), uni
ily applicable to all lawyers.
RULE 7.2 Advertising
(a) Subject to the requirements of
Rules 7.1 and 7.3. a lawyer may advertise services through public media,
such as a telephone directory, legal
directory, newspaper or other periodical, outdoor advertising, radio or
television, or through written or recorded communication

6-14-4
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(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or communicati on shall be
kept for two years after its last dissemination along with i record of
when and where it was us ed.
(c) A lawyer shall not gi ye anything
of value to a person for rec ommending
the lawyer's services ex cept that a
lawyer may
(I) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or coma aunications
permitted by this Rule;
(2) pay the usual cha ges of a notfor-profit lawyer referraLIservice or
legal service organizatio n; and
(3) pay for a law pra ctice in accordance with Rule 1.17.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall i nclude the
name of at least one lawye r responsible for its content.
COMMENT.
To assist the public in obt aining legal
services, lawyers should be allowed to
make known their service not only
through reputation but also through
organized information campai.gns in the
form of advertising. Advertisi ing involves
an active quest for clients, 4 ontrary to
the tradition that a lawyer should not
seek clientele. However, the p ublic's need
to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advert tising.
This
need is particularly acute in the
case of
persons of moderate means w ho have
not
made extensive use of legal se -rvices.
The
interest in expanding public iLnformation
about legal services ought to p
arevail over
considerations of tradition. N
evertheless,
advertising by lawyers entails
the risk of
practices that are misleadin
g or over-

reaching.
This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerni ng a lawyer's name or firm name, a(ddress and
telephone number, the kinds of services
the lawyer- will undertake; thie basis on
which the lawyer's fees are determined,
including prices for specific s(ervices and
payment and credit arrangements; a
lawyer's foreign language abil ity; names
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of references and, with their consent,
names of clients regularly represented;
and other information that might invite
the attention of those seeking legal assistance.
Questions of effectiveness and taste in
advertising are matters of speculation
and subjective judgment. Some jurisdic"
tions have had extensive prohibitions
against television advertising, against
advertising going beyond specified facts
about a lawyer, or against "undignified"
advertising. Television is now one of the
most powerful .media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income;
prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors
of the public. Limiting the information
that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information
that the public would regard as relevant.
Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3 prohibits communications authorized by law,
such as notice to members of a class in
class action litigation.
Record of Advertising
Paragraph (b) requires that a record
of the content and use of advertising be
kept in order to facilitate enforcement of
this Rule- It does not require that advertising be subject to review prior to dissemination. Such a requirement would be
burdensome and expensive relative to its
possible benefits, and may be of doubtful
constitutionality.
Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer
A lawyer is allowed to pay for advertising permitted by this Rule and for the
purchase of a law practice in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 1.17, but otherwise is not permitted to pay another
person for channeling-professional work.
This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending
the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid
t 24 -94
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agency or prepaid legal services plan
may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices. Likewise, a lawyer may participate in not-for-profit lawyer referral programs and pay the usual
fees charged by such programs. Paragraph (c) does not prohibit paying regular compensation to an assistant, such as
a secretary, to prepare communications
permitted by this RuleMODEL CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a). DR 2101(B) provided that a lawyer "may publish or broadcast, subject to DR 2-103,
in print media _.or television or radio-"
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 2101(D) provided that if the advertisement is "communiiated to the public
over television or radio.- a recording of
the actual transmission shall be retained
by the lawyer."
With regard to paragraph (c), DR 2103(B) provided that a lawyer "shall not
compensate or give anything of value to
a person or organization to recommend
or secure his employment - except that
he may pay the usual and reasonable fees
or dues charged by any of the organizations listed in DR 2-103(D)." (DR 2103(D) referred to legal aid and other legal services organizations.) DR 2-101(1)
provided that a lawyer "shall not compensate or give anything of value to representatives of the press, radio, television, or other communication medium in
anticipation of or in return for professional publicity in a news item."
There was no counterpart to para-

graph (d) in the Model Code.
RULE 7.3 Dir
spective Cli

t Contact with Prots

(a)-,A Ia
shall not by in-person
or live teleph e contact solicit professional empi
eut from a prospective client.wi
whom the lawyer has
no family or p ior professional relationship when a ignificant motive for
the lawyer's do
so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain.
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Consolidated Integrated Services, Inc. ("CIS"), a large closely-held
1.
corporation, is about to enter into an initial public offering in order to raise funds to expand its
capital facilities and product lines so as to enter additional markets. It has retained M,D & P to
counsel it with respect to the transaction, a multi-disciplinary firm providing accounting, legal,
trust, valuation, insurance and financial services. CIS has been represented by M,D &P since
CIS was founded by Pat Patriarch, a highly respected businessman who continues to be the eyes
and ears of CIS and a very effective spokesperson for the company. In addition to providing
accounting and legal services to the company, M, D & P has represented Pat with his personal
accounting, legal, financial and estate planning affairs for many years. M, D & P is engaged in
negotiations with the underwriters on behalfofCIS. At the same time, M, D & P's accounting
arm has prepared the financial statements for the company. Recently, Pat has been working with
M, D & P's estate planners to revise and update his estate plan in an effort to move a portion of
his stock to his children or trusts for them prior to the IPO. M, D & P's valuation unit will be
preparing the appraisal to be attached to the gift tax return. As part of the estate plan, it has been
suggested that a joint and survivor insurance policy be placed by M, D & P's insurance unit on
Pat's and his wife's life. The policy is to be purchased by an irrevocable trust. The medical
information obtained for the application has revealed that Pat's blood tests show he is in the early
stages of an ultimately debilitating disease which progresses at an unpredictable rate. In some
patients, the disease lies dormant for as many 20 years; in other patients it progresses rapidly.
A small multi-disciplinary firm, EPI, Inc., has recently acquired a very
2.
sophisticated insurance group, headed by J.P. Jones, who is well known nationally in insurance
circles, to augment its life underwriting capabilities. One of the clients of the group is Pam
Coniver, a U.S. citizen and high net worth individual who has invested in commercial real estate
projects across the U.S. and overseas. Coniver's estate will be highly illiquid and fully subject to
U.S. estate taxes except to the extent reduced by a credit for foreign death taxes. Because of the
overseas connections here, EPI's insurance group believes that there are considerable advantages
to using a sophisticated and highly specialized insurance product involving an offshore insurer.
The policy or policies would be owned by a Bermuda trust. EPI's legal group, which is quite
competent to handle estate matters for local clients, but has no experience in offshore insurance
or foreign trust work, will be handling the estate planning documentation. Pam has no
preference as to choosing an attorney for the work and is willing to accept the recommendations
of JP as to who should handle the legal work. Pam does like EPI's proposed fee arrangement,
which folds the cost of the insurance and the legal work into a single package.
3.
Mary Flowers, who founded the Tulip Law Firm, a 6 lawyer shop, has
represented Dr. and Mrs. Smith with their legal affairs for many years. This has included
assisting them with the-purchase of their primary and vacation homes, estate planning and
counseling their daughter with her divorce and their son with his DUI problems. She
incorporated Dr. Tulip's medical practice as a professional corporation, negotiated the
shareholders agreement with his partners as the practice grew and negotiated the lease for the
building where the medical practice operates. Recently, the Tulip Law Firm was acquired by
Multi-Services, Inc., a huge international MDP providing financial, accounting, trust, legal and

other services. Dr. Smith is about to retire and sell his practice to his current partners. He has
asked Mary to negotiate the buy-out agreement. A major question is whether the buy-out should
be for a lump sum cash payment, a note, a profits interest in the practice going forward or a
combination of the above. He has called Mary to arrange a meeting to discuss the sale, his
retirement and estate planning and the tax advantages of changing domicile. Mary explained that
through Multi-Services' financial planning arm, she could help the Smiths as well with decisions
relating to the investment of the funds received in the buy-out. The head of Multi-Services
insurance and financial services group has asked Mary to identify clients that would be good
prospects for the purchase of a line of new mutual funds and insurance products that have a high
commission potential for the firm. Mary understands that under the firm's fee sharing
arrangement, she will receive as originating partner a bonus on the sale of these products as well
as a portion of any continuing income stream to the firm resulting from the sale.
Dr. Smith was recently brought into a lawsuit on a cross claim arising from prescribing a
drug for.sexual dysfunction which has been shown to cause heart failure in some patients.
Harvey Heman, a local businessman owning a chain of exercise centers and a patient of Dr.
Smith, sued the pharmaceutical manufacturer after taking the drug for 2 years, and now the
manufacturer claims that Dr. Smith over-prescribed the drug in numerous inappropriate
situations to patients. Unfortunately, Dr. Smith is woefully under-insured for malpractice, and he
has sought advice from Mary about his personal liability, as well as asset protection techniques.
It turns out that the drug company uses Multi-Services' accounting arm to prepare its annual
financial statements, but it has never provided legal services to the company.

STATEMENT OF STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE 2000-2
(draft of 9/13/00)
1.
Introduction. The objective of this statement is to articulate the standards of
acceptable practice in the preparation and distribution of written legal opinions relating to Federal
tax issues. The impetus for this statement is a growing perception that some tax practitioners.
including some attorneys practicing law in traditional law firms or functioning within non-law
firm professional organizations. are preparing opinions relating to tax issues which are calculated
to assist their recipients or others to "game" the system. However. the guidance set forth in this
statement is intended to apply to tax opinions generally and is not limited to any specific situation
as to which more explicit standards of conduct may apply.
2.
Definition of "Tax Opinion" and Scope of this Statement. For the purposes of
this statement, a "Tax Opinion" is a written communication to a client or third person which
addresses specific factual circumstances and which states the author's opinion as to the
application of legal authorities, or the modification, reversal or extension of such authorities, to
such factual circumstances. Tax Opinions, as so defined, are subject to the standards set forth in
this statement. However, these standards are not intended to apply to an attorney's explanation of
the law in the abstract or to opinions which a reasonable person would consider to be only
tentative or preliminary. Nor do they specifically apply to oral opinions unless memorialized in
written form and communicated in writing to the client or others. I To the extent that the purpose
or contemplated use of a Tax Opinion presupposes that the preparation or scope of the opinions
set forth in the Tax Opinion will conform to specific statutory, regulatory, ethical or other
authoritative requirements, the standards set forth in this statement are supplemental to and not in
lieu of such other requirements. which are incorporated herein by reference. Thus, for example, a
Tax Opinion which also constitutes a "tax shelter opinion" for purposes of Section 10.33 of
Circular 230, 31 C.F.R.. Subtitle A, Part 10 ("Circular 230"), or A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346
should, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements of those authorities in order to comply with the
standards articulated in this statement. Similarly, a Tax Opinion stating that a client may properly
take a certain position on its tax return should, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements of I.R.C.
Section 6694 and Treas. Regs. Section 1.6694-2. Section 10.34 of Circular 230, and A.B.A.
Formal Opinion 85-352.
3.
Competency of Practitioner to Render Tax Opinion. A practitioner who
accepts an engagement to provide a Tax Opinion assumes an obligation to be knowledgeable, as
of the time that the Tax Opinion is rendered, in the relevant aspects of Federal tax law. To the
extent that any opinion set forth in a Tax Opinion is based upon any other person's opinion or
conclusions regarding any aspect of Federal tax law or any aspect of state or Federal non-tax law,
the author of the Tax Opinion should identify such other person and should explicitly describe the
opinion or conclusions of such other person being relied upon. Additionally, if necessary or
advisable in order to avoid misunderstanding, the author of a Tax Opinion should summarize the
substance of the analysis of such other person in reaching his or her opinion or conclusions or
should provide a copy of such analysis as an attachment to the Tax Opinion.

1 Although not subject to the specific standards applicable to written Tax Opinions, oral opinions
regarding the tax consequences of specific factual circumstances are equally subject to the
requirements of competency, thoroughness. and all other applicable ethical standards. See also
Treas. Regs. Sections i.6 6 64-4(cX2) and 1.6 6 9 4-2(cX3).
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4.
Statement of the Intended Purpose of the Tax Opinion. Underlying the
standards set forth in this statement is a recognition that Tax Opinions may be prepared to serve a
variety of needs or purposes and that. therefore, those standards should be sufficiently flexible to
accommodate those different needs or purposes. However. if necessary or advisable in order to
eliminate any risk of misunderstanding. a Tax Opinion should explicitly state the purpose or
purposes for which it has been prepared: whether or not the author contemplates that any person
other than the client for whom the Tax Opinion was prepared may rely upon it: and, if warranted
under the circumstances, any purpose for which reliance upon the Tax Opinion by the client or
any other person was not contemplated and/or would be inappropriate. In addition, if specific
statutory, regulatory, or other authoritative standards govern the manner in which opinions should
be prepared for a particular purpose, such as, for example. establishing a basis for the client's
"'reasonable belief" under Treas. Regs. Section 1.6662-4(g)(4) or
for "reasonable cause" under
Treas. Regs. Section 1.6664-4(c), a Tax Opinion should not be issued for such a purpose unless
the author has complied in good faith with those standards and includes in the Tax Opinion a
specific representation to that effect. These various disclosure requirements are not intended
to
limit an attorney's flexibility in providing written advice, but to ensure that the flexibility
contemplated by this statement is not inadvertently exceeded or purposefully abused.
5.
Factual Circumstances; Duty of Inquiry. Unless otherwise self-evident from
the context in which it is prepared, a Tax Opinion should clearly identify the material factual
circumstances upon which the author's conclusions are based. In any case in which the Tax
Opinion may be presented to or relied upon any person other than the client, the Tax Opinion
should describe the extent of any due diligence conducted by the author or others to verify the
accuracy of the material facts underlying the opinion and the reasonableness of any material
assumptions. In such a case as well, the Tax Opinion should specifically describe and identify
the
source of any material representations as to future activities, such as financial projections. For
example, the Tax Opinion may state that the material facts or representations as to future
activities have been established by a written certificate from the client or others, by an opinion
of
an expert, or by the author's own investigation. This standard does not require an attorney to
"audit" the facts as presented by his or her client. However, the attorney
must make further
inquiry if any asserted facts, assumptions, or representations as to future activities are materially
incomplete, inconsistent with other circumstances, or otherwise implausible or suspect. See
A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346. which discusses an attorney's duty to make factual inquiries in the
context of a tax shelter opinion: A.B.A. Formal Opinion 335. which establishes guidelines for
opinions regarding the sale of unregistered securities: and Section 10.34 of Circular 230. It is
improper to issue a Tax Opinion on the basis of stated facts or representations as to future
activities which the author of the Tax Opinion knows to be false. At least in cases in which the
Tax Opinion will be presented to or relied upon by any person other than the client, it is also
improper to issue a Tax Opinion which ignores or assumes away factual circumstances of which
the author of the Tax Opinion is aware and which, if properly considered, would materially alter
the author's analysis or conclusions.
6.
Relating the Law to the Facts. A Tax Opinion should relate the applicable
legal authorities, or the modification. extension, or reversal thereof, to the relevant factual
circumstances. If. under the applicable legal standards, the resolution of a material legal issue
depends upon how-a related-factual issue isdecided. the Tax Opinion should so state, identifying
the factual issue to be decided and. if appropriate. stating how, in the author's opinion, the factual
issue is likely to be resolved. Alternatively, if the Tax Opinion resolves the material legal issue
by making an assumption regarding the outcome of the related factual issue, the author should
so
state. In an appropriate case, a Tax Opinion should also explain how the material legal issue
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would likely be resolved if the related factual issue was decided contrary to the predicted or
assumed outcome.
Identify All Material Tax Issues. In certain situations. the governing standards
7.
require the author of a Tax Opinion to address and opine upon all material tax issues. See Section
10.33(a)(3) of Circular 230 or A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346. In other cases, based upon the
intended purpose of the Tax Opinion, an attorney may restrict the scope of a Tax Opinion to
specific issues. However. whenever reasonably necessary in order to avoid any
misunderstanding, the author of a Tax Opinion should identify all material tax issues and should
specifically designate those material tax issues as to which no opinion or prediction is being
rendered.
Legal Analysis. A Tax Opinion should express the author's degree of
8.
confidence in a stated opinion and, if appropriate, discuss whether the pertinent legal authorities
and factual circumstances constitute "substantial authority" for purposes of the substantial
understatement penalty established by I.R.C. Section 6662. These requirements are especially
important when a stated purpose of the Tax Opinion is to insulate the client against penalties with
respect to a specific position by setting forth counsel's opinion that there exists the stated degree
of probability that the position in question would be sustained if litigated and decided on the
merits. In such a case, the author of the Tax Opinion should analyze the position in question in
light of the required level of probability. Only if the author concludes unequivocally and in good
faith that the required level of probability existed as of the relevant date may the Tax Opinion be
given for the stated purpose of penalty protection.
9.
Discussion of Penalties. Whenever an attorney advises a client that. under the
existing facts and applicable law, the client may properly take a return position which, if
disallowed, may expose the client to penalties, the attorney should advise the client concerning
the existence of those penalties and how the client may avoid their imposition by disclosure, by
the timely filing of a qualified amended return, or otherwise. See A.B.A. Formal Opinion 85352. A failure to give such advice, even though the circumstances so warrant violates the
standards of acceptable practice contemplated by this statement. See Treas. Regs. Section
1.6694-2(cX3)(ii); Circular 230, Sec. 10.34(aX2).
10.
Duty to Prevent Misuse of Tax Opinion. Lastly, the committee believes that.
after issuing a Tax Opinion, the attorney and his or her firm should not ignore any inadvertent or
deliberate misuse of that Tax Opinion of which they become aware. For example, if an attorney
or the firm learns that, without prior approval, the client is using the Tax Opinion for a purpose
for which it was not intended, the attorney or the firm should take affirmative steps to correct the
situation. Obviously, those steps will depend upon the circumstances. However, even an
attorney's ethical obligation to protect the confidences and secrets of the client may be limited
under some circumstances if the client or another person is deliberately misusing the attorney's
work product to defraud or to mislead others. See generally A.B.A. Formal Opinion 92-366
concerning the misuse of an opinion on non-tax issues.
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STATEMENT OF STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE 2000-2
(draft of 4L,,4) 9/13/00)
1.
Introduction. The objective of this statement is to articulate the standards of
acceptible practice in the preparation and distribution of written legal opinions relating to Federal
tax issues. The impetus for this statement is a growing perception that some tax practitioners,
including some attorneys practicing law in traditional law firms or functioning within non-law
firm professional organizations, are preparing opinions relating to tax issues which are calculated
to assist their recipients or others to "game" the system. However, the guidance set forth in this
statement is intended to apply to tax opinions generally and is not limited to any specific situation
as to which more explicit standards of conduct may apply.
2.
Definition of "Tax Opinion" and Scope of this Statement. For the purposes of
this statement, a "Tax Opinion" is a written communication to a client or third-p.a
person
which addresses specific factual circumstances and which states the author's opinion asto the
application of legal authorities, or the modification, reversal or extension of such authorities, to
such factual circumstances. Tax Opinions, as so defined, are subject to the standards set forth in
this statement. However, these standards are not intended to apply to an attorney's explanation of
the law in the abstract or to opinions which a reasonable person would consider to be only
tentative or preliminary. Nor do they specitically apply to oral opinions unless memorialzed in
written torm and communicated in writing to the client or others. ] To the extent that the purpose
or contemplated use of a Tax Opinion presupposes that the preparation or scope of the opinions
set forth in the Tax Opinion will conform to specific statutory, regulatory, ethical or other
authoritative requirements, the standards set forth in this statement are supplemental to and not in
lieu of such other requirements. which are incorporated herein by reference. Thus, for example, a
Tax Opinion which also constitutes a -tax shelter opinion" for purposes of Section 10.33 of
Circular 230, 31 C.F.R.. Subtitle A, Part 10 ("Circular 230"), or A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346
should, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements ot those authorities in order to comply with the
standards articulated in this statement. Similarly, a Tax Opinion stating that a client may properly
take a certain position on its tax return should, at a minimum, satisfy the requirements of I.R.C.
Section 6694 and Treas. Regs. Section 1.6694-2 as,-vie
, Section 10.34 of Circular 230, and
A.B.A. Formal Opinion 85-352.
3.
Competency of Practitioner to Render Tax Opinion. A practitioner who
accepts an engagement to provide a Tax Opinion assumes an obligation to be knowledgeable, as
of the time that the Tax Opinion is rendered, in the relevant aspects of Federal tax law. To the
extent that any opinion set forth in a Tax Opinion is based upon any other person's.aaa io,,.o(
opinion or conclusions regarding any aspect of Federal tax law or 4" any aspect of state or
-ederal non-tax law. the author ot the Tax Opinion should identify such other person and should
explicitly describe the opinion or conclusions of such other person being relied upon.
Additionally, ifnecessary or advisable in order to avoid misunderstanding, the author of a
Tax Opinion should summarize the substance ot the analysis i "i'l.'05" -1 such other person
in reaching his or her opinion or conclusions or should provide a copy of such analysis as an
attachment to the Tax Opinion.

I Although not subject to the specific standards applicable to written Tax Opinions. oral opinions
regarding the tax consequences of specific factual circumstances are equally subject to the
requirements of competency, thoroughness, and all other applicable ethical standards. See also
Treas. Regs. Sections 1.6 664-4(cX2) and 1.6 6 9 4-2(cX3).
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Statement of the Intended Purpose of the Tax Opinion. Underlying the
4.
standards set forth in this statement is a recognition that Tax Opinions may be prepared to serve a
variety of needs or purposes and that. therefore. those standards should be sufficiently flexible to
accomnodate those different needs or purposes. However. if necessary or advisable in order to
eliminate any risk of misunderstanding, a Tax Opinion should explicitly state the purpose or
purposes for which it has been prepared, whether or not the author contemplates that any person
other than the client for whom the Tax Opinion was prepared may rely upon it: and. if warranted
under the circumstances, any purpose for which reliance upon the Tax Opinion by the client or
any other person was not contemplated and/or would be inappropriate. In addition. if specific
statutory, regulatory, or other authoritative standards govern the manner in which opinions should
be prepared for a particular purpose. such as, for example, establishing a basis for the client's
"reasonable belief' under Treas. Regs. Section 1.6662-4(gX4) or for "reasonable cause" under
Treas. Regs. Section 1.6664-4(c)(2), a Tax Opinion should not be issued for such a purpose
unless the author has complied in good faith with those standards and includes in the Tax Opinion
a specific representation to that effect. These various disclosure requirements are not intended to
limit an attorney's flexibility in providing written advice, but to ensure that the flexibility
contemplated by this statement is not inadvertently exceeded or purposefully abused.
5.
Factual Circumstances; Duty of Inquiry. Unless otherwise self-evident from
the context in which it is prepared. a Tax Opinion should clearly identify.u the material factual
circumstances upon which the author's conclusions are based. In any case inw'which the Tax
Opinion may be presented to or relied upon any person other than the client, the Tax Opinion
should describe the extent of any due diligence emplay.d conducted by the author or others to
verify the accuracy ot the material facts underlying the opinion and the reasonableness of any
material assumptions. In such a case as well, the Tax Opinion should specifically describe and
identify the source of any material representations as to future activities, such as financial
projections. For example, the Tax Opinion may state that the material facts or representations as
to future activities have been established by a written certificate from the client or others, by an
opinion of an expert, or by the author's own investigation. This standard does not require an
attorney to "audit" the facts as presented by his or her client. However, the attorney must make
further inquiry if any asserted facts, assumptions, or representations as to future activities are
materially incomplete, inconsistent with other circumstances, or otherwise implausible or suspect.
See A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346. which discusses an attorney's duty to make factual inquiries in
the context of a tax shelter opinion: aW A.B.A. Formal Opinion 335, which establishes guidelines
for opinions regarding the sale of unregistered securities; and Section 10.34 of Circular 230. It
is improper to issue a Tax Opinion on the basis of stated tacts or representations as to tuture
activities which the author of the Tax Opinion knows to be false. At least in cases in which the
Tax Opinion will be presented to or relied upon by any person other than the client, it is also
improper to issue a Tax Opinion which ignores or assumes away factual circumstances of which
the author of the Tax Opinion is aware and which, if properly considered, would materially alter
the author's analysis or conclusions.
6.
Relating the Law to the Facts. A Tax Opinion should relate the applicable
legal authorities, or the modification, extension, or reversal thereof, to the relevant factual
circumstances. If, under the-applicable legal- standards, the resolution of a material legal issue
depends upon how a related factual issue is decided, the Tax Opinion should so state, identifying
the factual issue to be decided and, if appropriate, stating how, in the author's opinion, the factual
issue is likely to be resolved. Alternatively, if the Tax Opinion resolves the material legal issue
by making an assumption regarding the outcome of the related factual issue. the author should so
state. In an appropriate case, a Tax Opinion should also explain how the material legal issue

SI3S.3

would likely be resolved if the related factual issue was decided contrary to the predicted or
assumed outcome.
7.
Identify All Material Tax Issues. In certain situations, the governing standards
requiri the author of a Tax Opinion to address and opine upon all material tax issues. See Section
10.33(aX3) of Circular 230,wpa,or A.B.A. Formal Opinion 346. In other cases, based upon the
intended purpose of the Tax Opinion, an attorney may restrict the scope of a Tax Opinion to
specific issues. However, whenever reasonably necessary in order to avoid any
misunderstanding, the author of a Tax Opinion should identify all material tax issues and should
specifically designate those material tax issues as to which no opinion or prediction is being
rendered.
8.
Legal Analysis. A Tax Opinion should express the author's degree of
confidence in a stated opinion and, if appropriate. discuss whether the pertinent legal authorities
and factual circumstances constitute "substantial authority" for purposes of the substantial
understatement penalty established by I.R.C. Section 6662. These requirements are especially
important when a stated purpose of the Tax Opinion is to insulate the client against penalties with
respect to a specific position by setting forth counsel's opinion that there exists the stated degree
of probability that the position in question would be sustained if litigated and decided on the
merits. In such a case, the author of the Tax Opinion should analyze the position in question in
light of the required level of probability. Only if the author concludes unequivocally and in good
faith that the required level of probability existed as of the relevant date may the Tax Opinion be
given for the stated purpose of penalty protection.
9.
Discussion of Penalties. Whenever an attorney advises a client that. under the
existing facts and applicable law, the client may properly take a return position which, if
disallowed. may expose the client to penalties. the attorney should advise the client concerning
the existence of those penalties and how the client may avoid their imposition by disclosure, by
the timely filing of a qualified amended return, or otherwise. See A.B.A. Formal Opinion 85352. A Ta. G-i.i-... "hich f is- :-I...j failure to give such advice, even though the
circumstances so warrant, .aikto -..p
6,h
violates the standards of acceptable practice
contemplated by this statement. See Treas. Re.-p:S~ion 1.6694-2(c)(3)(ii); Circular 230, Sc
I 0.34(a)(2).
10.
Duty to Prevent Misuse of Tax Opinion. Lastly, the committee believes that,
after issuing a Tax Opinion. the attorney and his or her firm should not ignore any inadvertent or
deliberate misuse of that Tax Opinion of which they become aware. For example, if an attorney
or the firm learns that. without prior approval, the client is using the Tax Opinion for a purpose
for which it was not intended, the attorney or the firm should take affirmative steps to correct the
situation. Obviously, those steps will depend upon the circumstances. However, even an
attorney's ethical obligation to protect the confidences and secrets of the client may be limited
under some circumstances if the client or another person is deliberately misusing the attorney's
work product to defraud or to mislead others. See generally A.B.A. Formal Opinion 92-366
concerning the misuse of an opinion on non-tax issues.
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I Although not subject to the specific standards applicable to written Tax Opinions, oral
opinions regarding the tax consequences of specific factual circumstances are equally
subject to the requirements of competency, thoroughness. and all other applicable ethical
standards. See also Treas. Regs. Sections 1.6664-4(c)(2) and 1.6694-2(c)(3).
I
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COMMENTS ON ETHICS 2000 PROPOSED RULES AND COMMENTS
(March 6, 2000)

These comments were drafted by a Task Force consisting of Donald P. Lan, Jr., Michael
B. Lang (serving as chair of the Task Force), Denise D. J. Roy, Ira B. Shepard, Sylvan Siegler
(serving as liaison to the Ethics 2000 Commission), and Bryan Skarlatos. The Task Force has
also considered comments received from James P. Holden. The Task Force was appointed by
Linda Galler, Chair of the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice of the Section of Taxation.
Proposed Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.15, 1.18, 4.4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and the proposed
deletion of Rule 2.2 are discussed in these comments.
The contact person is:

Michael B. Lang
University of Maine School of Law
246 Deering Avenue
Portland, Maine 04102
(207) 780-4366
Fax: (207) 780-4239
E-mail: mlanuci-Dusm.maine.edu

General Comment - Lawyers in Multidisciplinary Practice
The proposed Rules and Comments do not address situations where lawyers are
performing work that clearly constitutes the practice of law in a multidisciplinary practice firm
(MDP). The Task Force understands that the Ethics 2000 proposals to date have not undertaken
to address such issues.

Proposed Rule 1.4
Proposed Rule 1.4 provides a definition of the "informed consent" standard used
elsewhere in the proposed rules. It is apparent that this standard was not intended to be
substantively different from the consent "after consultation" standard found in the current rules,
such as Model Rules 1.6 and 1.9. However, deletion of the "consultation" requirement seems to
suggest that the proposed rule embodies a lower requirement for two-way communication than
does the current rule. This implication may be partly offset by the inclusion of the "informed"
concept in the new standard. Nonetheless, it would be preferable to retain the "after consultation"
requirement as part of proposed Rule 1.4(c)'s definition of informed consent. In addition, the
definition of "informed consent" should be modified to add a reference to the "advantages" as well
as the material risks of the proposed course of conduct, following the language of present Model
Rule 2.2.
Proposed Rule 1.7(b) requires that informed consent in the context of waiving a conflict of
interest be in writing. There is no apparent reason to limit the writing requirement to this

situation. Accordingly, it would be appropriate to add the requirement that informed consent be
in writing to the definition of informed consent in proposed Rule 1.4 and make conforming
changes in the other proposed rules and comments.
Either Rule 1.4 or the Comments should cross-reference all rules in which informed
consent is required for any action. Furthermore, if the lawyer's duties to another client or to a
former client, or the lawyer's own interests or duties to a third person will materially limit the
communication with a client required by Rule 1.4, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.7, relating
to conflicts of interest. This point should be mentioned in the Comments to Rule 1.4.
Although the proposed placement of the informed consent standard in Rule 1.4 has some
merit in that the rule deals with communication, it might be more appropriate to place the
definition in the terminology section of the Rules, with a cross-reference in Rule 1.4 instead. In
the alternative, the terminology section should include a cross-reference to Rule 1.4 to assist
readers who look in the terminology section for a definition of the term "informed consent."

Proposed Rule 1.5
Proposed Rule 1.5, like the other proposed rules, does not refer directly or by crossreference to other rules of conduct imposed upon specific segments of the legal community.
While Comment [2] notes that "applicable law "may impose limitations on contingent fees," the
Comments should also state that applicable law may provide more general limitations on fees.
For example, lawyers authorized to appear before the Internal Revenue Service are subject to
Treasury Department Circular 230 (Circular 230), §10.28(a) of which prohibits a "practitioner"
from charging "an unconscionable fee for representing a client in a matter before the Internal
Revenue Service." It is unclear whether this standard is different from the standard in proposed
Rule 1.5.
Comment [2] should emphasize that Rule 1.5(d) is not an exhaustive list of situations in
which a contingent fee is prohibited. For example, §10.28(b) of Circular 230 does not permit a
practitioner to charge a contingent fee for preparing an original tax return and limits the
circumstances in which a contingent fee may be charged for preparing an amended return or a
claim for refund.
Circular 230 may also affect the subject of proposed Rule 1.5(e), relating to the division of
a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. Section 10.30 of Circular 230 restricts the
associations of an attorney with any persons or entities who, to the knowledge of the lawyer,
obtain clients or otherwise practice in a manner forbidden under that section. While this is a much
broader restriction than.Rule 1.5:s restriction on fee-sharing,.it suggests the possibility of adding
to the Comments a statement that other provisions of applicable law may impose additional
restrictions, covering more than just fee-sharing, on a lawyer's professional associations.

Proposed Rule 1.6

In applying the confidentiality obligation, uncertainty may arise as to when a lawyer is
representing a client, thus causing the confidentiality obligation to arise. This uncertainty may
arise in many contexts, including situations where lawyers are employed by MDPs. For example,
"information relating to representation of a client" may or may not include information relating to
services other than legal services, such as return preparation, that a lawyer may provide along
with legal services. In this context, one might ask whether an activity that is not itself a "legal
service" can be the sole basis for "representation of a client." The Comments to Rule 1.6 should
address this issue and refer to Rule 5.7 and the Comments to Rule 5.7 on the lawyer's
responsibilities when providing law-related services. While these issues will be important in the
MDP context, they also arise outside the MDP context; the Comments should attempt to address
the non-MDP context.
The Comments should also clarify that the term "another" in proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2) and
(3) includes a governmental entity and that these provisions permit disclosure of client
information, for example, in the case of paragraph (b)(2), to prevent the client from committing
tax fraud that is likely to result in substantial injury to the taxing jurisdiction's financial interests
(loss of revenue) in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services.
Unfortunately, the expanded permissive disclosure rules of proposed Rule 1.6(b)(3) may
also present opportunities for extortion-like behavior. For example, assume a lawyer represents a
client in a transaction that is arguably fraudulent, but unbeknownst to the lawyer. The lawyer is
not paid for his services. Subsequently, the transaction is questioned and the client is represented
by another lawyer. The proposed Rule may permit the original lawyer to threaten (perhaps in a
way that does not constitute extortion) to reveal client confidences unless the lawyer is paid. The
fact that a lawyer could disclose client confidences to some extent if in a suit to collect the fee the
client counters with a claim of inadequate representation may lead some lawyers to believe they
can engage in the kind of extortion-like behavior described earlier. Serious consideration should
be given to whether proposed Rule 1.6(b)(3) would permit such behavior by the lawyer, if so,
whether that result is appropriate, and, if not, whether the proposed Rule should be modified.
New Comment [151 requires a lawyer called as a witness or otherwise ordered to reveal
information relating to the client's representation to assert on behalf of the client "all nonfrivolous claims that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege or other applicable law." As written, it is unclear whether this requirement applies if a
statute or regulation mandates disclosure of information relating to the client as, for example,
might be the case under IRC section 60501, requiring persons engaged in a trade or business
(including lawyers) to report certain information about transactions in which they receive more
than $10,000. While new Comment [15] might be.read broadly to require the lawyer to assert on
behalf of the client all non-frivolous claims of privilege when faced with a provision such as
section 60501, the Comment's application to this kind of situation should be clarified by adding

the words "or is mandated by statute or regulation" to the second sentence of the Comment after
the word "ordered."

Proposed Rule 1.7

A.

Caption

It is not clear why the word "Concurrent" was added to the caption. The Reporter's
Explanation states that the word was added to distinguish "concurrent" conflicts from other
conflicts. However, since the proposed Rule applies to conflicts with current clients, former
clients and third parties as well as conflicts with the lawyer's own interests, it is unclear what
"'other" conflicts are. An introductory comment distinguishing "concurrent" conflicts from other
conflicts may be appropriate.
B.

Subsections (a) and (b) and Written Informed Consent

The reorganization of this rule, as proposed, is very helpful without affecting the
substance of the prior rule. The new requirement of written informed consent is generally a good
idea because it will focus attention on the client's interests and possible conflicts and will eliminate
any confusion over the existence of a waiver. The requirement of informed consent in writing
should be extended to all Model Rule informed consent requirements.
It should be noted that a Task Force of the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice that
reviewed Circular 230 last year did not recommend requiring that informed consent under §10.29
of Circular 230 (relating to conflicts of interest) be in writing. However, the Task Force noted
that imposing such a requirement in the absence of a similar requirement under the ABA Model
Rules would lead to significant inadvertent noncompliance. Parallel written informed consent
requirements in all ethical rules and other applicable law would help facilitate compliance by
affected lawyers.
C.

New Comment [31 - Conflicts That Arise After Representation Begins

New Comment [3] should include a discussion of how an attorney determines which client
he or she may continue to represent when such continued representation is appropriate. This idea
is briefly addressed in new Comment [20], which states:
Ordinarily, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation of
the client who will be least harmed by the lawyer's withdrawal. The
lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to
minimize harm to the clients.

However, it is difficult to imagine a conflict situation in which it would be appropriate to drop one
client and continue representing another client whose interests are adverse without obtaining
written informed consent from both clients. Accordingly, if a conflict arises between two existing
clients, the lawyer should be required to withdraw from representing both clients unless the
lawyer receives written informed consent from both clients to continue representing one of the
clients. In the process of obtaining written informed consent, the lawyer should disclose
(probably in writing) to both clients the risks, benefits and burdens that will result from the
lawyer's withdrawal from representing one or both clients.
One special category of situations in which this problem may arise is the joint
representation gone sour. For example, in a situation in which a lawyer represents a husband and
wife with respect to a joint tax liability and a conflict arises after the representation has begun
over an issue such as collection or innocent spouse relief, the lawyer should be required to
withdraw from representing both clients unless he receives written informed consent from both
clients. In the context of obtaining written informed consent, the lawyer should disclose
(probably in writing) the potentially adverse interests of the two clients, the difficulties in terms of
cost and familiarity with the facts in changing lawyers for either or both clients, and the benefit, if
any, of one of the clients continuing to be represented by the lawyer. While joint representation is
dealt with in Comments [28] to [3 1], those comments do not address how the lawyer should act
when a conflict arises after the joint representation has begun, except to generally note that
"ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the joint
representation fails." While it may be more appropriate to address conflicts arising after a joint
representation has begun in the comments about joint representation rather than in Comment [3],
the principles outlined above should apply in such situations.
D.

New Comment [41 - Renresentation of Competing Interests in Unrelated Litigation

New Comment [4] states that "representation of competing economic enterprises in
unrelated litigation does not constitute a conflict of interest." The sentence should be rewritten to
state that such representation "does not necessarilyconstitute a conflict of interest." In addition,
this Comment should include a cross-reference to Comment [23] and Comment [23] should
include a cross-reference to this Comment.
E.

New Comment [51 - Actual vs. Potential Conflicts

New Comment [5] includes a brief discussion of the possibility of subsequent harm to a
client if a conflict of interest arises in the future. The idea of potential conflicts of interest is an
important concept that should be expanded and discussed in its own separate comment. it is
important for lawyers to understand the difference between actual conflicts of interest that
currently exist and potential conflicts of interest that may arise in the future. Many client
engagements do not give rise to an actual conflict of interest, but the attorney must be able to
identify and evaluate potential conflicts of interest and, under certain circumstances, should be
required to discuss potential conflicts with the clients. Joint representations are the most common

source of potential conflicts. For example, representation of a married couple in connection with
a joint income tax return does not ordinarily involve an actual conflict of interest, although there is
always a potential conflict. However, when at some point in representing the couple with respect
to a tax deficiency the possibility of an innocent spouse defense arises, the potential conflict
becomes an actual conflict. While Comments [28] to [31] address such joint representation
situations at some length, potential conflicts in other contexts should also be addressed by a
comment.
F.

New Comment [91 - Conflicts Between Clients in the Same Litigation

New Comment [9] states that conflicts between clients represented by the same lawyer in
the same litigation are non-consentable because of the need for the lawyer to vigorously develop
each client's position. The Comment should clarify that such a conflict is non-consentable
because of the requirement of loyalty to each client, including the responsibility to vigorously
develop each client's position. The Comment should cross-reference the relevant rules regarding
this duty.
G.

New Comment [131 - Waivers of Future Conflicts

New Comment [13] discusses current waivers of future conflicts. This Comment should
cross-reference the proposed new Comment [5] discussing actual versus potential conflicts.
H.

New Comment [181 - Third Party Payment of Legal Fees

New Comment [18] deals with conflicts between a client and another person who is
paying for the client's legal fees. The Comment does not make any reference to written informed
consent. The Comment should clarify that, if a conflict exists, the lawyer must - after determining
that the conflict is consentable - obtain written informed consent of the client to the arrangement.
I.

New Comment [201 - Conflicts Arising During Representation

New Comment [20] should be expanded as discussed above under, and subsumed under,
new Comment [3].

J.

New Comment [231 - Issue Conflicts

New Comment [23] should not be limited to inconsistent legal positions taken in tribunals.
The same conflicts can and do arise in non-litigation contexts, including representing clients
before administrative agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service or the Environmental
Protection Agency, before legislative bodies or in private negotiations. ABA Formal Opinion 314
(1965) concluded that the Internal Revenue Service was not a tribunal. Either new Comment [23]
should be generalized to cover a broader range of situations than representation before tribunals

or a similar comment should be added to the group of comments dealing with non-litigation
conflicts.
K.

New Comment r281 - Joint Representation

New Comment [28] discusses special considerations in joint representations and states
that, "ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the
joint representation fails." The Comment should contain more information about how and when a
lawyer can choose between two or more jointly-represented clients who have a conflict, as
discussed in comments to new Comment [3] above. There should be a cross-reference to new
Comment [3] which discusses these ideas.

Proposed Rule 1.8
As in the case of proposed Rule 1.7, it is not clear why the word "Concurrent" was added
to the caption for proposed Rule 1.8.
Many of the paragraphs in proposed Rule 1.8 allow a client to waive a conflict provided
the client gives informed consent in writing. However, it is not clear that the drafters intended to
imply that every situation in which written informed consent is permitted automatically involves a
consentable conflict. To the contrary, it is likely that the drafters intended for lawyers to engage
in the same analysis regarding consentability on a case by case basis that is required under
proposed Rule 1.7. If this is so, then new Comments [1] through [3] should incorporate (either
by reference or by repeating the steps here) the same four-step analysis set forth in new Comment
[1] under proposed Rule 1.7. This four-step analysis requires a determination of consentability in
each case.

Proposed Rule 1.9
Proposed Rule 1.9 changes the standard for obtaining a former client's consent to a
conflict of interest. The idea of having one "informed consent" standard for all rules where client
consent may be required is a good idea. See comments above on proposed Rule 1.4 regarding the
"informed consent" standard.
Model Rule 1.9(c)(2) (which prevents a lawyer from revealing confidential information
gained in a former client relationship) is proposed to be moved from this Rule to proposed Rule
1.6(a), but retained in its entirety. This change makes sense.
Proposed Rule 1.10

The changes reflected in proposed Rule 1.10 seem appropriate. In particular, the
expansion of imputed disqualification to include all paragraphs of Rule 1.8 seems appropriate and
may have the incidental effect of protecting the profession from the appearance of impropriety in
that application of the proposed Rule 1.10 will call to clients' attention the profession's rigorous
conflict of interests rules. Proposed Rule 1.10(a)'s coverage of situations where the lawyer
"reasonably should know" of the conflict should have the salutary effect of causing firms without
conflicts review procedures to adopt them.

Proposed Rule 1.15
New Comment [2]'s statement that the disputed portion of funds "must" (as opposed to
"'should" in the current Comment) be kept in a trust account is a salutary change making the
lawyer's obligation clear.
More generally, however, although proposed Rule 1.15(c) is intended to prevent lawyers
from remitting disputed property to clients when the lawyer is obligated to retain the property and
to require distribution of property which is not in dispute, the operative language of the Rule does
not seem to depend on the apparent merit or bona fides of claims to the property. That is, the
Rule calls for retention of disputed property regardless of the basis for the dispute. While this
approach may help keep the lawyer out of the middle of the dispute, it may also result in hardship
for the lawyer and the client where a claim to the property is frivolous. Proposed Comment [3]
limits the requirement to disputes involving "lawful claims" and the lawyer's "duty under
applicable law to protect [lawful] third party claims against wrongful interference by the client."
If this is the standard intended by the drafters, it should be incorporated into the language of the
Rule itself, rather than relegated to a Comment. However, a "lawful" standard is perhaps vaguer
than necessary or even desirable. A more readily applied standard might be something akin to the
formulation in Section 57 of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, March 29, 1996). That section includes an exception to the obligation to deliver
property to the person entitled to receive it where "there are substantialgrounds for dispute as to
the person entitled to the property." (Emphasis added.)

Proposed Rule 1.18
Proposed Rule 1.18 represents an attempt to codify the duties that a lawyer owes to a
prospective client. Although the existence of such a duty has been well-settled for some time,
this attempt to clarify and codify the nature of this duty is an excellent idea. Nonetheless, the
proposed Rule 1.18(c) test of "significantly harmful" information will be difficult to implement. Of
particular significance is the fact that the.prospective client attempting to show that the lawyer
received information that could be "significantly harmful" to the prospective client within the
meaning of the Rule may need to disclose the very information sought to be protected.

Suppose the lawyer is not aware of any such information, but the client fears that
apparently innocuous information conveyed during the consultation may prove harmful in light of
later developments. For example, information initially disclosed may later raise a possible statute
of limitations defense to the prospective client's claim. Another, and perhaps more usual, example
would be a change of story between the time of the initial consultation and the then moreeducated prospective client's retainer of another lawyer.
There is also the possible problem of initial consultations for the purpose of disqualifying
the lawyer. This is often difficult to demonstrate, particularly if the prospective client is
disingenuously indiscrete during the consultation. Whether the Rule or Comments should
address this problem may depend on how common this problem is perceived to be.
The exceptions to disqualification in proposed Rule 1. 18(d) (as interpreted in proposed
Comments [3] through [7]) go some way to resolving some of the above difficulties, but these
exceptions give rise to problems of their own. The exception in Proposed Rule 1.1 8(d)(1) permits
post-consultation waivers with "informed consent." Such informed consent may be difficult to
secure after the fact, particularly in the case of a prospective client; a prospective client would
have no incentive to provide consent.
Proposed Comment [4] goes even further than proposed Rule 1.1 8(d)(1) in permitting the
lawyer to secure the prospective client's advance waiver of both the prohibition on representation
and the prohibition on use of any information conveyed during the consultation. The waiver, of
one or both of the prohibitions, requires the prospective client's informed consent and is an
approach previously approved in ABA Formal Opinion 90-358, but it is not clear whether this
approach will really provide a viable option for dealing with most prospective clients. In any
event, such informed consent is likely to be difficult to demonstrate after the fact, unless (as
suggested above in connection with proposed Rule 1.4) the informed consent is required to be in
writing.

Proposed Rule 1.1 8(d)(2) permits adverse representation by the consulted lawyer's firm
provided that the consulted lawyer took care to limit the information received during the initial
consultation and the lawyer is "screened." The first requirement is desirable, but it is subject to the
"changed story" and the "disingenuously indiscreet" problems. Expansion of the screening
remedy to situations involving prospective clients sounds appealing inasmuch as prospective
clients are entitled to less protection than actual clients. However, the lesser protection already
afforded the prospective client, when coupled with the concerns of observers about whether there
are leaks in the screens, argues against extending the screening remedy to this situation.
The application of proposed Rule I. 18 in an MDP context may prove particularly difficult
since it may be unclear in such circumstances whether a person consulting a lawyer about the
possibility of hiring the lawyer is thinking of entering into a client-lawyer relationship. While the
MDP problem is not yet ripe for addressing, a similar problem currently exists in situations where
one lawyer engages in both law practice and in the provision of law-related services. The

relationship between proposed Rule 1.18 and Rule 5.7 should be explained in the Comments,
perhaps clarifying when the duties under proposed Rule 1.18 do not arise because the client is
only seeking law-related services.

Proposed Deletion of Rule 2.2
Model Rule 2.2 merits deletion. It is difficult to distinguish from Model Rule 1.7. It really
adds nothing to the latter rule.

Proposed Rule 4.4
Proposed Rule 4.4(b) puts the burden of avoiding inquiries as to privileged information on
the lawyer who seeks information from a third person if the lawyer "knows or reasonably should
know" that the information is privileged. Placing this burden on the lawyer may be unwise.
Proposed Comment [2] indicates this proposal is designed, at least in part, to protect material in
the hands of an organization's present or former employees which is protected by a privilege of
the organization itself. Nonetheless, precluding the lawyer's seeking of such information before
the organization's privilege has been established seems undesirable and may, in some cases,
facilitate improper cover-ups. An alternative approach might be to require the lawyer to advise
the person from whom the information is sought that some other person may have a legal right to
prevent the disclosure of the information, leaving the decision on whether to disclose to the
person from whom the information is sought.
Proposed Rule 4.4(c) attempts to solve the longstanding question of what a lawyer is
to do upon receiving an inadvertently sent document. The Rule simply requires that the sender be
notified promptly, but does not resolve the question of whether the receiving lawyer may read the
document and/or will be presumed to have read the document. This is a crucial question and
should be addressed. It seems too important an issue to leave entirely to the lawyer's unguided
discretion. Proposed Comment [3]'s statement that other aspects of this problem are matters of
law "beyond the scope of these Rules" is of no help, particularly where there is no clear rule of
law.

Proposed Rule 5.1
Paragraphs (a) and (b) should apply to lawyers with supervisory authority over the
professional work of a legal department in a nonprofit organization, such as a charity, church or
university. Comment [1] should clarify thispoint, perhaps by substituting "organization" for
"enterprise" in the first sentence thereof and adding "nonprofit organization"
after "enterprise" in
the second sentence thereof.

Paragraph (b) of Rule 5.1 should apply to a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority
over professional work of another lawyer in an MDP to the extent that the work of the other
lawyer constitutes the practice of law, regardless of how other issues involving MDPs are
resolved. A sentence to this effect should be added to Comment [3]. The application of
paragraph (a) to MDPs is problematic and not appropriate for commentary at this time.
Proposed Rule 5.2
Proposed Comment [2] should be clarified to indicate that paragraph (b) only applies if the
lawyer acts in accordance with a "supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable
question of professional duty" as a lawyer. The ethical standards of any other professions of
which one or both of the lawyers is a member are not relevant and may not be relied upon to
resolve the question.

Proposed Rule 5.3
A comment should be added on this rule paralleling proposed Comment [1] to Rule 5. 1,
indicating that the Rule refers to lawyers who have supervisory authority over non-lawyer
assistants in a firm or a legal department of an organization, enterprise or government agency.
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General Comment - Lawyers in Multidisciplinary Practice
As the Task Force noted in its first report (dated March 15, 2000), the proposed Rules
and Comments do not address situations where lawyers are performing work that clearly
constitutes the practice of law in a multidisciplinary practice firm (MDP). The Task Force
understands that the Ethics 2000 Commission to date has not undertaken to address MDP issues.
Proposed Rule 1.2
Under Proposed Rule 1.2(c), a lawyer is permitted to limit the scope of representation "if
the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent."
According to Proposed Comment [5]:
A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited
objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation
is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to
accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the
client thinks are too costly....
Proposed Comment [6] states that any limitation 'must be reasonable under the circumstances."
As an example, the Proposed Comment explains that if the client is merely attempting to secure

general information about the law the client needs "in order to handle a common and typically
uncomplicated legal problem," the lawyer and client may agree to limit the lawyer's services to a
telephone consultation. Such limitations do not exempt the lawyer from the duty of competence,
but the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining whether competent representation
is afforded.
The Task Force strongly endorses Proposed Rule 1.2(c), explained in the Comments as
permitting a client and an attorney who is asked to render legal advice to agree to limit the extent
of the work performed. In tax practice, clients often wish to limit the extent of work performed
on matters that involve a relatively small amount (and the clients seek correspondingly minimal
fees), or where time constraints preclude extensive consideration. If the client understands the
implications of the limitations on the quality of the representation and on the advice sought from a
lawyer, the lawyer should be permitted to undertake representation on the client's terms. Thus,
the lawyer and the client should be able to agree that the lawyer will spend more or less time or
energy on a particular matter. A lawyer, however, may not agree to provide advice that is so
limited in scope as to violate the duty of competence.
The Task Force also agrees that the duty of competence is not an absolute standard
requiring that the lawyer go to all lengths in all representations, but rather that the extent of the
lawyer's duty in any particular representation depends on its own facts. Thus, it is appropriate to
take into account financial or time pressures in measuring the extent of the work to be done by a
lawyer in fulfilling the duty of competence. The duty to provide competent representation must
include a scope of representation that is sufficient to render useful service to the client within the
constraints of time and financial resources.
Proposed Comment [6] should address the lawyer's obligation to undertake adequate
research to make an informed and intelligent judgment. Where the lawyer is able to consult
relevant texts, treatises and articles, and draw upon relevant experience, it may be appropriate to
do so and to forego additional research into primary authorities. This may be so even if
exhaustive research might change the lawyer's advice as to the course of conduct. The Comment
should emphasize that it is incumbent upon the lawyer to decide when enough research has been
performed to conclude that, under the circumstances, the lawyer's judgment is adequately
informed.
Either the Rule or a comment should require the lawyer to indicate the extent to which the
client reasonably can rely upon the lawyer's advice. Thus, the lawyer normally should advise
whether the client reasonably could proceed to plan a transaction or take other contemplated
action based upon the level of advice provided. In the case of a tax lawyer, fbr example, the
lawyer should be required to advise whether the advice provides sufficient basis to take a position
in a tax return without running the risk of a penalty under I.RC..§ 6662, or whether the advice
reflects little more than the lawyer's "gut reaction."
The Comments should also expressly state that limiting the scope of representation is

improper in three contexts. First, limiting the scope of representation is not appropriate where the
lawyer can reasonably anticipate that legal advice rendered to a client may also be relied upon by
third parties, for example, courts or other third party non-clients. Thus, a client should not be
able to limit the work performed by an attorney in preparing a brief or other court document
involving a complex issue that cannot adequately be addressed given such a limitation. The court
is owed duties, including the duty of candor, that the client cannot waive nor the client
engagement mitigate.
Secondly, the Comments should state that a client may not limit an attorney's work in
preparing a tax or other legal opinion that will be referenced in promotional materials provided to
prospective investors, who are entitled to rely upon the advice of the attorney. Ordinarily, it
would be impossible both to explain adequately to third parties the effects of a limitation on the
agreed scope of the work and to ascertain whether the third parties sufficiently appreciate the
risks of relying on advice based on such a limited scope representation. Moreover, a tax attorney
has an obligation to the tax system not to give casual advice on substantial issues that are likely to
be relied upon for tax reporting, particularly where a number of third parties may be involved.
Third, the Comments should state that limiting the scope of representation is not
appropriate whenever the lawyer's duties under other statutes, rules, or laws might thereby be
compromised. Thus, a lawyer must always observe the rules of a court or an administrative
agency before which the lawyer practices. Similarly, tax lawyers should not agree to limit the
scope of representation in a manner that could expose the lawyer to penalties under the Internal
Revenue Code (e.g., I.R.C. § 6694 return preparer penalty).
As a final comment, the Task Force notes the importance of Proposed Rule 1.2(c) to pro
bono practice. In the tax area, for example, volunteer attorneys often enter appearances before
the United States Tax Court on behalf of otherwise pro se litigants merely for purposes of settling
cases with IRS. Appeals Officers on the same day as an appearance. (Whether it is ethically
proper to represent a client in these negotiations with little opportunity for preparation depends
primarily on whether such representation satisfies the lawyer's duty of competence, which in turn
depends on the facts and circumstances.) If the pro bono attorney is unable to reach a settlement
with the Appeals Officer, it is unclear under the current rules whether the attorney may decline
further representation. Some believe that this uncertainty has deterred otherwise willing attorneys
from taking on these cases. The Proposed Rule would clarify that an attorney and client could
agree to the limited representation. This subject is addressed in Proposed Comment [2] to New
Rule 6.5, which crossreferences Proposed Rule 1.2(c). A mention of this situation in the
Comments to Proposed Rule 1.2(c), with a crossreference to New Rule 6.5 would be appropriate.
Proposed Rule 1.11
Proposed Rule 1.1 (a) provides that a lawyer who formerly served as a public officer or
employee of the government is (1) subject to Rule 1.9 and (2) "except as law may otherwise

expressly permit, shall not represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer
participated personally and substantially" in his former role without the informed consent of the
appropriate government agency. Proposed Rule 1.1 (b) states that when a lawyer is disqualified
from representation under paragraph (a), no lawyer in the firm with which the lawyer is associated
who knows or reasonably should know of the lawyer's disqualification may undertake or continue
representation in the matter unless prescribed screening and notice procedures are followed.
Proposed Rule 1.11 (c) states that, except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having
information known to be confidential government information about a person acquired when the
lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a client whose interests are adverse to
that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that
person. The term "confidential government information" is newly defined and replaces the
definition found in paragraph (e) of the current Rule. Proposed Rule 1.1 1(d).is a counterpart of
paragraph (a) and addresses the case of a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee.
Such a lawyer, like one who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of the
government, is expressly made subject to Rule 1.9.
Proposed Comments [2] and [3] indicate that Rule 1.10 is not intended to apply to impute
disqualification to the other lawyers in the disqualified lawyer's firm or government agency when
Proposed Rule 1.1 (a) or (d) applies to an individual lawyer. This latter point is not clear from
the Proposed Rule and is very important; it should be expressly spelled out in the Rule, perhaps by
adding the parenthetical "(but is not subject to Rule 1.10)" after the reference to "Rule 1.9" in
Proposed Rule 1.1 (a) and (d). See Proposed Preamble and Scope [21].
The comments below focus primarily on Proposed Rule 1.11 (a)(1) and its application of
Proposed Rule 1.9 to former government employees or officers. Proposed Rule 1.9 addresses
conflicts of interest and states that a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are substantially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation. The latest version of
Proposed Comment [1] to Proposed Rule 1.9 states that current and former government lawyers
must also comply with Rule 1.11 (deleting the earlier version of the Proposed Comment to the
effect that in the case of these lawyers Rule 1.11, and not Rule 1.9, applies). Until now, then,
Rule 1.11 has been regarded as the exclusive source of guidance concerning disqualification by
reason of prior government service and Rule 1.9 has been considered irrelevant. The distinction
between the two Rules was also honored in prior drafts of Proposed Rule 1.11.
Under the current Proposed Rule 1.11 (a), a former government official who in any
a position adverse to the government is disqualified under Rule 1.9 if the "matter"
is substantially related to work done while in government service. While the term "matter" is
defined in Proposed Rule, 1. 1 to.require specific proceedings and parties, thereby excluding such
activities as rulemaking, Proposed Rule 1.9 contains no similar restrictive definition of the term,
and the term "matter" is likely to be construed more broadly in Rule 1.9 than it is in Rule 1.11.
This conclusion follows from an examination of section 213 (analogous to Rule 1.9) and section
nmatter" takes

214 (analogous to Rule 1.11) of the new Restatement, where Comment d. to section 214 states
that the "definition is narrower than that governing former client conflicts of interest under section
213." The difference is also apparent when the definition of "matter" in Proposed Comment [2] to
Proposed Rule 1.9 is compared with the definition of "matter" in Proposed Rule 1.11. Thus,
although both 18 USC §207(a)(1) and Circular 230 (31 C.F.R. § 10.26), the latter governing those
admitted to practice before the Internal Revenue Service, define amatter" in a way that excludes
rulemaking, the broad definition of matter for purposes of Rule 1.9 (as applied by Proposed Rule
1.11) seems to cover rulemaking.
Assuming Rule 1.9's definition of "matter" does include "rulemaking," Proposed Rule
1.11 (a)'s application of Rule 1.9 to former government lawyers would represent a major
departure from existing conflict of interest rules, rules that have worked well in the context of tax
practice without generating problems that warrant fundamental change. For example, while
section 10.26 of Circular 230 permits a former government lawyer who participated in rulemaking
to represent a private party with regard to the rulemaking so long as the lawyer does not use
confidential government information or challenge the validity of the rule, Rule 1.9 (as applied by
Proposed Rule 1.11) would bar the former government lawyer from such representations. The
Proposed Rule, as so interpreted, would effectively preclude a former government lawyer who
was involved in drafting regulations from ever representing a client who wanted to take a position
adverse to the government with respect to such regulations. This would severely limit the job
mobility of government lawyers and make it increasingly difficult for the government to attract
talented lawyers for certain kinds of positions. While Proposed Comment [2] makes it clear that
Proposed Rule 1.1 1(b)'s special imputation rule, allowing the screening of the disqualified lawyer,
will apply with respect to former government lawyers rather than the total firm disqualification
rule of Rule 1.10, this is unlikely to offer much solace to the former government lawyer whose
regulatory drafting experience is extensive, thus disqualifying her from representing numerous
clients who may want to take a position adverse to the government.
While the Task Force recognizes the concern of the Commission about the perception of a
"revolving door," where former government lawyers are perceived to sell the expertise acquired
during their government service, the Proposed Rule, as so interpreted, would be truly draconian.
Furthermore, if adopted by any State Bar, the proposal would apparently apply to former
government lawyers who left government service for private practice years before the Rule's
adoption. Indeed, this interpretation would be very reasonable in light of the Proposed Rule's
lack of a time limitation on the disqualification period and the fact that any other interpretation
would confer an enormous competitive advantage on those lawyers who left government service
before any stated effective date for the Proposed Rule.
Furthermore, the restrictive nature of the Proposed Rule would be likely, at least in the tax
field, to encourage former government lawyers to accept positions with accounting firms, which
generally take the view that they are not engaged in the practice of law. This avenue would be
particularly attractive to the former government lawyer who is also a certified public accountant.
In the alternative, a tax lawyer might argue that he is permitted to represent a client, at least

before the Internal Revenue Service, despite the prohibition that the Proposed Rule would impose
because he is only subject to the more liberal conflict of interest rule of Circular 230. Since a
lawyer's right to practice before the Internal Revenue Service depends on his membership in good
standing of any State, possession, territory, Commonwealth or the District of Columbia Bar, if the
lawyer were admitted to the Bar of a State in which the Proposed Rule had not been adopted, the
lawyer's right to practice before the Internal Revenue Service would probably be unaffected by
adoption of the Proposed Rule by the Bar of another State in which the lawyer's client resides.
For all of these reasons, the Task Force urges that Proposed Rule 1.1 (a) not subject
former government lawyers to Rule 1.9. In the alternative, if the Commission does not intend
Proposed Rule 1.1 1(a)(1) to apply Rule 1.9 to "matters" defined broadly to include rulemaking,
this intention should be made clear by expressly stating that in applying Rule 1.9 to former
government lawyers under Rule 1.11, the definition of "matter" in Rule 1.11 is controlling. At an
absolute minimum, application of Rule 1.9 to former government lawyers should be limited to a
reasonable time period after the lawyer leaves public service, such as the one-year time period of
section 10.26(b)(4) of Circular 230.

Proposed Rule 1.12
Rule 1.12 deals with conflicts of former judges and arbitrators who may represent clients
that previously appeared before them in their capacity as judge or arbitrator. The Proposed Rule
expands Rule 1.12 to include mediators and other third-party neutrals. By doing so, the Proposed
Rule provides different rules for (i) a former judge or other adjudicative officer and (ii) an
arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral who participates in either court-ordered or private
dispute resolution.
Proposed Rule 1.12(a), as amended, only applies to a former judge or other adjudicative
officer. It provides that a lawyer may not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which
he/she participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer unless the
client gives "informed consent," as opposed to the current Rule's "consent after consultation."
Subparagraph (a) also provides (as it did in prior subparagraph (c)) that no other lawyer in a firm
in which a disqualified former judge or adjudicative officer is associated who knows of that
lawyer's disqualification may undertake or continue representation unless the disqualified lawyer
is screened from the matter, is partitioned no part of the fee therefrom and written notice is
promptly given to the prior tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with provisions of the
Rule. The Proposed Rule 1.12(a) broadens the requirement of a Chinese wall to situations where
the firm knows or "reasonably should know" of the lawyer's disqualification. The Task Force
questions the workability of the requirement that a screened former judge not be apportioned any
part of the fee from the representation, particularly in the case of a large firm.
'The Task Force commented on both this generic change in the Proposed Rules and on the
"informed consent" standard in its earlier report, dated March 15, 2000.

New Rule 1.12(c) provides that an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral may
not represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's
interests are materially adverse to the interest of any former party to the proceeding in which the
lawyer served as an arbitrator, mediator or a third-party neutral unless the former party gives.
informed consent, again without consultation. This disqualification rule differs from the rule
applicable to a former judge in two significant respects.
First, the former judge must have participated personally and substantially in the matter.
The rule for arbitrators and neutrals only requires that the prospective client not be involved in the
same or a substantialy related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to any

party to the proceeding. There is no definition of "substantially related matter" in either the
Proposed Rule or the Proposed Comments. The Proposed Rule might be read as barring an
arbitrator, mediator or a third-party neutral from taking a legal position for a client that is adverse
to a legal position taken by a party in the proceeding in which the lawyer served as a mediator,
arbitrator or a third-party neutral. Applying the Proposed Rule to such "issues conflicts,"
however, seems too harsh. The Comments should reject this construction and provide additional
guidance about the meaning of the phrase "materially adverse."
Secondly, Proposed Rule 1.12(c) imputes disqualification of the lawyer to all lawyers in
the lawyer's firm who know or reasonably should know of the disqualification (parallel language
to subsection (a)) absent informed consent. There is no provision here, like that for former
judges, for allowing the firm to continue representation without informed consent if it builds a
Chinese wall and apportions no part of the fee to the neutral. Although Proposed Comment [2]
justifies the absence of such a screening option on the theory that the neutral may have
confidential information, the same is true of former government lawyers for whom a screening
option is provided in Proposed Rule 1.11 (c). The Task Force urges the Commission to consider a
similar option for the firm of a disqualified neutral.
Arbitrators were removed from the rules governing former judges because the
Commission believes that former judges do not typically have confidential information or share
confidentiality obligations with respect to the parties as do arbitrators, mediators and other thirdparty neutrals. This distinction makes sense, but not where the arbitrator or mediator is merely
arguing a legal position for a client in a different matter that may be adverse to a party to the
proceeding. Proposed Comment [2] suggests that the "substantially related matter" aspect of the
Proposed Rule may only be intended to apply where the former neutral is likely to have
confidential information, and thus may not be intended to cover an issues conflict. The Task
Force considers this the correct approach and believes, as stated above, that the Comments should
clarify that the Proposed Rule does not apply to issues conflicts.
Finally, it is unclear what rule applies to a lawyer who as a former government employee
served as an adjudicative officer, arbitrator or mediator, such as an IRS Appeals Officer. Is that
lawyer governed by Proposed Rule 1.12(a) or (c), as appropriate, or is the lawyer governed by

Proposed Rule 1.11, which deals with representation of clients by a former government
employee? The Rules should clarify which rule is to control in such a situation.

Proposed Rule 1.16
Current Rule 1.16(b)(3) allows permissive withdrawal if the client insists upon "pursuing
an objective" that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent. Proposed Rule 1.16(b)(4) would
change this to allow permissive withdrawal if the client insists upon taking action (instead of
"pursuing an objective") that the lawyer considers repugnant or "with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement." By making the trigger that can prompt withdrawal an "action," rather
than focusing on the client's objectives, the Proposed Rule applies a more objective standard. The
Task Force endorses this change.
The Proposed Rule also deletes the word 'imprudent." The Commission removed the
word "imprudent" because it permitted a lawyer to threaten withdrawal in order to prevail in
almost any dispute with the client. The Commission feels this change will prevent lawyers from
undermining their clients' ability to direct the course of the representation, a goal the Task Force
supports.
Proposed Comment [7] provides no examples of situations where the lawyer has a
"fundamental disagreement" with action that the client insists on taking. Thus, it appears that a
lawyer could withdraw under the Proposed Rule if he/she had a moral or religious objection to the
action the client wanted to take. The Task Force believes withdrawal should be permitted in such
a situation only if the lawyer could not reasonably have foreseen that the client might insist on
taking the objectionable action at the time the lawyer accepted the representation. Proposed
Comment [7] should elaborate on the meaning of the phrase "fundamental disagreement" with
respect to this and other situations.
Rule 1.16(b)(5) provides that a lawyer may withdraw if the representation will result in an
unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer. Proposed Rule 1.16(b)(6) modifies the rule to allow
withdrawal only if the representation would result in an unforeseeable and unreasonable financial
burden. The Commission believes that lawyers should not be permitted to withdraw when the
financial burden of the representation was foreseeable at the outset since lawyers are in a better
position than clients to assess the situation and avoid the financial burden. Consequently, if the
likelihood of the financial burden is apparent at the outset, the lawyer should decline
representation at that time. The Task Force supports this change and also believes that the
Commission should add a foreseeability element to Proposed Rule 1.16(b)(4) as well, as stated
above.
While Proposed Rule 1.16(c) maintains the current requirement that a lawyer must
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for termination when ordered to do so by a
tribunal, the Proposed Rule also requires that the lawyer comply with applicable law requiring

notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. Thus, if a court requires
that a lawyer notify the court of withdrawal or move for leave to withdraw, the Proposed Rule
requires the lawyer to do so. This probably just states the obvious.

Proposed Rule 1.17
Proposed Rule 1.17(b) modifies the current requirement that a law practice be sold as an
entirety to another lawyer or law firm to permit the entire practice to be sold to one or more
lawyers or law firms. The Task Force supports this change, which is designed to allow a lawyer,
for example, to sell his family law practice to family lawyers and his bankruptcy law practice to
bankruptcy lawyers, thus ensuring that the most competent practitioners are obtaining the cases.
Proposed Rule 1.17(c) deletes the current requirement that written notice of the terms of
the proposed change in the fee arrangement be given to each of the seller's clients. Proposed Rule
1.17(d) deletes the second sentence of current subparagraph (d), which allows the purchaser to
refuse to undertake the representation of any acquired client if the client refuses to pay increased
fees to the purchaser, provided such fees do not exceed the fees charged by the purchaser for
rendering substantially similar services. This change, effectively requiring the purchaser to
continue to charge the same fee that the client contracted for with the seller, justifies no longer
requiring written notice of a change in the fee arrangement. The Task Force supports these
changes. As the Commission notes, since the seller could not withdraw if the client refused to pay
increased fees (thus forcing an amendment to the fee. contract), the purchaser of the law practice
should not be able to do so either.

Proposed Rule 4.2
Proposed Rule 4.2 makes only a minor change to Rule 4.2 to expressly provide that a
lawyer may communicate with a person represented by counsel if he is authorized to do so by a
court order. This salutary change was made to alert lawyers to the availability of'judicial relief in
rare situations in which it is needed. The majority of the proposed changes affect only the
commentary.
A.

Rule - Indirect Communications by a Lawyer's Agent or Representative

Rule 4.2 states that a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of representation
with another person who is represented by another lawyer. However, the Rule does not mention
anything about indirect communications by a lawyer through the lawyer's agent or representative.
Thus, there is no prohibition against a lawyer counseling a client or an agent to communicate
with a represented person in a specific way that the lawyer could not do directly. The Rule should
contain language preventing communications with a represented person, directly or indirectly.
For an example of such a rule, see N.Y. CODE PROF. RESPONSIBLITY § 1200.35. Alternatively,

the Rule could expand the prohibition to cover agents or others acting on the lawyer's behalf
2.

Proposed Comment [2 - Communication Between Parties

Proposed Comment [2] provides that "parties to a matter may communicate directly with
each other...." Consistent with the change to the Rule suggested above, this Proposed Comment
should clarify that a party may not communicate with another represented party if he is doing so
at the request of or on behalf of the first party's lawyer.
1.

Proposed Comment [31 - Investigative Activities of Government Lawyers

Despite prosecutors' concerns, the Commission has decided not to recommend special
rules governing communications with represented persons by government lawyers who are
conducting an investigation. Instead, the Commission refers the issue to current law. Proposed
Comment [3] states that communications by government lawyers prior to the commencement of
criminal or enforcement activities may be authorized by law: However, the Proposed Comment
further provides that a communication is not necessarily authorized by law simply because the
communication does not violate a constitutional right. The Proposed Comment is intentionally
ambiguous about when a communication may be unauthorized despite the fact that it does not
violate a constitutional right. It would be helpful to have some additional explanation or examples
to highlight the types of other laws that could be implicated. For example, the Comment could
refer to other ethical rules, such as the attorney-client privilege, that could be implicated by
prosecutorial communications with represented persons.
2.

Comment [6] - Communications with
Agents or Employees of Represented Organizations

Proposed Comment [6] discusses the circumstances under which a lawyer may contact
employees or agents of a represented organization. Current Comment [4] prohibits
communications with any employee or agent having managerial responsibility within the
organization and any employee or agent whose statement may constitute an admission on the part
of the organization. This rule effectively creates a bright line test in most cases, distinguishing
between people currently employed by the corporation who, therefore, generally can make
admissions for the organization and people not currently employed by the organization who,
therefore, cannot generally make admissions for the organization. Proposed Comment [6]
effectively narrows the protections offered to the organization by eliminating the language
regarding managerial responsibility and the language regarding people who may make admissions.
Instead, the Proposed Comment prohibits contact with employees or agents who supervise,
direct, or regularly consult with the organization's lawyers regarding the subject matter, or any
person who has authority to obligate the organization with respect to-the matter. There may be
more certainty and reliability in the rule of the current Comment which, as stated, essentially
created a bright line test between current and former employees. The Task Force hopes that the
benefit of the narrowed protection for organizations justifies the less clearly applied rule of

Proposed Comment [6].

Proposed Rule 4.3
Proposed Rule 4.3 emphasizes the prohibition on giving legal advice to unrepresented
persons by incorporating the text of the prohibition found in Comment [I] under the current Rule.
The Proposed Rule also adds a new limitation to the prohibition by providing that it only applies
to situations in which the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person's interests "are or have a reasonable possibility of being" in conflict with the client's
interests. Finally, the Proposed Comments add a paragraph defining what generally constitutes
the giving of impermissible advice.
A.

The Rule - Prohibition on Giving Legal Advice to Unrepresented Persons

It is appropriate to limit the prohibition to circumstances in which the unrepresented
person's interests are in conflict with the client's interests. However, the language of the Proposed
Rule creates some ambiguity because it provides that the prohibition applies when the lawyer
"reasonably should know" that the interests of the unrepresented person have a "reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client." While it may be appropriate to
include such broad language, there will be issues regarding when a lawyer reasonably should
know of a conflict and when there may be a reasonable possibility of a conflict, as opposed to an
actual conflict. Some explanation in the commentary would help to reduce this uncertainty.
B.

Proposed Comment [2] - What Constitutes Impernissible Advice

Proposed Comment [2] attempts to define what constitutes impermissible advice when
there is or may be a conflict of interest. The examples state that it is permissible for a lawyer to
explain his own view of the meaning of a document. This permits a lawyer to explain the meaning
or legal effect of a document to an unrepresented person. Such an explanation essentially
constitutes the giving of legal advice. Thus, it would be appropriate to require a lawyer to advise
the unrepresented person of the need to consult independent counsel in any circumstance where
the lawyer finds himself explaining the meaning of a document to the unrepresented person if the
lawyer believes or has reason to believe the interests of the unrepresented person are in conflict
with the interests of the lawyer's client.
Proposed Rule 5.5
The Task Force supports Proposed Rule 5.5(b) to the extent that it codifies the
widespread view that the listed safe harbor activities do not constitute unauthorized practice of
law. The Task Force, however, believes the safe harbor list should be expanded. While the Task
Force's reasons for supporting such expansion focus on the practice of federal tax law, these

reasons also apply to any law practice that focuses principally on federal law.
Paragraph 8 of the Reporter's Explanation of Changes to Model Rule 5.5 (the
"Explanation") notes that the Commission considered a proposal to broaden the Proposed Rule
5.5(b)(2) safe harbor to allow occasional interstate practice by an out-of-state lawyer in
connection with the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed (the
"Proposal"). The interstate practice "need not involve a specific matter of a client in the lawyer's
home jurisdiction, but rather may involve a client who contacted the out-of-state lawyer because
of that lawyer's national reputation." According to the Explanation, the Commission is not yet
persuaded that it should adopt the Proposal. However, the Commission invites comments on the
matter. The Task Force urges the Commission to adopt the Proposal.
The Proposal is particularly relevant to tax lawyers. Many tax lawyers have national
reputations, based upon their expertise in federal tax law. It is not uncommon for clients all over
the country (or the world) to solicit tax advice from such renowned experts.
Paragraph 7 of the Explanation refers to Section 3 of the American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers as a model for the safe harbor in Proposed Rule
5.5(b)(2)(ii). Section 3(3) of the Restatement provides:
A lawyer properly admitted to practice in a jurisdiction may provide legal services
to clients in a matter:
(3) in a tribunal or administrative agency of the federal government
in compliance with requirements for admission to that tribunal or
agency. (Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, Preliminary
Draft No. 13, Aug. 11, 1997)
Under this formulation, a lawyer admitted to practice before the Internal Revenue Service under
Circular 230 (31 C.F. R. Part 10) should be allowed to give federal tax advice to clients in any
state, whether the lawyer is admitted to practice in that state or not. Indeed, while a lawyer's
right to practice before the Internal Revenue Service derives from the lawyer's good standing as a
member of the Bar of any State, possession, territory, Commonwealth or the District of
Columbia, there are no geographical limits on where the clients so represented may reside or have
their domicile or principal place of business. (See Circular 230, §§ 10.2 and 10.3.) At the very
least, the Commission should expand the Proposed Rule 5.5(b) safe harbors to recognize that this
type of multijurisdictional practice is allowed.
Even if the lawyer is not fbrmally admitted to practice before the Internal Revenue
Service, occasional interstate practice for the purpose of giving federal tax advice should be
expressly permitted. -As Paragraph I of the Reporter's Explanation notes, in view of "the
increasingly interstate and international nature of some clients' legal matters, the Commission
believes that some latitude should be accorded an out-of-state lawyer." Consistent with this view,
Proposed Comment [2], in explaining the rationale for the safe harbors, provides in part:

There are occasions in which lawyers admitted to practice in another jurisdiction,
but not in this jurisdiction, will engage in conduct in this jurisdiction under
circumstances that do not create significant risk to the interests of their clients, the
courts, or the public.
Surely, the practice of federal tax law is one of those occasions. The ability to interpret federal
tax law is not restricted to lawyers situated in any particular jurisdiction. Thus, a Wyoming
lawyer may interpret the Internal Revenue Code as well as a New York lawyer. The out-of-state
federal tax lawyer is the kind of lawyer meriting the "latitude" referred to by the Reporter's
Explanation.
There is a possibility that the federal tax advice would turn on the peculiarities of state and
local law, matters in which the federal tax lawyer might have no expertise. This possibility,
however, is uncommon outside a few specialized areas of tax-related practice, such as estate
planning. Moreover, Rule 1.1 obligates the lawyer to provide competent representation. If state
or local law issues arise, the tax lawyer has an obligation to assure competent representation,
whether by associating a local lawyer or otherwise. Comments on a safe harbor for occasional
interstate practice should emphasize this point and crossreference Rule 1.1. Subject to the
lawyer's obligation to provide competent representation, the risks inherent in allowing federal tax
lawyers to practice interstate are slight, and are far outweighed by the benefits to be derived from
allowing clients access to tax advice from the very best federal tax lawyers, no matter where they
may be.
As suggested above, those who specialize in federal tax law (and other areas of federal
law) often do not limit their practice or their client base to the jurisdiction in which their Bar
admission and office are located. Although it has been reported that some State Bars have sought
to preclude such out-of-state lawyers from representing clients within their jurisdictions, this
effort is unlikely to be fruitful in the long run. The principal effect of current restrictions in this
area may be that an occasional out-of-state lawyer whose client refuses to pay a fee may find the
local court unwilling to assist with collection of the fee on the theory that the lawyer was engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law. The Task Force doubts that such cases benefit either the
public or the profession.

Proposed Rule 7.1
In general, the transformation of Rule 7.1 into Proposed Rule 7.1's simple ban on "false or
misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services" makes sense. The Proposed
Comments demonstrate that the concerns reflected in the existing Rule are best addressed as
examples of false or misleading communication rather than by the overly broad prohibitions of the
existing Rule. The first sentence of Proposed Comment [2], however, adds a materiality standard
to the Rule's application that is unclear. The Proposed Comment implies that a truthful statement

is prohibited only if the statement is "materially misleading," but that a false statement is
prohibited regardless of whether it is misleading. This seems like a reasonable interpretation of
the Rule since there would seem to be no reason to prohibit a truthful statement that is not
materially misleading. If this is the intended interpretation, the materiality standard should be
included in the language of the Rule rather than added in a comment.

Proposed Rule 7.2
The Task Force applauds the changes in both Proposed Rule 7.2 and Comment [3] to the
Rule recognizing the legitimacy of electronic communication as a medium for advertising legal
services.

Proposed Rule 7.3
Given the simplification of Proposed Rule 7.1, Proposed Rule 7.3(a)'s continued ban on
direct solicitation of prospective clients, now extended to include real-time electronic contact
as
well as in-person or telephone contact, seems a vestige of another era. While the Task Force
recognizes as salutary the addition of an exception for solicitation of a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has a "close personal" relationship, the Commission's rationale that it added
this
exception because it was "difficult to justify prohibiting a lawyer from calling a close friend"
suggests both the difficulty of applying the "close personal" relationship exception as a practical
matter and the unnecessarily restrictive nature of the general rule.
Since the Proposed Rule, if adopted, will only be invoked by an unhappy client, the client
will then presumably be arguing that the lawyer had no close personal relationship with the client
before the solicitation of the client's business. The lawyer will presumably be arguing the
existence of a prior close personal relationship with the client. Assuming this dispute takes place
in an environment where the solicitation itself was neither false nor misleading (otherwise Rule
7.1
would apply and Rule 7.3(a) would be superfluous), it seems likely that the dispute over the
application of the Rule will be even more unseemly than the disputed solicitation. To put the
matter in a different context, would the Proposed Rule permit a soccer parent lawyer to explain
her firm's practice capabilities to another soccer parent sitting near her at a game if their
relationship is founded upon conversations at soccer games and an occasional school board
meeting? If not, would that be a good result? And how much more would be required for the
existence of a "close personal" relationship?
Indeed, the Task Force believes this discussion indicates that any ban on solicitations is
properly limited to solicitations which are either false or misleading, which are already prohibited
by Rule 7.1 (and would continue to be prohibited by Proposed Rule 7.1), or to the situations
covered by Proposed Rule 7.3(b), those involving prospective clients who have made known
to
the lawyer a desire not be solicited and solicitations involving coercion, duress or harassment.

The words "undue influence," "intimidation," and "over-reaching" could be added to Proposed
Rule 7.3(b). The Task Force doubts that solicitations by lawyers are generally, or even
frequently, "fraught with the possibility" of such behavior and does not think this possibility in a
small fraction of cases is justification for Proposed Rule 7.3(a) as suggested in Comment [I],
particularly in view of Proposed Rules 7.1 and 7.3(b). Nor is the availability of advertising and
other forms of nondirect communication a good reason for banning direct solicitation.
The Task Force recognizes that the Commission is not addressing issues involving
multidisciplinary practice firms. Nonetheless, there is an aspect of Proposed Rule 7.3(a) that is
particularly relevant to the ongoing competition between accountants and lawyers, particularly in
the tax field. In Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993), the Supreme Court invalidated
Florida's ban on direct, in-person solicitation of employment by certified public accountants,
distinguishing Ohralikv. Ohio State BarAssn, 436 U. S. 447 (1978), which upheld a ban on inperson solicitation by lawyers. The two cases can be distinguished on a variety of grounds other
than the professions of the litigants: Ohralik approached an accident victim at a time of high stress
and vulnerability, while Edenfield proposed to telephone supposedly more sophisticated business
executives of small and medium-sized businesses. Ohralik's solicitation could be characterized as
an invasion of privacy, while what Edenfield proposed would not have been so characterized.
Nonetheless, if a lawyer solicited business in the way Edenfield proposed to do, the solicitation
would be prohibited by Proposed Rule 7.3(a).
The Task Force, however, believes there is considerable doubt following the Edenfield
decision that application of Rule or Proposed Rule 7.3(a) to a tax lawyer who followed
Edenfield's solicitation practices would pass constitutional muster. The Task Force also doubts
most State Bars would seek to enforce the Rule on such facts. Adoption of a rule that is either
unlikely to be enforced or not enforceable in most instances breeds disrespect for the law. The
Task Force believes Rule 7.3(a) is such a rule and that it has long outlived its usefulness.
Furthermore, however a court might respond to an attempt to enforce Rule 7.3(a) in the
case of an in-person or phone solicitation by a tax lawyer, Edenfield leaves little room for
restricting such nondeceptive solicitation by certified public accountants. However, the activities
of lawyers and certified public accountants in the tax field overlap considerably. Lawyers should
be free to compete on an equal basis in this respect with certified public accountants. For this
reason, the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice of the Section of Taxation overwhelmingly
approved a 1998 recommendation of a Task Force that Circular 230 (31 C.F.R. §10.30), which
governs those admitted to practice before the Internal Revenue Service, be amended to permit
direct solicitations of prospective clients that do not involve false, fraudulent, unduly influencing,
coercive, unfair, misleading or deceptive statements or claims. (These recommendations were
forwarded to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in 1999.) The current Task
Force believes this is the correct-approach to regulating solicitation by all lawyers, not just tax
lawyers, and urges the Commission to consider it carefully.

The Task Force also notes that Circular 230 (§§ 10.2 and 10.3) permits an attorney in
good standing of the bar of the highest court of any State, possession, territory, Commonwealth.
or the District of Columbia to practice before the Internal Revenue Service. This authority is
widely viewed as allowing the attorney to represent clients before the Internal Revenue Service,
regardless of where the attorney is admitted to practice or where the client resides, is domiciled or
has its principal place of business. For this reason, if Circular 230 is amended to permit direct
nondeceptive solicitation of prospective clients for representation before the Internal Revenue
Service, a lawyer admitted to practice in State A may be able to engage in direct solicitation of
such clients in State B without concern about State B's Rule 7.3(a) ban on direct solicitation, the
lawyer's limited authority to represent such clients in State B deriving from Circular 230 and the
lawyer's bar membership in State A. Assuming State A either has a lenient rule regarding direct
solicitation of business by lawyers or is not interested in regulating the lawyer's activities in State
B, the State A lawyer will have a competitive advantage over lawyers admitted in State B in being
able to directly solicit prospective clients in State B. Elimination of the general ban on direct
solicitation of prospective clients from State B's Rule 7.3(a) would correct this disparity by
placing the lawyers in State B on an equal footing with those from outside the state.
The Task Force does not believe that Proposed Rule 7.3(c) (or the existing version of the
Rule) serves any valuable purpose. The Task Force wonders if the Rule is actually enforced in
any jurisdiction in which it has been adopted. The Task Force suspects that the required
"advertising material" label causes many recipients to discard written communications unopened
and to ignore recorded or electronic communications, and wonders if this was not part of the
original motivation for the Rule. In the absence of a demonstrated showing of a need for such a
requirement, the Task Force suggests that the Commission should consider deletion of Rule
7.3(c).
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L.

THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S DUTY OF COMPETENCE
American lawyers advising on law outside the of the United States must do so competently.
Model Rule 1.1. Thus, lawyers have a duty to inform themselves about foreign law if they
render legal services involving or requiring knowledge of foreign law. See In re Roel, 3
N.Y.2d 224, 232 (1957) ("When counsel who are admitted to the Bar of this State are
retained in a matter involving foreign law, they are responsible to the client for the proper
conduct of the matter, and may not claim that they are not required to know the law of the
foreign State."); see also Hart v. Carro, Spanbock, Kaster & Cuiffo, 211 A.D.2d 617, 619
(2d Dept. 1995) (principle applied in legal malpractice action).

"In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular
matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter,
the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question,
the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to
refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the
field in question." Comments to Model Rule 1.1.

The level of competence required by

Model Rule 1.1 must take into account the inherent complexity of international transactions
created not only by two or more sets of legal rules, but also by multijurisdictional and/or
multicultural business practices and customs as well as time and distance constraints.

Care should be taken, of course, not to practice law in a jurisdiction in which one is not
licensed. See generally, infra, VI.

II.

"REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS": THE TAX LAWYER'S BASIC
ETHICAL STANDARD
ABA Formal Opinion 85-352 (1985) defines the basic ethical standard governing lawyers
engaged in federal tax practice. The opinion states (in pertinent part):

"[A] lawyer, in representing a client in the course of the preparation of the
client's tax return, may advise the statement of positions most favorable to the
client if the lawyer has a good faith belief that those positions are warranted
in existing law or can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer can have a good faith belief
in this context even if the lawyer believes the client's position probably will
not prevail.

However, good faith requires that there be some realistic

possibility of success if the matter is litigated."

The opinion does not address a lawyer's ethical responsibilities in rendering tax advice.
Distinguished commentators, however, have asserted that the standards stated in Opinion 85352 should apply with respect to tax planning, particularly where return positions ultimately
will be involved. See BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS,
STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE

§ 204.2.1 (5h ed. 1999); Report of the Special Task Forceon

FormalOpinion 85-352,39 TAXLAW. 635,636 (1986); Gersham Goldstemi & Christopher
K. Heuer, EthicalDisclosureRequirements in Corporate Tax Representation, in ETHICAL
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN CORPORATE TAX REPRESENTATION,

at 767,812-13 (PLI Tax

Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 434, 1998). Even if Formal Opinion
85-352 does not apply to tax planning, a lawyer may never counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. Model Rule 1.2(d).
See, infra, III.

Does the realistic possibility of success standard apply to advice with respect to positions
taken under foreign laws? Although Opinion 85-352 literally applies only to tax advice in the
context of U.S. tax return positions, the principles applied are: (1) the generic litigation
standard applicable whenever lawyers act as advocates (Model Rule 3.1), and (2) the
prohibition against lawyers advising criminal or fraudulent behavior (Model Rule 1.2(d)). Just
as a U.S. attorney admitted to practice in one state must respect the substantive law of other
U.S. states in rendering legal advice, so too should a U.S. attorney respect the laws offoreign
nations.' Cf. South Carolina Ethics Advisory Opinion 79-05 (1979) ) (South Carolina lawyer
may not advise clients that a foreign divorce decree will withstand a direct attack in South
Carolina if the decree violates the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction).

'Moreover, an American attorney advising with respect to foreign laws might be engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction. See, infra, VI.

IUL

ADVISING THE CLIENT IN ILLEGAL OR FRAUDULENT CONDUCT: ETHICAL
STANDARDS
The same ethical standards apply where a client's conduct is, or may be, illegal or fraudulent.

A.

Conduct the Lawyer Knows isIllegal or Fraudulent
According to Model Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer may neither counsel a client to engage in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent nor assist a client in engaging
in such conduct. Thus, if a client is prohibited under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction
from engaging in certain acts, a U.S. lawyer may not counsel or assist the client as to
such acts. The lawyer may present an analysis of legal aspects of questionable
conduct but may not recommend the means by which a crime or fraud might be
committed with impunity. Comments to Model Rule 1.2.

If a client's course of action has already begun (and is continuing) when the lawyer
discovers the criminal or fraudulent nature of the acts, the lawyer may not continue
to assist the client with respect to the matter. Withdrawal from representation may
be required. Id.

A.

Conduct the Lawyer Believes to be Illegal or Fraudulent
A lawyer has discretion in dealing with conduct that she believes, but does not know,
may be intended to further an illegal or fraudulent act or scheme. According to
Model Rule 1.16(b), a lawyer may, but need not, withdraw from representation if,

inter ala:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that
the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent,
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud,
or
(3) the client insists on pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent.

A lawyer may withdraw under these circumstances only if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests.

B.

Lawyer's Duty of Inquiry
What is the lawyer's duty of inquiry when a client requests assistance or advice as to
otherwise legal conduct under circumstances that give rise to suspicion that the
conduct may be used to further an illegal or fraudulent act? A lawyer should not
undertake representation without first making inquiry if the facts presented by a
prospective client suggest that the representation might aid the client in perpetrating
a fraud or otherwise committing a crime.

In ABA Informal Opinion 1470 (1981), a prospective client requested a lawyer's
advice as to lawful means of bringing funds into the United States in a manner that
avoided or minimized tax liability. The client had received the funds, which were

substantial, while employed abroad from sources other than his employer. The client

had not disclosed the payments to anyone else and had not reported them in his U.S.
income tax returns. The client had not revealed facts sufficient to enable the lawyer
to determine the legality of the transactions surrounding the payments, but the lawyer
suspected that the payments might have been unlawful bribes or kickbacks and that
in taking the payments the client might have breached duties to his employer. The
Opinion concludes that the lawyer has a duty to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding receipt of the funds by the client in order to assure the lawyer that the
client is no longer engaging in illegal or fraudulent conduct and that the requested
services would not be predicated upon the client's past fraud or other criminal
conduct. Cf.Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof and Jud. Ethics,
Formal Opinion 1999-02 (1999) (a lawyer may assist a fugitive client in otherwise
legal conduct where the lawyer does not know or believe, after inquiry, that the
conduct is unlawful or will contribute to commission of an illegal or fraudulent act).

ABA Formal Opinion 246 (1982) indicates that a lawyer violates ethical standards in
rendering a tax shelter opinion ifshe accepts as true "facts" told to her by a promoter,
when the lawyer should know that further inquiry would disclose that such "facts" are
untrue. Opinion 246 therefore prescribes a duty of inquiry as to relevant facts and
circumstances.

"Recklessly and consciously disregarding information strongly

indicating that material facts expressed in the tax shelter opinion are false or
misleading involves dishonesty." Id; cf Circular 230 § 10.33 (a)(1) (prohibiting a

practitioner, in rendering a tax shelter opinion, from relying on a client's statements
of fact if she has reason to believe that any relevant facts are untrue).

D.

The Lawyer as Advisor
According to Model Rule 2.1, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other relevant
considerations, e.g., moral, economic, social and political factors, in rendering advice
to a client. The Comments to Model Rule 2.1 suggest that advice couched in purely
legal terms may be of little value to a client and, therefore, that it is proper for a
lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical consideration. These suggestions may
be particularly relevant in international law practice where the lawyer often plays a
role in educating clients on social, cultural, and/or moral aspects of doing business in
foreign countries.

IV.

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
A.

The Act
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended ("FCPA"), prohibits persons
from making offers or payments to foreign government officials or foreign political
party representatives in order to obtain or retain business. Specifically, the FCPA
authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice to bring criminal charges and the Securities
and Exchange Commission to impose fines and injunctions against companies,
officers, and directors who fail to take the steps necessary to avoid prohibited
payments.

The scope of the FCPA was broadened earlier this year to conform with the terms of
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

I.

The amendments substantially expand the definition of prohibited
conduct to include not only offers or payments made for the purpose
of "influencing any act or decision" of a foreign official or political
party representative or for "inducing such foreign official to do or not
to do any act," but also offers or payments made for the purpose of
"securing any improper advantage."

The amendments do not

eliminate the exception for expediting or facilitating payments.

2.

The amendments broaden the scope of persons and entities subject to
the FCPA. Prior to the amendments, the FCPA applied only to issuers
of securities registered under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,
"domestic concerns," and U.S. citizens. The FCPA's coverage now
include all foreign persons who commit an act in furtherance of a
foreign bribe while in the United States.

3.

The amendments extend the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA to acts
committed by U.S. businesses and nationals entirely outside of the
territorial boundaries of the United States.

"While aggressive enforcement of an expanded FCPA poses risks for U.S. companies
operating abroad, U.S. companies competing in the international marketplace
formerly at a competitive disadvantage should find themselves closer to an equal
footing with a greater number of foreign corporations. In theory at least, the adoption
of the OECD Convention empowers U.S. firms to present evidence of competitor
bribery directly to the authorities in the relevant countries rather than the pointless
diplomatic and media protests of the past. But businesses and individuals not
previously subject to FCPA provisions may now find themselves vulnerable to FCPA
liability. As a result, U.S. companies with employees or agents operating outside of
the United States would be well advised to re-evaluate their compliance policies an
procedures to ensure full compliance with the recent FCPA amendments." Joseph F
.Savage, Jr., Charles F. Willson, & Jennifer Martin, New Amendments to the Foreign
CorruptPracticesActBroadenIts Scope asEnforcement Increases,WmTE-CoLLAR
CRIME REP., July-Aug. 1999, at 1.

B.

The Lawyer's Role Where the Client Violates the FCPA
I.

The principles and considerations addressed, supra, at m, would apply.

2.

If a lawyer who represents a corporation knows or strongly believes that a

corporate executive is engaged in a violation ofthe FCPA, the question arises
whether the lawyer has a duty to report this to higher corporate levels.
According to Model Rule 1.13(b), the duty to take action is premised on both
a violation of the law and a risk of substantial injury to the corporation. The
Model Rules do not, however, prescribe a particular course of action, but
rather suggest a number of possibilities, including referring the matter to
higher authority within the corporation. For a general (but somewhat dated)
discussion of this question and related issues, see Roger J. Goebel,
ProfessionalResponsibilityIssues in InternationalLaw Practice,29 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 1.34-43 (1981).

V.

OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
A.

The Convention
Earlier this year, the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions ("OECD Anti-Bribery Convention") entered into
force. Signed by all twenty-nine member countries of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation (OECD) and five non-member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Chile, and the Slovak Republic), 2 the Convention provides generally for the
criminalization of bribery through domestic law and reform and the cooperation

2To

date, the Convention has been ratified by eighteen of the thirty-four signatories. The
United States has ratified the Convention.

among the signatories in battling corruption.3 The OECD Anti-Briberv Convention
represents the culmination of U.S. efforts to encourage its trading partners to enact
legislation similar to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention requires each government to "establish that it
is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or
give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order
that the official act or refrain from action in relation to the performance of official
duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the
conduct of international business."

Article 1(1).

"[C]omplicity in, including

incitement, aiding and abetting, or authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign
public official," as well as attempt or conspiracy, and criminalized by the Convention,
as well. Article 1(2).

To some (perhaps limited) degree, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention levels the
playing field for American companies, who have complained that they lose overseas
contracts to foreign competitors, which can or do pay bribes.

3See

also Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, signed April 1996 by twentyone members of the Organization of American States. This Convention requires signatories to
criminalize domestic and foreign bribery and to take measures to combat the illicit enrichment of
government officials. Signatories also agree to provide mutual assistance in criminal matters and
extradition with respect to covered offenses. Several signatories of this Convention, including the
United States, are also parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
11

B.

The Lawyer's Role Where the Client Violates the Convention
See, supra, IV(B).

VL

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Advising clients on foreign law may be considered the practice of law by a foreign
jurisdiction, subjecting the U.S. lawyer to claims of unauthorized practice of law. Engaging
in unauthorized practice violates the ethical standards of the jurisdiction in which the attorney
is licensed, Model Rule 5.5, and also may be actionable under the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction. "As a practical matter, it is normally the lawyer's home jurisdiction that is most
likely to bring a disciplinary action against the member lawyer. Nevertheless, given the reach
of some long-arm jurisdictional statutes as well as the extraterritorial reach of some lawyer
regulation codes, legal services in one country that somehow relate to a transaction in another
may subject a lawyer to the courts and laws of a foreign country." Robert E. Lutz, Ethics
and InternationalPractice:A Guide to the ProfessionalResponsibilitiesof Practitioners,

16 FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 53, 60-61 (1992/1993).
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Question at Heart of New Tax Adviser Privilege

When Is Tax Practice 'Legal'?
BY CHRISTOPHER S. RZK

these challenges in the IRS Resrcturing

he recent report of the
American Bar Association's
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice stresses the need to
maintain client confidentiality. While
lawyers may believe they need not be
reminded of the sanctity of secrets, the
comuission understood that client confi.
dences may be underrmned when firms
include lawyers and non-lawyer pro!cssionals working side by side. The problem is simply this: A client's communications to his or her accountant. auditor,
or other nonlawyer professional ordinanly are not covered by the atomey-client
privilege.
Tax practice. in which lawyers and
non-lawyers frequently work together to
advise and represent clients, presents
perhaps the most visible example of the
challenges of maintaining client confidences in a multidisciplinary setting.
Last year. Congress addressed some of
Christopher S. Rtaek is a parmer at
D.C.'s Caplin & Drvsdale. From 1995 to
1998. Rizek served as attorney-adviser
and then associate tax legislative counsel in the Treasury Departmeni' Office
of Tax Legislative Counsel. While at
Treasur: he was the deparments main
negotiator on the taxpayer rights provisions of the IRS Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998.

and Reform Act of 1998, enacting a new
evidentary privilege for ceraim communications between taxpayers and their
advisers.
Issues relating to the scope of. and
exceptions to. this new privilege are sure
to be litigated in coming years. but commentary from the courts has already
begun. In dicta in United States v.
Frederick. 83 AFTR2d 99-1870 (7h Cir.
1999). Judge Richard Posner highlighted
the conceptual issue at the heart of the
new privilege: that it applies to accounor other nonlawyers only when they
ts
are rendering legal advice-in other
words. practicing law. This core problem
is likely to focus attention on a broader
issue in the tax field, namely the extent
to which Congress has overridden the
authority of stases to regulate
practice
of law.

COMMON LAW GAP
Common law recognizes no privilege
for communic pons made between individuals and their accountants. Since
there is no common law accountantclient privilege, federal courts do not recognize such a privilege under Rule 501
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Likewise, the U.S. Tax Court does not
recognize an accountant-client or tax
adviser-client privilege, even though it
allows accountants and others to epresent taxpayers before it. IRC §17452.
7453; Tax. CL Rule 200.

American University

Washington College of Law
Learning Tax Law Through Tax Practice.

In the 1998 law. however. Congress
creased a federal statutory privilege nalogous to the statutory accountant-client
privilege is many states. New §7525 of
the Internal Revenue Code provides:
With respect to tax advice, te same
common law protections of confidentiality which apply to a communicainon between a taxpayer and an atorney shall also apply to
a communication between a taxpayer and
any federally authorized tax pracuoner to
the extent the communicanon would be considered a privileged
communication if it
were between a taxpay.
er and an anorney.
The statute defines a
"federally authorized tax
pracuuoner" (FATP) as an
individual authorized to .
practice before the IRS
pursuant to 31 U.S.C.
§330. "Tax advice" is'
defined as "advice given
by an individual with resct to a m-ner
which is within the scope of the individual's authority to practice."
The statute identifies various exceptions to the new privilege. It does not,
apply to criminal tax maters. nor can it
be asserted in any proceeding other than
a federal civil tax maner (e.g.. in nontax
litigation or an investigation by the
Securities and Exchange Commiassion).
Like the attorney-client privilege, the
statutory privilege is wavable, so communications disclosed in nontax proceedings will presumably be nonprivileged in subsequent tax proceedings.
Finally. the new privilege does not apply
to certain communicatons related to carporaste tax shelters.
In order for communications -with
respect to tax advice" to be privileged
under thisprovision, they must be the
sort of communications that would be

protected if made between a lawyer and
a Client. Of Course, it is hoMbook law

that communications between a lawyer

WCL's Federal Tax Clinic prepares students
for the rigors of a sophisticated tax practice
through a program focused on resolving real
life tax disputes.
With advanced coursework in tax law and the
opportunity to represent clients before the
US Tax Court and the IRS. WCL students
enter the profession with a powerful combination of academic and practical experience.
For information about recruitment or to post a job
announcement, contact . Jill Barr, Director
Office of Career Services
(202) 274-4091

SOur

and a client are privileged only to the
exient they are made in conneeton with

legal advice.
Although defining the exact boundaries of "legal advice" has been the
source of much controversy over the
yeas, the general principle is well-euablished that communications with an
atoney that are not for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice (e.g.. manageal
consultations, investment or economic
analysts, or preparation of a taxrenum)
are not privileged. A fornor such com-

muications with a nonlawyer FATP cannot be privileged under 17525. Indeed.
the legislative history of the new privilege says exactly this. H. Conf. Rep. No.
105-599 at page 268.

Conversely, if a communication is
privileged only to the
advice" would be "legal
by a lawyer, then such
necessarily be a subset

extent the "tax
advice" if given
tax advice must
of legal advice.

True, some kinds of taxadvice may be

Students are Prepared for Practice.

N

AMEMCAN UNWVERSrn'

otaide the scope of legal advice. But a
communication for the purpoe of geting such tax advice would then be outauk the scope of th anorneyiat privilege even if made with a lawyer, and so
it would man noalmvielid m
the
new same
This analysis was apparently discerned
by Judge Pouner in Frederit and underlies his comment about the new privi-

I lege. Richard Frederick. who is an asorney and an accountant, rendered both
legal and tax return preparation services
to his chens. The court held thatne was
acting primarily as an accountantL not as
a lawyer, and thus that the communicauons at issue were not privileged. The
court correctly held that the new sunitory privilege was inapplicable because the
communicatuons occurred
before its effective date.
But Judge Posner nevertheless observed that the
new privilege can be
invoked onlyif the sub)ect
mustser of the communicauons is legal and. noting
that the IRS allows nonlawyers to practice before
it. said."Nothing in the
new statute. . suggests
that these non-lawyer
S
practitioners are entued
to privilege when they are
doing other than lawyvers"
work.'
Sothe question is not
whether privileged tax
advice constiutes legal advice. It doestudeed it must. or there
will be no privilege. The only question iswhether an
FATP can offersuch advice without
-engaging in theunathorzed pracuce of

-law. This is a -uch trckir issue. paruc.

-ulary i view of the accounting pmfession's.long-standing claim that an
accountnt isnot prscticing law when be
or she offers tax advice or other taxrelated
sm'viceL

PACTICE PUZZLER
The statutory provision cross-refer.
enced in the definition of an FATP autho.
rizesthe secretary of the Treasury to
"regulate the practice of representatives
of persons" before Treasury, to impose
certain requirements for admission to
such practice, and to suspend or disbar
such persons. 31 U.S.C. *330. The

authority to admit and regulate practice
is subject to5 U.S.C. 1500. which in turn
provides. with certain limitations, that a
member in good standing of the bar of a
state may practice before any federal
agency and that a duly qualified certified
public accountant may represent a person
before the IRS.
Pursuant to these provisions. Treasury
regulations state that attorneys, CPAs,
enrolled agents, and (in limited cases)
enrolled actuaries may practice before
the IRS. 31 C.F.R. §10.3 (Treasury
Department Circular 230). Circular 230
states that "practice" before the IRS
comprehends all matters connected with
a presentation" to the IRS "relating toa
client's rights, privileges, or liabilities"
under federal tax laws, including "preparing and filing necessary documents.

corresponding and communicating with
the Internal Revenue Service, and representing a client a conferences. hearings,
and meetings." 31 C.F.R. §10.2(e).
On the other hand, Circular 230
expressly states that "nothing in the regulations in this part shall be construed as
authorizing persons not members of the
bar to practice law."
Although the boundaries of the practice of law are notoriously difficult to
delineate, the ABA Commission on

Mulidisciplinary Practice has proposed
to define item by presumptively includ-

ing in legal practice "Preparing any legal
SEEPVg.IE0, PAGES26

PUVUM FROM PAGE524
docurrnL'" "prepang or expressing any
legal opinion." and -preparing any
claims, demands or pleadings of any
kind. or any written documents containing legal argument or interpretation of
law. for filing in any court. adminisalive agency or other mbunal." The MDP
Commission also suggests defining
'legal
services- as "'services which. if
provided by a lawyer engaged in the
practice of law would be regarded as
part of such pracuce of law" forpurposes
of the disciplinary rule..
Arguably. theretore. Circular 230 is
self-contradictory. At the same ume it
disclaims that it authorizes nonlawvers to
engage in thepractice of law, it identifies
as part of 'pracuce before theIRS" many
activities thatwould undoubtedly consicute the pracuce of law if pertormed by a
lawyer. Acts that would constitute the
practice of law if done by a lawyer in a
legal setting cannot logically cease to be
the practice of law simply because they
are done by nonlawyers in different settings.
In a similar situation, the Supreme
Court found that federal authorizaon to
practice before the Patent Office permutted acuvities by nonlawyer patent agents
that certainly consuituted the practice of
law in Florida. Sperry v.Florida. 373
U.S. 379 (1963). Among the specific
activities the Court found tobe perosuned
were "rendering legal opinions." "preparing, drafting, and construng legal documents." and "otherwise engaging in the
practice of law." At the same ume. the
Court somewhat confusingly found that
registration with the Patent Office did not
authorize "the general practice of patent
law." but only those services that were
reasonably necessary and incident to
preparing and prosecuting patent applicaUiOns.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Should the disclaimer regarding the
practice of law in Circular 230 be given
effect? If so. it could be argued that the
new statutory privilege applies to no
communications whatsoever. for it would
then apply only to a nonlawyer's communications related to legal advice, i.e.,
advice rendered in the practice of law.
which Circular 230 does not authorize.
This might be what Judge Posner was
hinting at in Frederick- Of course, this
interpretation would leave Congress'
effort to create a tax adviser privilege an
empty set. devoid of legal effecL Given
Congress' penchant for symbolic acts.
that may well be accurae, but it is not an
interpretation likely to be favored by the

courts.
It seems more likely that controversies
over the scope of the new statutoy privilege will force the conclusion that tax
advisory services by FATh do constitute
the practice of law if they would otherwise be the practice of law when per.
formed by a lawyer. This may even be
the better interpretaion. Notwithstanding
Circular 230's disclaimer, it and the
statutory provisions itinterprets clearly
authorize some activities by FATPs that
would constitute "legal services" or the
practice of law under the MDP
Commission's proposed definition. At
the very least, they authorize activities
such as appearing before the IRS to seek
a private letter ruling for a client,
responding to an IRS summons or examination request. and appealing a proposed adjustment.
Under the Sperry analysis. legal opin.
ions and advice concerning tax issues.
research and preparation for such items,
and perhaps even the stuucturing of transactions, may be considered to be parts of
the practice of law that are now federally
authortized for nonlawyem. Communications may therefore be privileged to the

extent they relate to such manes.
As long as its own disclaimer is
ignored, Circular 230 can be rad to supoort this interuretation. For instance.

even though one need not be an authorized "practitioner' to prepare tax
returns. Circular J0 eStablishes ethical
standards governing the positions that
authorized practitioners can take on a
return or advise a client to take.
Likewise. Circular 230 provides standards for opiioss on certain kinds of tax
shelter transactions. From these facts. it
may be argued that FATPs are authorized
to offer legal advice as to return positions
and opinions on iansaciton: otherwise.
how could Treasury regulate such activities?
Taking the position even furthe. onr
might even argue that "tax advice" is
broader than advice directly related to an
actual presentation to the IRS. on the
grounds that "tax advice" is defined as
-advice given by an individual with
respect to a matter which is within the
scope of the individual's authority to
practice." Thus. if a matter eventually
ends up before the IRS. any communications relatng to the matwr may arguably
be considered within the scope of pnvieged tax advice.
Courts are likely to come out somewhere between these extremes. Circular
230 can probably best be harmonized
with the prohibition against unauthorized
practice of law simply by adopting a narrow interpretation of the scope of the
federal authority to practice before the
IRS. A restictive interpretation of such

Tax advisers
may be forced
to admit that
they practice
law, albeit
with federal

authority.
authorized tax practice in the privilege
context would also be consistent with the
habit of courts to constle privileges narrowly, since they are impediments to the
determination of the truth. One ironic
consequence, however, may be that. in an
effort to keep the playing field between
lawyers and accountants level, the courts
will begin adopting a narrow view of
what constitutes legal services provided
to taxpayers by lawyers. The end result
may be a loss of taxpayer confidentiality.
not a gain.
Multidisciplinary practices in the tax
area have so far dodged accusations that
they are engaged in the practice of law.
The new privilege provision may focus
this controversy and force such practitioners to acknowledge that they are
practicing law. albeit with federal authority. Otherwise. the definitional problem
highlighted by Judge Posner in Frederick
could lead to the conclusion that tax
practitioners do not enjoy any privilege.
It may come as a surprise to some
state bar associations to letrn that nonlawyers claim federal authority to perform broad categories of work that are
squly within the traditional definition
of legal services, and that Congress has
implicitly endorsed these practices. At
least in the practice of taxation, that day
appears to be upon us.
5
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LEGAL AFFAIRS

Should law firms be taking equity stakes in their clients?

EVERYONE

the Internet pie. Silicon Valley landlords wants
are demanding
a piece of
stock from high-tech startups
that want to lease office space.
And if there are equal bids on a home in
the Bay Area, some sellers want to know
if the prospective owners have stock they
can throw in to sweeten the deaL
No surprise, then, that the San Francisco legal newspaper The Recorder reports that 1999 was a very good year for
technology-focused Silicon Valley law
firms. Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati, for example, held stock in 34
newly public clients worth a total of
sz3o million by year-end. If the firm distributed that sum among its 12o partners,
it would come to si.9 million apiece.
Wilson Sonsini has been a longtime investor in its client companies, going
back to Rolm and Activision in the mid'8os. More recent investments include
Bamboo.com, Brocade Communications,
E-Loan, Juniper Networks, and VA
Linux Systems; Wilson Sonsini holds
more than ioo,ooo shares in each, as well
as more than 2 million shares in Webvan.
Cooley Godward is another law

firm that has a history of investing in
clients, starting with the io8,ooo shares it
held in Amgen before the biotech superstar went public in z986 (Nasdaq:

AMGN). More recently, Cooley took
stakes of more than z8,ooo shares in
Caliper Technologies and over 13,000 in
Tularik. Other top Silicon Valley law
firms haven't done too
badly either (see "Rainmakers," below).
According to The
Recorder, Silicon Valley
firms had 173 clients go

'Nobodyhas
a problem as
long as everyone
makes a profit.'

public in z999 and held

shares or stock options
in 99 of them. A venture capitalist told
Red Herring that one firm refused to do
legal work for his startups unless it was
granted an equity stake of at least ioo,ooo
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shares per company. An American Bat
Association analysis of Securities Exchange Commission records showed
that one in three of the lawyers representing more than 500
companies that went
public in 1999 held stock
in those clients at the
time of the offering.
And those figures don't
even include the stakes

that law firms may have
in clients that have been acquired or investments in nonclient companies and
venture capital funds.
The Venture Law Group, a combination law firm, consultancy, and venture
capital fund, has purposely structured its
business model to earn more in investment returns than in fee revenues; it actively encourages partners to take a personal stake in client companies. VLG's
clients include HealthCentral, Preview
Systems, eToys, Chemdex, and Yahoo.
All of the attorneys participate in the
fruits of the firm's investment program
and divide it equally; like most top employees in Silicon Valley, the bulk of their
compensation comes in equity, not salary.
While no hard-line rule prohibits
lawyers from taking equity investment
in clients, in the minds of some longtime

law practitioners, the situation inevitably creates potential conflicts of interest. "Nobody has a problem as long as
everyone makes a profit," Ronald
Mallen, a San Francisco lawyer who
counsels law firms on ethics and malpractice issues, told the ABA Journal.
"It's when the market turns down that
the problems arise. That is where the exposure is. You not only have the opportunity to become a multimillionaire, you
can get sued."
One possible area for conflict is a
law firm's handling of an IPO registration statement, which requires adequate
investigation of a company in which the
firm may have an equity stake. The firm
might be insufficiently thorough in its
due diligenre if it is also a direct investor
in the company. Another scenario: suppose companies A and B, both clients of
the same firm, come into conflict, but the
firm has an equity stake only in A. In this
case, a plaintiff might question the firm's
objectivity about a company in which it
holds stock.
Big accounting firms have recently
been called to account for a similar issue:
taking equity stakes in companies they
audit. The SEC released a report in January saying that more than 5o percent of
partners at PricewaterhouseCoopers had
violated rules prohibiting them from
holding personal investments in companies audited by the firm. The concern is
that service professionals are ceasing to be
independent analysts and becoming advocates of their own equity investments.
Most big law firms have enacted
mechanisms to insulate themselves from
liability and potential lawsuits. Wilson
Sonsini, Cooley Godward, and VLG all
use outside investment groups to manage their investments. The hope is that
by having a third party handle the details, the attorneys appear to have their
fingers less directly in the pie. Sullivan &
Cromwell, a New York-based law firm
second only to Wilson Sonsini in the
amount of IPO money it handled last
year, does not invest in its clients at all.
Other law firms simply try to limit their
investments. "Most of our equity investments in clients are limited to $30,000,"
says Craig Johnson, chairman of VLG.
"Admittedly, that can be worth millions
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of dollars post-IPO in today's market."
This is certainly enough to impress a
jury in a conflict-of-interest case. VLG
also brings in other counsel to work on
the IPO prospectuses of companies in
which it has a stake. The truth is, there
have not been many lawsuits over poten-

tial equity-conflict situations and, as a result, most firms aren't concerned that
such suits will crop up in the future.
"We have no choice but to
make this part of our business
model," says Mr. Johnson.
"The volume of business is

just getting higher. There arc entrepreneurs camping out in our lobby all the time
hoping we'll take them on, yet I personally
can only take on five new deals a year. I feel
as if I'm on my porch hanging on for dear
life in the midst of a hurricane."
The hurricane is unlikely to blow
over anytime soon. And if law firms aren't
careful, a conflict-of-interest storm might
be hard on its heels.
-Michael Perkins

NETWORKING

Female entrepreneurs get a leg up.

DESPITE

events like Carly Fiorina's
appointment as HewlettPackard's CEO, the pronews-making
portion of men
to women
on Silicon Valley startup boards still resembles Amazon.com's price/earnings
ratio. But that may be changing. According to the National Foundation for
Women Business Owners, women currently own or lead 5o percent of all U.S.
businesses, and in the top 5o U.S. metropolitan areas, women-owned businesses
are growing faster than the overall economy. However, last year only 5 percent of
the $30 billion's worth of venture capital
went to women-headed startups. To
speed their access to capital and informal
resources like mentoring, job opportunities, and networking, several organizations catering to women entrepreneurs
have emerged.

"Women aren't exposed to the right
network of people," says Kay Koplovitz,
who chairs the National Women's Business Council. In late January, together
with the Forum for Women Entrepreneurs, the council sponsored a venture
capital fotum for women entrepreneurs,
Springboard zooo. "The roots of the networking process in Silicon Valley came
out of the semiconductor business. Although there have been women engineers, they weren't in managerial roles
and were left out of the cycle."
Mary Choy, the point woman for
the San Francisco chapter of Women on
the Web (WOW), agrees that a de facto
old boys' network still exists. "Women
haven't had the same opportunity as
men to create a network over the years,"
she says. WOW's z,ooo-member community offers workshops on all facets of
technology, from programming and site
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ETHICS

The Ethical Question
Behind Referral Fees
{

LAWYERS HOLD A UNIQUE POSITION of trust, and
our clients instinctively rely on our objectivity when
we assist them with their estate
planning and help them select the
estate planning team. That unique
attribute of objectivity provides
additional ,alue to our legal skill,
helps build a loyal client base
and sets us apart from the sales
people. This article discusses the
decision making process of referral
fees - right or wrong?

ay 2 lawyer
the representation.'
accept a cornThe
Commentaries
mission or refurther
provide that
ferral fee from a
'The
receipt
by
non-lawyer, such as
the lawyer of such
a life insurance agent,
a payment involves
in connection with
a conflict of inthe representation of
terest with respect to
a client?
the client. It is imThe American Bar
proper for a lawyer,
Association's Model Rules of
to obtain if he or she were ever
who is subject to the strict
Professional Conduct do not
to consider accepting and retainobligations of a fiduciary,
specifically prohibit the lawyer's
ing such payments.
to benefit personally from such
acceptance of rebates, discounts,
Although not within the scope
a representation."
referral fees and commissions
of this column, the lawyer should
The American Bar Association
from non-lawyers. However,
also be certain the sharing of the
agrees. In its Formal Opinion
a lawyer's acceptance of such
compensation by the non-lawyer
93-379 (1993), the ABA Ethics
payments, when combined with
is lawful.
Committee opined that the
the fee received from a client,
The Commentaries on the
benefit of any discount accorded
could result in a fee deemed
Model Rules of Professional Conto a lawyer by a third-party
to be unreasonable pursuant
duct, developed by The American - provider must be passed along
to
to Rule 1.5. It is also probable
College of Trust and Estate
the client.
that the lawyer's objectivity
Counsel, make it clear that
No opinions directly on
while representing the client
ACTEC believes Rules 1.5 and 1.7
point have been issued by
would be materially affected
prohibit a lawyer from accepting
any state ethics committees, but
by the prospect of receiving
a rebate, discount, commission
ethics opinions recently issued
such payments thus giving rise
or referral fee from a non-lawyer.
in Pennsylvania and New York
to a conflict of interest imThe ACTEC Commentaries say
provide guidance. The Pennsylvaplicating Rule 1.7(b). Finally,
'even with full disclosure to
nia Bar Association's Committee
the lawyer may be deemed
and consent by the client, such
on Legal Ethics and Proto have a pecuniary interest
an arrangement involves too
fessional Responsibility has issued
adverse to the client or to have
great a risk of over-reaching
two pertinent written opinions.
received compensation from
by the lawyer and the potential
In Opinions' 98-12 and 95-78,
a person other than the client
for actual or apparent abuse,
the Committee representatives
that interferes with the lawyer's
The client is generally entitled
advised that a lawyer's receipt of
independence of professional
to the benefit of any ecoa portion of an investment advijudgment implicating
Rules
nomies that are achieved by
sor's annual management fee and
1.8(a) and 1.8(0. These concerns
the lawyer in connection with
a real estate broker's commission,
would exist even if the
might be permissible. The
client were to consent
By
Paul C. Heintz
opinions caution that the
to the financial arrangeObermayerRebmannMaxveg&Hppel LLP
lawyer first must conclude
ment which consent the
Pbiladpbhiz PA
that
his
or
lawyer would be required
her loyalty and judgment
'
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would not be compromised, otherwise implicating Rule 1.7(b),
and that the client must also consent to the arrangement after consultation. Indeed, it is difficult
to conceive of a 'kick back"
arrangement -that would not
compromise a lawyer's loyalty
and judgment.
The issue of referral fees is
not new to Pennsylvania lawyers.
For many years it was the
practice of title insurance
companies to pay a 'commission'
to lawyers or realtors who
referred such business to the tide
company. The lawyers' general
practice in those days, however,
was to remit the commission to
the client either in the form of a
credit on the lawyer's statement
or on the real estate settlement
sheet. Thus the long term professional practice in Pennsylvania
seems to comport with what
the Rules suggest should be
the lawyer's course of action
when he or she has an opportunity to accept commissions
from non-lawyers.
Opinion 711 issued earlier
this year by the New York State
Bar Association's Committee on
Professional Ethics, is also
instructive. It relates to a lawyers'
actual sale of long term care
insurance policy to a client.
The Committee opined'
'A
lawyer may not sell long term
care insurance to the lawyer's
own clients if the representation
relates to estate planning or other
matters or areas of practice that
might reasonably cause the
lawyer's professional judgment
on behalf of the client to be affected by the lawyer's own financial or business interests.'
The Committee went on to
say that where the lawyer is
in a position to receive personal
gain by recommending a service
or product where that service or
product is central to the estate
planning service, and not tangential to it, the lawyer is 'categorically forbidden' from receiving
the benefits of the sale of such
services or products to those
whom the lawyer represents
in the course of estate planning and 'this conflict cannot

___

A
lawyer
mayterm
not
sell long
care insuranceto the
lawyer's own clients
if the representation
relates to estate
planning or other
matters or areas of
practice that might
reasonably cause the
lawyer'sprofessional
judgment on behalf
of the client to be
affected by the lawyer's
own financialor
business interests.
0>
be cured by disclosure and
client consent.'
Refraining from accepting
inducements from those on

the estate planning team assures
us that we will remain objective
while helping our clients assemble that team and that we will
continue to serve as the actual
quarterback of that team. it seems
highly inappropriate both to
serve up to the sales people surrounding us those who repose so
much trust in us and to sacrifice
our ability to properly select the

estate planning team and the ability to quarterback it.
Most significant of all, we
should do nothing to imperil the
bedrock on which our profession
is based - total loyalty to the
client and independence of professional judgment while representing that client.
We estate planning lawyers

have
been
blessedly
removed from the debate currently
raging within the accounting
profession between those who
wish to remain traditional feeonly accountants and those who
wish to "sell product, or at least
participate in commissions. That
battleground is not pretty. +
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IST CASE of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm)
HOUSE OF LORDS
(1999] 1 All ER 517,
HEARING-DATES:

9, 10, 11,

[1999] 2 WLR 215

12, 18 November, 18 December 1998

18 December 1998

CATCHWORDS:
Accountant - Duty - Conflict of interest - Duty of confidentiality to client
- Former client - Accountant providing litigation support services - Accountants

instructed to act on behalf of client in investigation adverse to former client
- Accountants possessing confidential information relating to former client Information relevant to investigation - Accountants erecting Chinese walls
around inVestigation - Former client seeking injunction to prevent accountants
from acting in investigation - Whether injunction should be granted - Principles
to be applied.
HEADNOTE:
The defendant firm of accountants were employed as auditors of the core
assets of the investment agency (the BIA) established to hold and manage the
general reserve fund of the Government of Brunei and its external assets and to
provide the government with money management services. The plaintiff had been
the chairman of the BIA until his removal in 1998. For a period of 18 months
between 1996 and 1998 the plaintiff, acting in his personal capacity, retained
the defendants to act for him or one of his companies in private litigation in
which he was then engaged. In the course of acting for the plaintiff in that
litigation the defendant firm provided extensive litigation support services of
the sort usually undertaken by solicitors. In so doing the defendants were
entrusted with or acquired extensive confidential information about the
plaintiff's assets and financial affairs. The defendant firm employed 168
personnel on the plaintiff's litigation, which was settled in March 1998 and
were paid approximately L476m for that work. The plaintiff was subsequently
dismissed from his position as chairman of the BIA and in June 1998 the Brunei
government commenced an investigation into the conduct of the affairs of the
BIA, including the destination and present location of money which had been
transferred from the BIA's funds while the plaintiff was the chairman. The
government wished to retain the defendant firm to assist the investigation. The
defendants took the view that they could accept the instructions because they
had ceased to act for the plaintiff more than two months previously and he was
no longer a client but, .aware of the possibility of a conflict of interest
because the investigation was likely to be adverse to the plaintiff's interests
and they possessed confidential information relating to his financial affairs,
the firm erected an information barrier (a so-called Chinese wall) around the
department carrying out the BIA investigation on behalf of the Brunei
government. The plaintiff, who had not been informed by the defendants of their
instructions nor had his consent been sought, was granted an injunction to
restrain the defendants from continuing to work on the investigation. The
defendants successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, which discharged the
injunction on the grounds that the defendants were only obliged to make
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reasonable efforts to protect the plaintiff's confidential information and that,
balancing the competing interests, the precautions taken by the defendants meant
that there was no real or appreciable risk that the confidential information
(] (]would be disclosed. The plaintiff appealed to the House of Lords.
Held - Like a solicitor, an accountant providing litigation support services
owed a continuing professional duty to a former client following the termination.
of the client relationship to preserve the confidentiality of information
imparted during the subsistence of that relationship. That duty was unqualified
and required the accountant to keep the information confidential, not merely to
take all reasonable steps to do so, and also not to misuse it.
Where,
therefore, a former client established that the defendant firm was in possession
of information which had been imparted in confidence, that he had not consented
to its disclosure, and that the firm was proposing to act for another client
with an interest adverse to his in a matter to which the information was or
might be relevant, the court would intervene to restrain the firm from acting
for that other client, unless the firm satisfied it, on the basis of clear and
convincing evidence, that effective measures had been taken to ensure that no
disclosuri would occur and that there was no risk of the information coming into
the possession of those acting for the other client. Although there was no rule
of law that Chinese walls or other arrangements of a similar kind were
insufficient to eliminate the risk, the presumption was that, unless special
measures were taken, information moved within a firm and, to be effective, those
measures had to be an established part of the organisational structure of the
firm, not created ad hoc. In the instant case, on the evidence, the defendant
firm had not discharged the heavy burden of showing that there was no risk that
information in their possession which was confidential to the plaintiff and
which they had obtained in the course of a former client relationship with him
might unwittingly or inadvertently come into the notice of those working for the
BIA. Accordingly the appeal would be allowed.
Re a firm of solicitors

[1995]

3 All ER 482 approved.

Rakusen v Ellis Munday & Clarke (1911-13] All ER Rep 813 overruled.
NOTES:
For an accountant's duty of confidence, see 8(1) Halsbury's Laws
reissue) para 458.

(4th edn
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INTRODUCTION:
His Royal Highness Prince Jefri Bolkiah appealed with leave of the Appeal
Committee of the House of Lords given on 29 October 1998 from the decision of
the Court of Appeal (Lord Woolf MR and Otton LJ; Waller LJ dissenting) delivered
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on 19 October 1998 allowing the appeal of the respondents, KPMG (a firm), from
the order made by Pumfrey J on 15 September 1998 granting the appellant an
iijunction restraining the respondents from continuing to carry out certain work
for the Brunei Investment Agency (the BIA) under instructions from the BIA to
[] []assist in establishing the extent of the withdrawal of funds by special
transfer
from the BIA, the use made of the withdrawn funds, the assets acquired with
them, the present location of such assets, and the identity of the persons or
entities now controlling them, and to work with the BIA's legal advisers in
obtaining evidence and where appropriate to trace, secure and recover assets
belonging to the BIA both in Brunei and overseas. The facts are set out in the
opinion of Lord Millett.
COUNSEL:
Gordon Pollock QC, Richard Meade and James Collins for Prince Jefri; David
Donaldson QC, Ali Malek QC and David Quest for KPMG.
JUDGMENT-READ:
Their Lordships took time for consideration; 18 November 1998. The House of
Lords gave judgment allowing the appeal for reasons to be given later. 18
December 1998. The following opinions were delivered.
PANEL: LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON, LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD, LORD CLYDE, LORD HUTTON
AND LORD MILLETT
JUDGMENTBY-I: LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON
JUDGMENT-1:
LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON. My Lords, shortly after the conclusion of the
argument in this case we gave judgment allowing the appeal and granting an
injunction, saying that we would give our reasons at a later date.
I have had
the advantage of reading in draft the speech to be given by my noble and learned
friend Lord Millett. It fully sets out the reasons which led me to allow the
appeal and grant the injunction.
JUDGMENTBY-2: LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD
JUDGMENT-2:
LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in
draft the speech which has been prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord
Millett. For the reasons which he has given, with which I agree, I also was in
favour of allowing the appeal and granting the injunction.
I consider that the nature of the work which a firm of accountants undertakes
in the provision of litigation support services requires the court to exercise
the same jurisdiction to intervene on behalf of a former client of the firm as
it exercises in the case of a solicitor. The basis of that jurisdiction is to
be found in the principles which apply to all forms of employment where the
relationship between the client and the person with whom he does business is a
confidential one. A solicitor is under a duty not to communicate to others any
information in his possession which is confidential to the former client.
But
the duty extends well beyond that of refraining from deliberate disclosure.
It
-s the solicitor's duty to ensure that the former client is not put at risk that
confidential information which the solicitor has obtained from that relationship
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may be used against him in any circumstances.
Particular care is needed if the solicitor agrees to act for a new client who
has, or who may have, an interest which is in conflict with that of the former
client. In that situation the former client is entitled to the protection of
the court if he can show that his solicitor was in receipt of confidential
H [Jinformation which is relevant to a matter for which the solicitor is acting,
against the former client's interest, for a new client. He is entitled to
insist that measures be taken by the solicitor which will ensure that he is not
exposed to the risk of careless, inadvertent or negligent disclosure of the
information to the new client by the
solicitor, his partners in the firm, its employees or anyone else for whose
acts the solicitor is responsible.
As for the circumstances in which the court will intervene by granting an
injunction, it will not intervene if it is satisfied that there is no risk of
disclosure. But if it is not so satisfied, it should bear in mind that the
choice as to whether to accept instructions from the new client rests with the
solicitor and that disclosure may result in substantial damage to the former
client for which he may find it impossible to obtain adequate redress from the
solicitor. It may be very difficult, after the event, to prove how and when the
information got out, by whom and to whom it was communicated and with what
consequences. In that situation everything is likely to depend on the measures
which are in place to ensure that there is no risk that the information will be
disclosed. If the court is not satisfied that the measures will protect the
former client against the risk, the proper course will be for it to grant an
injunction.
As my noble and learned friend has shown in his careful analysis of the facts
in this case, KPMG have been unable to demonstrate that they can provide the
protection to which Prince Jefri is entitled in order to ensure that there is no
risk that confidential information which they have acquired from him will be
disclosed to those engaged on Project Gemma. The terms of the injunction are
designed to protect him against that risk, while enabling KPMG to continue to
provide services to BIA as its auditors.
JUDGMENTBY-3:

LORD CLYDE

JUDGMENT-3:
LORD CLYDE.
My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the
speech prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord Millett. The reasons which
he fully sets out are those which led me to allow the appeal and grant the
injunction.
JUDGMENTBY-4: LORD HUTTON
JUDGMENT-4:
LORD HUTTON. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the
speech prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord Millett. The reasons which
he fully sets out are those which led me to allow the appeal and grant the
injunction.
JUDGMENTBY-5: LORD MILLETT
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JUDGMENT-5:
LORD MILLETT. My Lords, the question in this appeal is whether, and if so in
what circumstances, a firm of accountants which has provided litigation support
services to a former client and in consequence has in its possession information
which is confidential to him can undertake work for another client with an
adverse interest. The question has become of increased importance with the
(][]emergence of huge international firms with enormous resources that operate
on a
global scale and offer a comprehensive range of services to clients.
Some time after the conclusion of the argument your Lordships gave their
unanimous opinion that the appeal should be allowed and stated that they would
give their reasons later. I now give my reasons for allowing the appeal.
The facts
Your Lordships have been supplied with an agreed statement of facts.
It is
the principal though not the only source from which the following summary is
derived.
The respondents (KPMG) are a large and well-known English firm of chartered
accountants with associated but separate firms around the world. Their London
office employs almost 5,000 staff and has at least 350 partners working from
different offices. The staff of the forensic accounting department alone
numbers more than 100. RPMG are the auditors to between 20 and 25 of all
listed companies in the United Kingdom. They are one of the five largest firms
of accountants not merely in this country but in the world.
Ever since the Brunei Investment Agency (the BIA) was established in 1983
KPMG have undertaken the annual audit of its core funds. The BIA was formed to
hold and manage the General Reserve Fund of the government of Brunei and its
external assets and to provide the government with money management services.
The exact size of its core funds is secret but they are valued in many billions
of dollars. In the last three years, KPMG have undertaken over 6,000 hours per
year of chargeable time on the audit. The engagement partner responsible for
the audit work was Mr Peter Harrison. The affairs of the BIA are secret and
under its governing Act unauthorised disclosure is a criminal offence. The BIA
did not authorise the disclosure in these proceedings of the details of KPMG's
relationship with it until after the hearing at first instance, amd this has
caused KPMG difficulties in the presentation of their case which have led to
adverse criticism of their apparent lack of candour. In addition to their audit
work, KPMG also carried out associated advisory and consultancy work for the
DIA. On average, about 4,000 hours a year of chargeable time is spent on this
work. A long and close working relationship between the BIA and KPMG has
resulted.
The appellant (Prince Jefri) is the third and youngest brother of the Sultan
of Brunei. Until March 1998 he enjoyed a very close relationship with the
Sultan. He is a former minister of finance and was for many years the chairman
of the BIA. He is, however, no longer in favour. He has recently been removed
from his position as chairman of the BIA, and partners of Arthur Andersen have
taken control of his companies as executive managers under powers conferred by
emergency decrees.
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Over the years numerous large transfers of capital (the special transfers)
were made out of the core funds. The destination and use of these transfers did
not form part of KPMG's audit. KPMG were required to accept an annual
representation from the board of the BIA (of which Prince Jefri was chairman)
1
that the transfers were made on behalf of or for the benefit of the Brunei
government and accordingly carried out no further investigation of them.
U(1
Over a period of 18 months between 1996 and 1998 KPMG were also retained by
one of Prince Jefri's companies on his behalf and at his request to undertake a
substantial investigation in connection with major litigation (the Manoukian
litigation) in which he was personally involved. The investigation, which was
given the code name Project Lucy, was mainly conducted by KPMG's London forensic
accounting department, though their taxation department was also involved. The
engagement partner on Project Lucy was Mr Adam Bates.
Project Lucy involved the forensic accounting department in the provision of
extensive litigation support services in the course of which they performed
tasks usually undertaken by solicitors. They investigated the facts,
interviewed witnesses with or without solicitors being present, searched for
documents, took part -in conferences, including telephone conferences, with
counsel and in the absence of solicitors, drafted subpoenas, reviewed draft
pleadings and prepared ideas for cross-examination. They took instructions and
obtained information directly from Prince Jefri's own staff without the
intervention of solicitors.
In the course of Project Lucy, as well as a number of other personal
assignments which they undertook for Prince Jefri, KPMG were entrusted with or
acquired extensive confidential information concerning Prince Jefri's assets and
financial affairs. In particular they became privy to a substantial volume of
information concerning the identity of his assets, their location, the legal
structure of their ownership, the identity and structure of corporate and other
vehicles used by Prince Jefri to hold assets, and the manner and financing of
their purchase. Altogether some 168 KPMG personnel, i2 of whom were partners
and 81 of whom were assistant managers or above, worked on assignments for
Prince Jefri between 1996 and 1998.
KPMG were paid approximately L476m for
their work.
Project Lucy was subject to a degree of security, but the effectiveness of
the steps taken by KPMG to keep the work confidential is disputed.' After
January 1997 Project Lucy was accorded a separate area within the forensic
accounting department, and after July 1997 it was housed in rooms on a separate
floor with restricted access. Team members were forbidden to take work home to
avoid the risk of papers being stolen or mislaid. In briefings Mr Bates
stressed to members of the team.that Project Lucy was exceptionally confidential
and should not be discussed outside the team.
The Manoukian litigation was settled in March 1998, and thereafter no further
work was undertaken on Project Lucy. KPMG were formally instructed to
discontinue the project on 14 May 1998.
Following the settlement of the
litigation the Inland Revenue served notices under s 20B(1) of the Taxes
Management Act 1970 on KPMG in respect of information in their possession
relating to the Manoukians. All documents in the possession of KPMG's tax
department were gathered together and delivered to their solicitors in March
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Thereafter KPMG were involved in only two relatively minor assignments on
1998.
behalf of Prince Jefri, and work on these had also ceased by the middle of May
1998.
In June 1998 the government of Brunei appointed a finance task force to
conduct an investigation into the activities of the BIA. On 16 June 1998 mr
Harrison was summoned by the Ministry of Finance to Brunei where he attended a
meeting with the task force. He had been requested to co-operate with the task
force, and he explained the nature of his firm's audit of the core funds and
[] []what little KPMG as auditors knew of the special transfers. He was asked to
assist the task force in establishing the position of the core funds as at 31
May 1998 and to prepare a summary of movements on the core funds since the
establishment of the BIA in 1983. These movements included the special
transfers. All the information, necessary to perform this task was capable of
being extracted from the audited accounts and the auditors' working papers. The
work was carried out by members of the audit team and was covered by an
KPMG
engagement letter negotiated by KPMG and eventually dated 2 July 1998.
plainly
are
KPMG
1998.
8
July
on
project
this
on
force
task
the
to
reported
correct ii maintaining that the work thus far was a natural extension of their
audit function.
In the meantime, however, Mr John Ellison, a partner in the forensic
accounting department, was approached on 2 July on behalf of the BIA and asked
whether KPMG would be able to assist the task force in carrying out further
investigations into the destination and the present location of the money which
had been the subject of the special transfers. On 3 July 1998 Mr Ellison, Mr
Harrison and another partner Mr Michael Fowle met to consider whether KPMG could
properly accept these instructions. The meeting was attended by KPMG's
solicitors. Mr Ellison had spoken by telephone to Mr Bates beforehand and
discussed the matter with him. The view was taken that there was no conflict of
interest as KPMG had ceased to act for Prince Jefri more than two months
previously and there was no longer a client relationship with him. It was
concluded that the BIA's instructions could properly be accepted, but that it
would be necessary to establish special arrangements to provide additional
protection against the use or disclosure of confidential information relating to
Prince Jefri which was still in KPMG's possession.
On 8 July 1998 the BIA formally instructed KPMG to provide assistance in
connection with the investigation of the withdrawal of assets from the BIA by
It was at about this time that it became clear
means of the special transfers.
that the assignment was at least in part adverse to Prince Jefri's interests.
This
The work was covered by an engagement letter dated 13 August 1998.
required KPMG to assist in establishing the extent of the withdrawal of funds,
the use made of the withdrawn funds, the assets acquired with them, the present
location of such assets, and the identity of the persons or entities now
controlling them. KPMG were instructed to work with the BIA's legal advisers in
obtaining evidence and where appropriate to trace, secure and recover assets
belonging to the BIA both in Brunei and overseas.
This further assignment was given the code name Project Gemma and Mr Harrison
was appointed as the lead partner. He had never been in receipt of any
confidential information relating to Prince Jefri's business, financial or
personal affairs. Although he was to head the project, this was clearly not
simply an extension of the audit; it would involve the tracing and recovery of
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assets and might well lead to civil and even criminal proceedings against Prince
Jefri. It would be undertaken by members of the forensic accounting department
and would be likely to involve them in the provision of litigation support
services. It must have been obvious, and indeed is common ground, that some at
least of the confidential information obtained by or provided to KPMG in the
course of Project Lucy was or might be relevant to Project Gemma. It must also
have been obvious, and again is common ground, that in relation to Project Gemma
the interests of the BIA were adverse to those of Prince Jefri. KPMG did not
inform Prince Jefri of their new assignment, nor did they seek his consent to
their acceptance of the project.

1 []
KPMG employed some 50 people on Project Gemma, 11 of whom had previously been
engaged on work for Prince Jefri. Most of them worked in Brunei but never more
than 15 at a time. KPMG contends that none of the 11 was in possession of
information confidential to Prince Jefri.
Over 7,500 hours were spent on work for the BIA between 18 June and 15
September when Pumfrey J granted an injunction to restrain KPMG from continuing
with work on Project Gemma. A large number of transactions then still remained
to be investigated. KPMG allege that the work which they had already
undertaken, based on information provided to them by the BIA, had already
demonstrated that very substantial sums had been paid to or for the benefit of
Prince Jefri from funds of the BIA and appeared to have been used to acquire
assets for himself or for entities which he controlled.
When KPMG accepted instructions in relation to Project Gemma, Mr Ellison gave
instructions that an information barrier (popularly known as a 'Chinese wall')
should be put in place within the forensic accounting department, and special
arrangements were established from 3 July 1998 to protect the confidentiality of
information in the possession of KPMG which related to Prince Jefri. These
arrangements had two components. First, the selection of staff was intended to
ensure that nobody who was in possession of such information was permitted to
work on Project Gemma. Secondly, steps were taken to avoid the risk of such
information becoming available to those working on Project Gemma in the future.
It was made clear at a meeting on 3 July 1998 that no one who was in possession
of any confidential information deriving from Project Lucy could work on Project
Gemma. Staff were appointed to Project Gemma only after confirming that they
had no material prior involvement with Prince Jefri and were not in.possession
of any information which was confidential to him. Staff who had done work of a
minor administrative nature on Project Lucy were permitted to work on Project
Gemma but only after KPMG had satisfied themselves that they were not in
possession of confidential information relating to Prince Jefri. Most of the
work on Project Gemma was carried out in Brunei. Work in London was done in a
separate project room with restricted access in a building separate from that
which houses the forensic accounting department. Since the services of the
notices by the Inland Revenue the documentary records of Project Lucy had been
in the possession of KPMG's solicitors and were not available to those working
on Project Gemma. Separate computer file servers were used for Project Gemma,
and all electronic information relating to Project Lucy was deleted from KPMG's
servers.
In order to confirm the effectiveness of these arrangements, all Project
Gemma staff were interviewed by KPMG's solicitors about their knowledge of
Project Lucy. All those interviewed confirmed on affidavit that they were not
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in possession of confidential information acquired from Prince Jefri whether in
the course of Project Lucy or otherwise. The solicitors attempted to contact
all the personnel who had worked on Project Lucy or the other projects for
Prince Jefri. 146 persons were contacted and confirmed that they had not
discussed confidential matters outside the team. Twenty three could not be
traced because they were no longer employed by KPMG.
The decisions below
In the course of the hearing before Pumfrey J KPMG offered a voluntary
undertaking not to use or disclose any information about Prince Jefri's affairs
acquired in the course of Project Lucy. KPMG submitted that this was
[][ ]sufficient to protect Prince Jefri's interests and was the only relief to
which
he was entitled.
For its part the BIA acknowledged that it was not entitled to require KPMG to
make use for its benefit of any information which was confidential to Prince
Jefri. It protested that an order which prevented KPMG from continuing to work
on Project Gemma would cause unnecessary disruption to the investigations being
carried on in Brunei. KPMG confirmed its assertion that a replacement could not
readily be found since only a limited number of firms possess the necessary
skills and resources to undertake an investigation of the magnitude required.
The BIA added that it was reluctant to increase the number of people and
organisations in possession of information which was confidential to the BIA.
It expressed particular concern at the prospect that an injunction might prevent
KPMG from completing the audit of the core funds for 1997.
This evidence was challenged by Prince Jefri. It does appear that Arthur
Andersen were already retained to carry out certain work for the government of
Brunei (though not for the BIA), and that following the grant of the injunction
by Pumfrey J the scope of their instructions was extended to include some at
least of the matters covered by Project Gemma.
The judge found that KPMG had taken all the steps which could be expected to
minimise or avoid disclosure of confidential information. He declined to impute
to KPMG and their staff anything other than an honest intention not to disclose
confidential information and said that he was satisfied that they would do their
best to fulfil their obligations. These findings have not been challenged. But
the judge took the view that he was bound by authority to approach'any question
of the adequacy of the protective measures which KPMG had adopted with a very
critical eye. He said that the intrinsic difficulty with Chinese walls was
that, while they were well adapted to deal with foreseeable or deliberate
disclosure of information, they were not well adapted to deal with disclosure
which was accidental, inadvertent or negligent. He was firmly of the view that
a former client should not be exposed to the risk of such disclosure unless
there were powerful reasons for saying that he should. No such reasons existed
in the present case. Accordingly he granted an injunction which restrained KPMG
from continuing to carry out work on or covering the same subject matter as
Project Gemma.
In the Court of Appeal the majority (Lord Woolf MR and Otton LJ) did not
ic-cept, at least in the case of accountants, that there was inevitably a risk of
i.:;closure or that Chinese walls were incapable of removing any real risk.
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Favouring the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Russell
McVeagh McKenzie Bartleet & Co v Tower Corp (25 August 1998, unreported), Lord
Woolf MR (with whose approach Otton LJ agreed) identified three questions for
consideration: (i) whether there was confidential information which if disclosed
was likely to affect Prince Jefri's interests adversely; (ii) whether there was
a 'real or appreciable risk' that the confidential information would be
disclosed; and (iii) whether the nature and importance of the former fiduciary
relationship meant that the confidential information should be protected by an
order of the kind sought. These questions were to be answered on the evidence,
balancing the different interests involved and remembering that the issues would
inevitably overlap. Taking into account the facts that as chairman of the BIA
Prince Jefri was aware when he retained KPMG that they had a long-standing
relationship with the BIA as their auditors and that this would involve them in
providing related accountancy services, and that Prince Jefri would have been
(]0aware that the BIA would be put to inconvenience and expense if his retainer
were to interfere with their use of KPMG's services, Lord Woolf MR considered
that KPMG's duty should be limited to making reasonable efforts to protect
Prince Jefri's confidential information and that it was not reasonable for
Prince Jefri to require KPMG to be dismissed unless he 'really would suffer
serious damage' if they were not. On the evidence Lord Woolf MR was not
satisfied that Prince Jefri would suffer any 'real prejudice' if the injunction
were discharged. When the undertaking which KPMG had offered was also taken
into account, he said, the balance was clear. The continuation of the
injunction would 'set an unrealistic standard for the protection of confidential
information' which would create unjustified impediments in the way large
international firms conduct their business.
The law
The issues raised in these proceedings have not previously been considered by
your Lordships' House. The controlling authority in England hitherto has been
the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rakusen v Ellis Munday & Clarke (1912] 1
Ch 831, (1911-13] All ER Rep 813. The facts of that case were unusual. It
concerned a small firm of solicitors with only two partners who carried on what
amounted to separate practices, each with his own clients, without any knowledge
of the other's clients and with the exclusive services of some of the clerks.
The plaintiff consulted one of the partners in relation to a contentious matter.
After he had terminated his retainer, the other partner, who had never met the
plaintiff and was not aware that he had consulted his partner, was retained by
the party opposite in the same matter. The judge granted an injunction to
restrain the solicitor from acting. The Court of Appeal found that there was no
risk of disclosure of confidential information and discharged the injunction.
The case is authority for two propositions: (i) that there is no absolute
rule of law in England that a solicitor may not act in litigation against a
former client; and (ii) that the solicitor may be restrained from acting if such
a restriction is necessary to avoid a significant risk of the disclosure or
misuse of confidential information belonging to the former client. Like most of
the later authorities, the case was concerned with the duties of a solicitor.
The duties of an accountant cannot be greater than those of a solicitor, and may
be less, for information relating to his client's affairs which is in the
possession of a solicitor is usually privileged as well as confidential. In the
present case, however, some of the information obtained by KPMG is likely to
have attracted litigation privilege, though not solicitor-client privilege, and
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it is conceded by KPMG that an accountant who provides litigation support
services of the kind which they provided to Prince Jefri must be treated for
present purposes in the same way as a solicitor.
The basis of the jurisdiction
In Rakusen's case the Court of Appeal founded the jurisdiction on the right
of the former client to the protection of his confidential information. This
was challenged by counsel for Prince Jefri, who contended for an absolute rule,
such as that adopted in the United States, which precludes a solicitor or his
firm altogether from acting for a client with an interest adverse to that of the
former client in the same or a connected matter. In the course of argument,
however, he modified his position, accepting that there was no ground on which
the court could properly intervene unless two conditions were satisfied: (i)
that the solicitor was in possession of information which was confidential to
[]i]the former client and (ii) that such information was or might be relevant to
the
matter on which he was instructed by the second client. This makes the
possessioh of relevant confidential information the test of what is comprehended
within the expression 'the same or a connected matter'. On this footing the
court's intervention is founded not on the avoidance of any perception of
possible impropriety but on the protection of confidential information.
My Lords, I would affirm this as the basis of the court's jurisdiction to
intervene on behalf of a former client. It is otherwise where the court's
intervention is sought by an existing client, for a fiduciary cannot act at the
same time both for and against the same client, and his firm is in no better
position. A man cannot without the consent of both clients act for one client
while his partner is acting for another in the opposite interest. His
disqualification has nothing to do with the confidentiality of client
information. It is based on the inescapable conflict of interest which is
inherent in the situation.
This is not to say that such consent is not sometimes forthcoming, or that in
some situations it may not be inferred. There is a clear distinction between
the position of a solicitor and an auditor. The large accountancy firms
commonly carry out the audit of clients who are in competition- with one another.
The identity of their audit clients is publicly acknowledged. Their clients are
taken to consent to their auditors acting for competing clients, though they
must of course keep confidential the information obtained from their respective
clients. This was the basis on which the Privy Council decided Kelly v Cooper
[1993] AC 205 in relation to estate agents.
Where the court's intervention is sought by a former client, however, the
position is entirely different. The court's jurisdiction cannot be based on any
conflict of interest, real or perceived, for there is none. The fiduciary
relationship which subsists between solicitor and client comes to an end with
the termination of the retainer. Thereafter the solicitor has no obligation to
defend and advance the interests of his former client. The only duty to the
former client which survives the termination of the client relationship is a
continuing duty to preserve the confidentiality of information imparted during
its subsistence.
Accordingly, it is incumbent on a plaintiff who seeks to restrain his former
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:itor from acting in a matter for another client to establish (i) that the
:itor is in possession of information which is confidential to him and to
.isclosure of which he has not consented and (ii) that the information is or
-e relevant to the new matter in which the interest of the other client is
y be adverse to his own. Although the burden of proof is on the plaintiff,
not a heavy one. The former may readily be inferred; the latter will
be obvious. I do not think that it is necessary to introduce any
mptions, rebuttable or otherwise, in relation to these two matters. But
the basis on which the jurisdiction is exercised, there is no cause to
e or attribute the knowledge of one partner to his fellow partners.
er a particular individual is in possession of confidential information is
stion of fact which must be proved or inferred from the circumstances of
ase. In this respect also we ought not in my opinion to follow the
prudence of the United States.
e extent of the solicitor's duty
ether founded on contract or equity, the duty to preserve confidentiality
qualified. It is a duty to keep the information confidential, not merely
ke all reasonable steps to. do.so. Moreover, it is not merely a duty not to
nicate the information to a third party. It is a duty not to misuse it,
is to say, without the consent of the former client to make any use of it
cause any use to be made of it by others otherwise than for his benefit.
ormer client cannot be protected completely from accidental or inadvertent
osure. But he is entitled to prevent his former solicitor from exposing
o any avoidable risk; and this includes the increased risk of the use of
nformation to his prejudice arising from the acceptance of instructions to
or another client with an adverse interest in a matter to which the
mation is or may be relevant.
gree of risk
follows that in the case of a former client there is no basis for granting
f if there is no risk of the disclosure or misuse of confidential
mation. This was the ground on which the Court of Appeal discharged the
ction in Rakusen v Ellis Munday & Clarke [19121 1 Ch 831, (1911-13] All ER
13. The test for disqualification was expressed in different terms by each
e three members of the court, but the case has been taken to indicate that
ourt will not intervene unless it is satisfied that there is O 'reasonable
bility of real mischief'. This test has been the subject of criticism both
is country and overseas, particularly in relation to solicitors, and a more
gent test has frequently been advocated: see for example Professor Finn
licts of Interest and Professionals' published by the New Zealand Legal
rch Foundation in Professional Responsibility cited with evident approval
mmow J in National Mutual Holdings Pty, Ltd v Sentry Corp (1989) 22 FCR 209.
s been abandoned in Canada: see MacDonald Estate v Martin (1990) 77 DLR
249, where it has been replaced by two rebuttable presumptions: i) that
dential information will have been communicated by the former client in the
e of the retainer and (ii) that lawyers who work together share
dences. The clear trend of the authorities is towards a stricter approach.
Lords, I regard the criticisms which have been made of the test supposed
ve been laid down in Rakusen's case as well founded. It imposes an unfair
:n on the former client, exposes him to a potential and avoidable risk to
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should, without the consent of his former client, accept instructions unless,
viewed objectively, his doing so will not increase the risk that information
which is confidential to the former client may come into the possession of a
party with an adverse interest.
The adequacy of the protective measures taken by KPMG
Once the former client has established that the defendant firm is in
possession of information which was imparted in confidence and that the firm is
proposing to act for another party with an interest adverse to his in a matter
to which the information is or may be relevant, the evidential burden shifts to
the defendant firm to show that even so there is no risk that the information
will come into the possession of those now acting for the other party. There is
no rule of law that Chinese walls or other arrangements of a similar kind are
insufficient to eliminate the risk. But the starting point must be that, unless
special measures are taken, information moves within a firm. In MacDonald
Estate v Martin (1990) 77 DLR (4th) 249 at 269 Sopinka J said that the court
should restrain the firm from acting for the second client 'unless satisfied on
the basis 'of clear and convincing evidence that all reasonable measures have
[][]been taken to ensure that no disclosure will occur'. With the substitution
of
the word 'effective' for the words 'all reasonable' I would respectfully adopt
that formulation.
Application to the facts of the present case
Chinese walls are widely used by financial institutions in the City of London
and elsewhere. They are the favoured technique for managing the conflicts of
interest which arise when financial business is carried on by a conglomerate.
The Core Conduct of Business Rules published by the Financial Services Authority
recognise the effectiveness of Chinese walls as a means of restricting the
movement of information between different departments of the same organisation.
They contemplate the existence of established organisational arrangements which
preclude the passing of information in the possession of one part of the
business to other parts of the business. In their consultation paper on
Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules (Law Com No 124) (1992) the Law Commission
describe Chinese walls as normally involving some combination of the following
organisational arrangements: (i) the physical separation of the various
departments in order to insulate them from each other-this often extends to such
matters of detail as dining arrangements; (ii) an educational programme,
normally recurring, to emphasis the importance of not improperly or
inadvertently divulging confidential information; (iii) strict and carefully
defined procedures for dealing with a situation where it is felt that the wall
should be crossed and the maintaining of proper records where this occurs; (iv)
monitoring by compliance officers of the effectiveness of the wall; (v)
disciplinary sanctions where there has been a breach of the wall.
KPMG insist that, like other large firms of accountants, they are accustomed
to maintaining client confidentiality not just within the firm but also within a
particular team. They stress that it is common for a large firm of accountants
to provide a comprehensive range of professional services including audit,
corporate finance advice, corporate tax advice and management consultancy to
clients with competing commercial interests. Such firms are very experienced in.
the erection and operation of information barriers to protect the confidential
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information of each client, and staff are constantly instructed in the
importance of respecting client confidentiality. This is, KPMG assert, part of
the professional culture in which staff work and becomes second nature to them.
Forensic projects are treated as exceptionally confidential and are usually
given code names. In the present case KPMG engaged different people, different
servers, and ensured that the work was done in a secure office in a different
building. KPMG maintain that these arrangements satisfy the most stringent
test, and that there is no risk that information obtained by KPMG in the course
of Project Lucy has or will become available to anyone engaged on Project Gemma.
I am not persuaded that this is so. Even in the financial services industry,
good practice requires there to be established institutional arrangements
designed to prevent the flow of information between separate departments. Where
effective arrangements are in place, they produce a modern equivalent of the
circumstances which prevailed in Rakusen's case. The Chinese walls which
feature in the present case, however, were established ad hoc and were erected
within a single department. When the number of personnel involved is taken into
account, together with the fact that the teams engaged on Project Lucy and
Project Gemma each had a rotating membership, involving far more personnel than
were working on the project at any one time, so that individuals may have joined
from and returned to other projects, the difficulty of enforcing
0 (3confidentiality or preventing the unwitting disclosure of information is
very
great. It is one thing, for example, to separate the insolvency, audit,
taxation and forensic departments from one another and erect Chinese walls
between them. Such departments often work from different offices and there may
be relatively little movement of personnel between them. But it is quite
another to attempt to place an information barrier between members all of whom
are drawn from the same department and have been accustomed to work with each
other. I would expect this to be particularly difficult where the department
concerned is engaged in the provision of litigation support services, and there
is evidence to confirm this. Forensic accountancy is said to be an area in
which new and unusual problems frequently arise and partners and managers are
accustomed to share information and expertise. Furthermore, there is evidence
that physical segregation is not necessarily adequate, especially where it is
erected within a single department.
In my opinion an effective Chinese wall needs to be an established part of
the organisational structure of the firm, not created ad hoc and dependent on
the acceptance of evidence sworn for the purpose by members of stiff engaged on
the relevant work.
How should the discretion be exercised?
In the course of his submissions before your Lordships, counsel for KPMG
submitted that, whether the special transfers were proper or improper, Prince
Jefri was an accounting party in respect of them, and could not properly refuse
to provide the BIA with the information which it was seeking. This may or may
not be true, for the information which the BIA is seeking to obtain would appear
to go far beyond what a recipient of proper payments would be bound to disclose.
But even if true, it does not follow, as counsel for KPMG submitted, that KPMG
can discharge themselves from their duty of confidentiality to their former
c'ient, acting as judges of the question between him and their present client.
Thc information was imparted to KPMG in confidence, and they are bound to
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maintain that confidence unless and until they are relieved of that duty by
Prince Jefri's consent or an order of the court obtained at the suit of the BIA.
Conclusion
I am not satisfied on the evidence that KPMG have discharged the heavy burden
of showing that there is no risk that information in their possession which is
confidential to Prince Jefri and which they obtained in the course of a former
client relationship may unwittingly or inadvertently come to the notice of those
working on Project Gemma. It was for this reason that I was in favour of
allowing the appeal and granting the injunction in the terms proposed.
DISPOSITION:
Appeal allowed.
SOLICITORS:
Lovell White Durrant; Stephenson Harwood

